verdict creates presumption in Georgia

2025In considering this question, we keep in mind that an excessive verdict is a mistake of fact, that the trial court, “like the jury, saw the witnesses and heard the testimony[,]” and that the trial court’s “approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness which is not to be disturbed absent 1 Southern Clearing argues that the trial court failed to exercise discretion in considering the general grounds, which we address below. 8 compelling evidence.” Rockdale Hosp., 306 Ga. at 851 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024Even if the verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold it and one of which would defeat it, that which would uphold it is to be applied.” Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80-81 (citations and punctuation omitted); 18 Rockdale Hosp. v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 851 (2) (a) ( 834 SE2d 77 ) (2019) (“[T]he trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness which is not to be disturbed absent compelling evidence.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2002The general rule on appeal of an award of damages is that a jury’s award cannot be successfully attacked so as to warrant a new trial unless it is so flagrantly excessive or inadequate, in the light of the evidence, as to create a clear impli *419 cation of bias, prejudice, or gross mistake on the part of the jurors. [Cits.] Even though the evidence is such as to authorize a greater or lesser award than is actually made, the appellate court will not disturb it unless it is so flagrant as to “shock the conscience.” [Cits.] . . . [T]he trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption

2002The general rule on appeal of an award of damages is that a jury’s award cannot be successfully attacked so as to warrant a new trial unless it is so flagrantly excessive or inadequate, in the light of the evidence, as to create a clear impli *419 cation of bias, prejudice, or gross mistake on the part of the jurors. [Cits.] Even though the evidence is such as to authorize a greater or lesser award than is actually made, the appellate court will not disturb it unless it is so flagrant as to “shock the conscience.” [Cits.] . . . [T]he trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption

1996Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. Southern Aggregates Co., 207 Ga. App. 886, 888 (1) ( 429 SE2d 294 ) (1993).

1996Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. Southern Aggregates Co., 207 Ga. App. 886, 888 (1) ( 429 SE2d 294 ) (1993).

2025In fact, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness which is not to be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Moody v. Dykes, 269 14 Ga. 217 , 221-222 (6) ( 496 SE2d 907 ) (1998).

2019However framed, the threshold for an appellate court to set aside a jury verdict approved by the trial court under OCGA § 10 51-12-12 (a) is “extremely high.” Moody, 269 Ga. at 222 (6) (“[T]he trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness which is not to be disturbed absent compelling evidence.”).

2024Even if the verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold it and one of which would defeat it, that which would uphold it is to be applied.” Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80-81 (citations and punctuation omitted); 18 Rockdale Hosp. v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 851 (2) (a) ( 834 SE2d 77 ) (2019) (“[T]he trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness which is not to be disturbed absent compelling evidence.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023Even if the verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold it and one of which would defeat it, that which would uphold it is to be applied.” Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80-81 (citation and punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 51-12-12 (a) (“The question of damages is ordinarily one for the jury; 15 and the court should not interfere with the jury’s verdict unless the damages awarded by the jury are clearly so inadequate or so excessive as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence in the case.”); Rockdale Hosp. v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 851 (2) (a) (

2024Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.”Booker, 278 Ga. App. at 411 (4).

2020Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.22 The Georgia Whistleblower Act permits a prevailing public employee to recover, inter alia: reinstatement to the same position held before the retaliation or to an equivalent position; reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; 22 Booker v. Older Americans Council of Middle Ga., 278 Ga. App. 407, 411 (4) ( 629 SE2d 69 ) (2006) (citations and punctuation omitted). 17 compensation for lost wages, benefits, and other remuneration; and an

1998Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wells v. Roberts, 225 Ga. App. 112, 113 (1) ( 483 SE2d 339 ) (1997).

1998Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wells v. Roberts, 225 Ga. App. 112, 113 (1) ( 483 SE2d 339 ) (1997).

2000(Punctuation omitted.) Consolidated Freightways Corp. &c. v. Futrell, 201 Ga. App. 233, 234 (2) ( 410 SE2d 751 ) (1991).

2000(Punctuation omitted.) Consolidated Freightways Corp. &c. v. Futrell, 201 Ga. App. 233, 234 (2) ( 410 SE2d 751 ) (1991).

2025This Court’s review “is confined to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the motion for new trial on this ground.” Evans, 306 Ga. at 851 (2) (b); accord Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 446 ( 31 SE2d 236 ) (1944) (“The determination of the question, as to whether a verdict for damages is inadequate in the legal sense, lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will be interfered with by the appellate court only in case of a manifest abuse of discretion.”). “[T]he threshold for an appellate court to set aside a jury verdict appr

2025This Court’s review “is confined to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the motion for new trial on this ground.” Evans, 306 Ga. at 851 (2) (b); accord Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 446 ( 31 SE2d 236 ) (1944) (“The determination of the question, as to whether a verdict for damages is inadequate in the legal sense, lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will be interfered with by the appellate court only in case of a manifest abuse of discretion.”). “[T]he threshold for an appellate court to set aside a jury verdict appr

2012A verdict will not be set aside as unsupported by the evidence when the amount of it is within the range covered by the testimony, though it may not correspond with the contentions of either party.7 6 See McReynolds v. Krebs, 307 Ga. App. 330, 333 (1) ( 705 SE2d 214 ) (2010). 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McDavid, 303 Ga. App. at 609 (4). 7 Moreover, “a plaintiff [is prohibited] from a double recovery of damages; the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery and satisfaction of damages, because such recovery and satisfaction is deemed to make the plaintiff whole.”8 (a) Trespass/Nuisan

2012A verdict will not be set aside as unsupported by the evidence when the amount of it is within the range covered by the testimony, though it may not correspond with the contentions of either party.7 6 See McReynolds v. Krebs, 307 Ga. App. 330, 333 (1) ( 705 SE2d 214 ) (2010). 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McDavid, 303 Ga. App. at 609 (4). 7 Moreover, “a plaintiff [is prohibited] from a double recovery of damages; the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery and satisfaction of damages, because such recovery and satisfaction is deemed to make the plaintiff whole.”8 (a) Trespass/Nuisan

2012A verdict will not be set aside as unsupported by the evidence when the amount of it is within the range covered by the testimony, though it may not correspond with the contentions of either party.7 6 See McReynolds v. Krebs, 307 Ga. App. 330, 333 (1) ( 705 SE2d 214 ) (2010). 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McDavid, 303 Ga. App. at 609 (4). 7 Moreover, “a plaintiff [is prohibited] from a double recovery of damages; the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery and satisfaction of damages, because such recovery and satisfaction is deemed to make the plaintiff whole.”8 (a) Trespass/Nuisan

2010(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gold Kist v. Base Mfg., 289 Ga. App. 690, 692-693 (1) ( 658 SE2d 228 ) (2008).

2010(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gold Kist v. Base Mfg., 289 Ga. App. 690, 692-693 (1) ( 658 SE2d 228 ) (2008).

1998Brown v. Southern Aggregates Co., 207 Ga. App. 886, 888 (1) ( 429 SE2d 294 ) (1993); Peterson v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 201 Ga. App. 849, 850 ( 412 SE2d 612 ) (1991).

1998Brown v. Southern Aggregates Co., 207 Ga. App. 886, 888 (1) ( 429 SE2d 294 ) (1993); Peterson v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 201 Ga. App. 849, 850 ( 412 SE2d 612 ) (1991).

1997Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Turpin v. Worley, 206 Ga. App. 341, 343 (1) ( 425 SE2d 895 ) (1992).

1997Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Turpin v. Worley, 206 Ga. App. 341, 343 (1) ( 425 SE2d 895 ) (1992).

1991Plaintiffs contend in this tribunal that it was error to fail to give their request number 24: “Bodily pain and suffering are inferred from personal injury, and loss of time from the disabling effect thereof.” The charge is based on language in County of Bibb v. Ham, 110 Ga. 340, 341 ( 35 SE 656 ) (1900).

1991Plaintiffs contend in this tribunal that it was error to fail to give their request number 24: “Bodily pain and suffering are inferred from personal injury, and loss of time from the disabling effect thereof.” The charge is based on language in County of Bibb v. Ham, 110 Ga. 340, 341 ( 35 SE 656 ) (1900).

1991Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Cullen v. Timm, 184 Ga. App. 80, 82-83 ( 360 SE2d 745 ) (1987). “ ‘After a verdict, the evidence is construed in its light most favorable to the prevailing party, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict.’ [Cit.]” McKinney & Co. v. Lawson, 257 Ga. 222, 224 ( 357 SE2d 786 ) (1987).

1991Moreover, the trial court’s approval of the verdict creates a presumption of correctness that will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Cullen v. Timm, 184 Ga. App. 80, 82-83 ( 360 SE2d 745 ) (1987). “ ‘After a verdict, the evidence is construed in its light most favorable to the prevailing party, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict.’ [Cit.]” McKinney & Co. v. Lawson, 257 Ga. 222, 224 ( 357 SE2d 786 ) (1987).