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29 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Drury Displays, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of City of St. Louisgreen2 sentences2023"As a general rule the verification requirement is not so strict as to make an unverified petition 'unsalvageable.'" Id. (quoting Drury Displays, 760 S.W.2d at 114 ). 2023"As a general rule the verification requirement is not so strict as to make an unverified petition 'unsalvageable.'" Id. (quoting Drury Displays, 760 S.W.2d at 114 ). | 4 | 5 |
Federated Mortgage & Investment Co. v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2023Co. v. Jones, 798 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Mo. banc 1990) (citing Drury Displays v. Bd. of Adjustment, 760 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Mo. banc 1988)). 2023Co., 798 S.W.2d at 721 . | 4 | 4 |
Kilgore v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990) (holding that for purposes of Rule 29.15 the verification requirement “is an essential element of the postconviction motion”). 1990Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990) (holding that for purposes of Rule 29.15 the verification requirement "is an essential element of the postconviction motion"). | 3 | 5 |
Mills v. Stategreen2 sentences1990To say the verification requirement of Rule 27.26(c) is jurisdictional, as did the Eastern District Court of Appeals in Mills v. State, 769 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Mo. App.1989), is not entirely accurate and does not resolve the question. 1990Though defendant’s counsel attached a certificate stating that the motion was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and he knew of no additional grounds or allegations that could be raised in behalf of defendant, the verification requirement of Rule 29.15(f) has been held to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, Mills v. State, 769 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Mo.App.1989), and this Court’s review is limited to grounds raised in the original motion, Sloan v. State, 779 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. banc 1989), none of which have been presented on appeal. 2 *402 IV. | 3 | 5 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2009White, 873 S.W.2d at 594 . 2005The Supreme Court, however, eliminated the verification requirement in State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Wilson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. banc 1991) posed as the question for decision: ■ “Whether the motion court had jurisdiction over Wilson’s post-conviction proceedings when a timely filed, properly verified, amended motion was filed subsequent to the filing of an unverified pro se motion.” The court answered: Because the sole deficiency in the pro se motion, the absence of verification, was remedied by a timely filed, verified, amended motion that presented the claims litigated in this proceeding, the purpose of the verification requirement was satisfied in this case. 1991The Wilson court held, “Because the sole deficiency in the pro se motion, the absence of verification, was remedied by a timely filed, verified, amended motion that presented the claims litigated in this proceeding, the purpose of the verification requirement was satisfied in this case.” Wilson , at 834. | 1 | 2 |
Marriage of Plunkett v. Plunkettgreen2 sentences1991Second, the purpose of the verification requirement is said to be “to discourage frivolous and unfounded allegations which must be addressed by trial courts already over burdened with a proliferation of post-conviction remedy motions.” Malone, 798 S.W.2d at 151 , quoting from West v. State, 787 S.W.2d 856 , 857 (Mo.App.1990). 1990West v. State, 787 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo. App.1990). | 1 | 2 |
Malone v. Stategreen2 sentences1991Second, the purpose of the verification requirement is said to be “to discourage frivolous and unfounded allegations which must be addressed by trial courts already over burdened with a proliferation of post-conviction remedy motions.” Malone, 798 S.W.2d at 151 , quoting from West v. State, 787 S.W.2d 856 , 857 (Mo.App.1990). 1991State v. Vinson, 800 S.W.2d 444, 446-448 (Mo. banc 1990); Malone v. State, 798 S.W.2d 149, 150-151 (Mo. banc 1990) (citing Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990)). | 1 | 2 |
Moore v. Moreheadgreen1 sentence2024Plainly, Foster – and the Court in this present case – agree with the conclusion in Moore v. Morehead, 666 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Mo. App. 1984), stating: “To the extent that the statutes governing election contests are silent as to the procedural rules to apply in the conduct of such contests, the relevant procedural statutes and rules that apply in all civil actions also apply in governing procedure in election contests.” 17 The verification requirement is not so strict as to make the initial, unverified petition unsalvageable, and the verification relates back to the filing of the original petiti | 1 | 1 |
BASLER, ESTATE OF v. Delassusgreen1 sentence2021But assuming it 5 All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2020). 5 was, the lack of verification does not render the judgment erroneous because “[t]he absence of verification is effectively cured by the judgment following the hearing.” In re Estate of Basler v. Delassus, 690 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Mo. banc 1985) (evaluating a claim of error under the probate code based upon the lack of verification). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Buchligreen1 sentence2009See Buchli, 152 S.W.3d at 305 ; State v. Wegrzyn, 751 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.App.1988) (deputy sheriffs notarized application for warrant was *366 based on document signed by police officer that was not dated, not verified by oath, and not properly notarized; court held that the combination of documents was sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement); State v. Gannaway, 786 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App.1990) (no signature, but evidence of intent to make affidavit was sufficient); State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 284-288 (Iowa 1998) (reason to believe signer under oath at the time he signed his name | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gannawaygreen1 sentence2009See Buchli, 152 S.W.3d at 305 ; State v. Wegrzyn, 751 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.App.1988) (deputy sheriffs notarized application for warrant was *366 based on document signed by police officer that was not dated, not verified by oath, and not properly notarized; court held that the combination of documents was sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement); State v. Gannaway, 786 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App.1990) (no signature, but evidence of intent to make affidavit was sufficient); State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 284-288 (Iowa 1998) (reason to believe signer under oath at the time he signed his name | 1 | 1 |
State v. Benoskigreen1 sentence2009See Buchli, 152 S.W.3d at 305 ; State v. Wegrzyn, 751 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.App.1988) (deputy sheriffs notarized application for warrant was *366 based on document signed by police officer that was not dated, not verified by oath, and not properly notarized; court held that the combination of documents was sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement); State v. Gannaway, 786 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App.1990) (no signature, but evidence of intent to make affidavit was sufficient); State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 284-288 (Iowa 1998) (reason to believe signer under oath at the time he signed his name | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walkergreen1 sentence2009See Buchli, 152 S.W.3d at 305 ; State v. Wegrzyn, 751 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.App.1988) (deputy sheriffs notarized application for warrant was *366 based on document signed by police officer that was not dated, not verified by oath, and not properly notarized; court held that the combination of documents was sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement); State v. Gannaway, 786 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App.1990) (no signature, but evidence of intent to make affidavit was sufficient); State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 284-288 (Iowa 1998) (reason to believe signer under oath at the time he signed his name | 1 | 1 |
Bullard v. Stategreen1 sentence1994This is in part because “[a]n amended motion differs significantly from the original motion.” Bullard v. State, 853 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Mo. banc 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vinsongreen1 sentence1991State v. Vinson, 800 S.W.2d 444, 446-448 (Mo. banc 1990); Malone v. State, 798 S.W.2d 149, 150-151 (Mo. banc 1990) (citing Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rectorgreen2 sentences1990State v. Rector, 547 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Mo.App.1977); Riley v. State, 588 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo.App.1979). 1990State v. Rector, 547 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Mo.App. 1977); Riley v. State, 588 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo.App.1979). | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Stategreen2 sentences1990State v. Rector, 547 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Mo.App.1977); Riley v. State, 588 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo.App.1979). 1990State v. Rector, 547 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Mo.App. 1977); Riley v. State, 588 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo.App.1979). | 1 | 1 |
Sloan v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Though defendant’s counsel attached a certificate stating that the motion was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and he knew of no additional grounds or allegations that could be raised in behalf of defendant, the verification requirement of Rule 29.15(f) has been held to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, Mills v. State, 769 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Mo.App.1989), and this Court’s review is limited to grounds raised in the original motion, Sloan v. State, 779 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. banc 1989), none of which have been presented on appeal. 2 *402 IV. | 1 | 1 |
| American Industrial Resources, Inc. v. T.S.E. Supply Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
Koerper & Co. v. Unitel International, Inc.green1 sentence1988The purpose of the thirty-day requirement is to give the board of adjustment timely notice of the litigation, and “a party who is notified of litigation concerning a given transaction or occurrence has been given all the notice the statutes of limitation are intended to afford.” Koerper & Co., Inc. v. Unitel International, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Mo. banc 1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Evert
green
1 sentence2024Beatty did not address whether Rule 55.33(c) applies to the issue here of whether the verification requirement can be satisfied by an amended petition filed outside the 30-day period, and this Court in Foster quoted Beatty for the proposition that “[i]t is only by the invention of a tortuous reading that the election contest statutes can be made to be confusing, indefinite or uncertain.” Foster, 751 S.W.2d at 44 (quoting Beatty, 700 S.W.2d at 837 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District
green
2 sentences2024Beatty did not address whether Rule 55.33(c) applies to the issue here of whether the verification requirement can be satisfied by an amended petition filed outside the 30-day period, and this Court in Foster quoted Beatty for the proposition that “[i]t is only by the invention of a tortuous reading that the election contest statutes can be made to be confusing, indefinite or uncertain.” Foster, 751 S.W.2d at 44 (quoting Beatty, 700 S.W.2d at 837 ). 2024In the very next paragraph in Foster, this Court concluded: “To the extent that it relies on rules of procedure which normally control civil actions to address election contest issues, respondent’s argument is flawed[.]” Id. (holding cases requiring personal service on the contestee as a basis for jurisdiction in election contests should no longer be followed). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Wegrzyn
neutral
1 sentence2009See Buchli, 152 S.W.3d at 305 ; State v. Wegrzyn, 751 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.App.1988) (deputy sheriffs notarized application for warrant was *366 based on document signed by police officer that was not dated, not verified by oath, and not properly notarized; court held that the combination of documents was sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement); State v. Gannaway, 786 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App.1990) (no signature, but evidence of intent to make affidavit was sufficient); State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 284-288 (Iowa 1998) (reason to believe signer under oath at the time he signed his name | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Utterback
green
2 sentences2009Identified Informant State v. Utterback, 240 Neb. 981 , 485 N.W.2d 760 (1992), 3 urged by defendant Henry as authoritative here, and relied upon by the trial court, is not on point. 2009Identified Informant State v. Utterback, 240 Neb. 981 , 485 N.W.2d 760 (1992), 3 urged by defendant Henry as authoritative here, and relied upon by the trial court, is not on point. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. White
green
1 sentence1994FACTS We adopt the statement of facts from our earlier opinion in State v. White, 813 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. banc 1991). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Bradley
green
1 sentence1994The Court noted that the purpose of the verification requirement is to “to discourage frivolous and unfounded allegations which must be addressed by trial courts already overburdened with the proliferation of postconviction remedy motions.” Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Barry v. State
green
2 sentences1994This Court holds that: (1) the verification requirement for defendant’s pro se 29.15 motion was met when defendant signed the motion; (2) a remand to the motion court in accordance with Barry v. State, 850 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. banc 1993), is required for findings of fact and conclusions of law on defendant’s pro se 29.15motion; (3) defendant’s first and second amended 29.15 motions were verified, but were not timely filed and should have been dismissed; (4) defendant was abandoned by the decision of the Office of State Public Defender to change defendant’s counsel fourteen days before the end of th 1994This Court holds that: (1) the verification requirement for defendant’s pro se 29.15 motion was met when defendant signed the motion; (2) a remand to the motion court in accordance with Barry v. State, 850 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. banc 1993), is required for findings of fact and conclusions of law on defendant’s pro se 29.15motion; (3) defendant’s first and second amended 29.15 motions were verified, but were not timely filed and should have been dismissed; (4) defendant was abandoned by the decision of the Office of State Public Defender to change defendant’s counsel fourteen days before the end of th | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Life Medical System, Inc. v. Franklin County Commission
green
1 sentence1991Co. v. Jones, 798 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Mo.banc 1990); Life Medical System, Inc. v. Franklin County Commission, 810 S.W.2d 554, 558-59 , (Mo.App.1991). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Quinn v. State
green
2 sentences1990In Quinn v. State, 776 S.W.2d 916 (Mo.App.1989), the Western District held that the language contained in Rule 29.15(f) regarding verification of amended motions was “more explicit in terminology” and it added “emphasis to the verification requirement Mills held to be a jurisdictional requisite.” Quinn , at 918. 1990The court, thus, held that, where a movant failed to verify his motion, “such motions should be dismissed.” Id. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Day v. State
green
1 sentence1990Id. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| In Re Marriage of Dunn green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Standard of Beaverdale, Inc. v. Hemphill green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re Marriage of PKA green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Marriage of Stuart v. Stuart green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Kelly v. City of St. Louis, Board of Adjustment neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Kaesser v. Becker green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.