29 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1948–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bonham State Bank v. Beadlegreen2 sentences2005See Beadle, 907 S.W.2d at 471 (declaratory-judgment action governed by general venue rule). 2003See Beadle, 907 S.W.2d at 471 (declaratory-judgment action governed by general venue rule). | 3 | 3 |
Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co.green2 sentences1978Such venue facts must be both clearly pleaded and proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the general venue rule, Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co., 150 Tex. 159 , 237 S.W.2d 969, 972 (1951), for venue may not be sustained by implication. 1978Such venue facts must be both clearly pleaded and proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the general venue rule, Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co., 150 Tex. 159 , 237 S.W.2d 969, 972 (1951), for venue may not be sustained by implication. | 2 | 4 |
Compton v. Elliottgreen2 sentences1988Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1935). 1988Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1935). | 2 | 3 |
In Re Adan Volpe Properties, Ltd.green2 sentences2023In re Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259 ; In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding). 2023In re Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259 ; In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Masonite Corp.green2 sentences2023In re Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259 ; In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding). 2023In re Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259 ; In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding). | 2 | 2 |
Rorschach v. Pittsgreen2 sentences1976Southwestern Investment Go. v. Shipley, 400 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.1966); Rorschach v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 215 , 248 S.W.2d 120, 123 (1952); Owens v. Sherrard Motor Co., 496 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Tex.Civ.App.— Tyler 1973, no writ). 1976Southwestern Investment Go. v. Shipley, 400 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.1966); Rorschach v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 215 , 248 S.W.2d 120, 123 (1952); Owens v. Sherrard Motor Co., 496 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Tex.Civ.App.— Tyler 1973, no writ). | 1 | 2 |
Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc.green1 sentence2022Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Weaver, 982 S.W.2d at 893 ; Wood v. State, 573 S.W.2d 207, 210-211 (Tex.Crim.App. [Pan *507 el Op.] 1978). | 1 | 1 |
Chiriboga v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.green2 sentences2008Co., 96 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (holding that, if "[n]one of the mandatory or specific permissive venue provisions apply[,]" then the general venue rule applies). 1. 2008Co., 96 S.W.3d 673, 678 (TexApp.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (holding that, if “[n]one of the mandatory or specific permissive venue provisions apply[,]” then the general venue rule applies). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Districtgreen2 sentences2008Texas Code Construction Act When interpreting a statute, we "`consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.'" Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.1999) (quoting Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991)). 2008Texas Code Construction Act When interpreting a statute, we “ ‘consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.’ ” Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.1999) (quoting Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc.green2 sentences2008Texas Code Construction Act When interpreting a statute, we "`consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.'" Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.1999) (quoting Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991)). 2008Texas Code Construction Act When interpreting a statute, we “ ‘consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.’ ” Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.1999) (quoting Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Santleben v. Taylor-Evans Seed Co.green1 sentence1983Santleben v. Taylor-Evans Seed Co., 585 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1979, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Union Bus Lines v. Byrdgreen2 sentences1983In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first three conditions have been met, so we focus our attention on whether appellants are necessary parties to the suit by plaintiff against Bruce Campbell, Inc. 3 A party is “necessary” within 29a “if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled under the facts of the' case as against the defendant properly sueable in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both defendants are parties.” Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.1973); Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1956) 1983In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first three conditions have been met, so we focus our attention on whether appellants are necessary parties to the suit by plaintiff against Bruce Campbell, Inc. 3 A party is “necessary” within 29a “if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled under the facts of the' case as against the defendant properly sueable in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both defendants are parties.” Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.1973); Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1956) | 1 | 1 |
Briarcliff, Inc. v. Texas Automatic Sprinklers, Inc.green1 sentence1979Briarcliff, Inc. v. Texas Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Burtis v. Butler Bros.green2 sentences1978Burtis v. Butler Bros., 148 Tex. 543 , 226 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1950). 1978Burtis v. Butler Bros., 148 Tex. 543 , 226 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
Southwestern Investment Company v. Shipleygreen1 sentence1976Southwestern Investment Go. v. Shipley, 400 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.1966); Rorschach v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 215 , 248 S.W.2d 120, 123 (1952); Owens v. Sherrard Motor Co., 496 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Tex.Civ.App.— Tyler 1973, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Sherrard Motor Company, Inc.green1 sentence1976Southwestern Investment Go. v. Shipley, 400 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.1966); Rorschach v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 215 , 248 S.W.2d 120, 123 (1952); Owens v. Sherrard Motor Co., 496 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Tex.Civ.App.— Tyler 1973, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Team Rocket, L.P.
green
2 sentences2023In re Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259 ; In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding). 2023In re Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 259 ; In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Weaver
green
1 sentence2013Weaver, 982 S.W.2d at 893 ; Wood v. State, 573 S.W.2d 207, 210-211 (Tex.Crim.App. [Pan *507 el Op.] 1978). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Papas v. Harmon
neutral
2 sentences1983Malone v. Shoemaker, 597 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1980, no writ); Papas v. Harmon, 263 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1954, no writ). 1983Malone v. Shoemaker, 597 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ.App. Tyler 1980, no writ); Papas v. Harmon, 263 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1954, no writ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Portland Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Government Securities, Inc.
green
1 sentence1983In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first three conditions have been met, so we focus our attention on whether appellants are necessary parties to the suit by plaintiff against Bruce Campbell, Inc. 3 A party is “necessary” within 29a “if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled under the facts of the' case as against the defendant properly sueable in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both defendants are parties.” Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.1973); Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1956) | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1983In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first three conditions have been met, so we focus our attention on whether appellants are necessary parties to the suit by plaintiff against Bruce Campbell, Inc. 3 A party is “necessary” within 29a “if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled under the facts of the' case as against the defendant properly sueable in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both defendants are parties.” Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.1973); Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1956) | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Malone v. Shoemaker
green
2 sentences1983Malone v. Shoemaker, 597 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1980, no writ); Papas v. Harmon, 263 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1954, no writ). 1983Malone v. Shoemaker, 597 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ.App. Tyler 1980, no writ); Papas v. Harmon, 263 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1954, no writ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ladner v. Reliance Corp.
green
2 sentences1983In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first three conditions have been met, so we focus our attention on whether appellants are necessary parties to the suit by plaintiff against Bruce Campbell, Inc. 3 A party is “necessary” within 29a “if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled under the facts of the' case as against the defendant properly sueable in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both defendants are parties.” Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.1973); Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1956) 1983In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first three conditions have been met, so we focus our attention on whether appellants are necessary parties to the suit by plaintiff against Bruce Campbell, Inc. 3 A party is “necessary” within 29a “if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled under the facts of the' case as against the defendant properly sueable in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both defendants are parties.” Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Texas Packers, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.1973); Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1956) | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Community Inns Franchise, Inc. v. Plummer
green
1 sentence1982At the very outset we recognize that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not fix venue, and further, that actions for declaratory relief are subject to the general venue rule and its thirty-one exceptions, Community Inns Franchise, Inc. v. Plummer, 379 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. Edwards
green
1 sentence1977Article 2212a, Subsections (g) and (h) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated provide as follows: “(g) All claims for contribution between named defendants in the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a named defendant may proceed against a person not a party to the primary suit who has not effected a settlement with the claimant. *583 “(h) This section prevails over Article 2212, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, and all other laws to the extent of any conflict.” The above quoted sections of the statute have recently been interpreted by this court in th | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Coffield v. Richter
neutral
1 sentence1975The Court distinguished cases such as Coffield v. Richter, 229 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1950, no writ) in which there were consequential damages growing out of the failure to take itself, as opposed to a failure to pay the contract price. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Cowden v. Cowden
green
2 sentences1975Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446 , 186 S.W.2d 69 (1945). 1975Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446 , 186 S.W.2d 69 (1945). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Blackmon v. Esmond
neutral
1 sentence1974In Blackmon v. Esmond, 387 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1965, no writ), the plaintiff attempted to defeat the defendant’s plea of privilege, not by proof of an applicable statutory exception to the general venue rule, but by proof adduced at the venue hearing that the defendant’s residence was not as it was sworn to be in the plea of privilege. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Magness v. Herider
neutral
1 sentence1973Magness v. Herider, 392 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler, 1965, n. w. h.); Rorschach v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 215 , 248 S.W.2d 120 (1952). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Pinkston-Hollar, Inc. v. Big Three Welding Supply Co. neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Galloway v. Nichols green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Lindsey v. State green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Federal Mortgage Co. v. Hawkins green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Ricker, Lee & Co. v. Shoemaker green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Meredith v. McClendon green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.