general venue rule in California

2021(Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 483 .) “It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule.” (Ibid.; accord, Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 760, 763 (Kaluzok) [“The right of a defendant to have an action brought against him tried in the county of his residence is an ancient and valuable right, safeguarded by statute and supported by a long line of decisions.”].) Thus, “[t]he right of a plaintiff to have an action tried in a county other than that of the def

2017OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT VENUE RULES "It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. [Citations.]" ( Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477 , 483, 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ( Brown ); Fontaine , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 837 , 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 ; see also Massae v. Superior Court ( Massae ) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 527 , 531, 173 Cal.Rptr. 527 [" 'policy of the law favors the right of trial at the defendant's residence' "].) This general rule i

2021(Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 483 .) “It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule.” (Ibid.; accord, Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 760, 763 (Kaluzok) [“The right of a defendant to have an action brought against him tried in the county of his residence is an ancient and valuable right, safeguarded by statute and supported by a long line of decisions.”].) Thus, “[t]he right of a plaintiff to have an action tried in a county other than that of the def

2021If the plaintiff would claim such right [h]e must bring himself within the exception.” (Kaluzok, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 763 .) Moreover, when the plaintiff contends that the case fits within an exception to the general rule that venue is proper in the county of defendant’s residence, any ambiguities in the complaint must be construed against the plaintiff towards the end that the defendant will not be deprived of the right to a trial in the county of his or her residence.

2017Section 392(a) provides that "[s]ubject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings," the proper county for trial of an action to adjudicate rights or interests in or injuries to real property is the county "where the real property that is the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated." Cases governed by section 392(a) are often characterized as "local" in nature and distinguished from cases seeking personal or "transitory" relief, *764 which are typically governed by the general venue rule that a case should be tried in the county where the defendants or some

2017Section 392(a) provides that "[s]ubject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings," the proper county for trial of an action to adjudicate rights or interests in or injuries to real property is the county "where the real property that is the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated." Cases governed by section 392(a) are often characterized as "local" in nature and distinguished from cases seeking personal or "transitory" relief, *764 which are typically governed by the general venue rule that a case should be tried in the county where the defendants or some

2017OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT VENUE RULES "It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. [Citations.]" ( Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477 , 483, 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ( Brown ); Fontaine , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 837 , 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 ; see also Massae v. Superior Court ( Massae ) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 527 , 531, 173 Cal.Rptr. 527 [" 'policy of the law favors the right of trial at the defendant's residence' "].) This general rule i

2017OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT VENUE RULES "It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. [Citations.]" ( Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477 , 483, 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ( Brown ); Fontaine , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 837 , 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 ; see also Massae v. Superior Court ( Massae ) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 527 , 531, 173 Cal.Rptr. 527 [" 'policy of the law favors the right of trial at the defendant's residence' "].) This general rule i

2015(See Peiser v. Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 601-602 [ 328 P.2d 953 ] [cause of action for damages for breach of contract is clearly a transitory cause of action].) Ordinarily, the proper county for trial of a transitory action is the county in which the defendants or some of them reside. (§ 395.) “It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. [Citations.]” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 483 .) In this writ proceeding, Silva Trucking and McDonold have aba

2015(See Peiser v. Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 601-602 [ 328 P.2d 953 ] [cause of action for damages for breach of contract is clearly a transitory cause of action].) Ordinarily, the proper county for trial of a transitory action is the county in which the defendants or some of them reside. (§ 395.) “It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls within some exception to the general venue rule. [Citations.]” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 483 .) In this writ proceeding, Silva Trucking and McDonold have aba

2009(California State Parks Foundation v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 826, 833 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 ].) Fontaine does not dispute defendants’ assertions that none of them resides in Santa Clara County and that individual defendant Vargas resides in Orange County.

2009(California State Parks Foundation v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 826, 833 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 ].) Fontaine does not dispute defendants’ assertions that none of them resides in Santa Clara County and that individual defendant Vargas resides in Orange County.

1984(Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 760, 763-764 [ 167 P.2d 481 , 163 A.L.R. 1308 ]; Mosby v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-224; Holstein v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 708, 710 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 301 ].) Section 395 codifies this rule and provides that the trial of the action shall be in the county of the defendant’s residence, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” Three cases have construed the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” language of section 395.

1984(Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 760, 763-764 [ 167 P.2d 481 , 163 A.L.R. 1308 ]; Mosby v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-224; Holstein v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 708, 710 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 301 ].) Section 395 codifies this rule and provides that the trial of the action shall be in the county of the defendant’s residence, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” Three cases have construed the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” language of section 395.

1976Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [ 155 P.2d 42 , 158 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Hadler v. Western Greyhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 502 ]; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 [ 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062 , 67 S.Ct. 839 ], wherein the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue The doctrine was judicially accepted in California in 1954 (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1976Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [ 155 P.2d 42 , 158 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Hadler v. Western Greyhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 502 ]; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 [ 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062 , 67 S.Ct. 839 ], wherein the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue The doctrine was judicially accepted in California in 1954 (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1976Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [ 155 P.2d 42 , 158 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Hadler v. Western Greyhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 502 ]; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 [ 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062 , 67 S.Ct. 839 ], wherein the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue The doctrine was judicially accepted in California in 1954 (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1976Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [ 155 P.2d 42 , 158 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Hadler v. Western Greyhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 502 ]; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 [ 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062 , 67 S.Ct. 839 ], wherein the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue The doctrine was judicially accepted in California in 1954 (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1976Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [ 155 P.2d 42 , 158 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Hadler v. Western Greyhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 502 ]; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 [ 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062 , 67 S.Ct. 839 ], wherein the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue The doctrine was judicially accepted in California in 1954 (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1976Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609 [ 155 P.2d 42 , 158 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Hadler v. Western Greyhound Racing Circuit, 34 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 502 ]; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 [ 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062 , 67 S.Ct. 839 ], wherein the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue The doctrine was judicially accepted in California in 1954 (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1976Co., 42 Cal.2d 577, 583-584 [ 268 P.2d 457 , 43 A.L.R.2d 756 ]), and was recently given statutory recognition by the enactment of section 410.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss thq action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” It is now established in this state that a trial court has no discretion to dismiss an action upon the ground of for

1976Co., 42 Cal.2d 577, 583-584 [ 268 P.2d 457 , 43 A.L.R.2d 756 ]), and was recently given statutory recognition by the enactment of section 410.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss thq action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” It is now established in this state that a trial court has no discretion to dismiss an action upon the ground of for