circuit court committed reversible error in West Virginia

2020We have long held that “[t]he determination of whether a prospective juror should be excused to avoid bias or prejudice in the jury panel is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” O’Dell v. Miller, 211 W.

2020Pursuant to syllabus point 5 of State v. Miller, 194 W.

2020In sentencing petitioner, the circuit court examined this Court’s decision in State v. Lane, 241 W.

2018Petitioner asserts that the circuit court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury on a vicarious liability theory, because petitioner’s claim was pled and litigated as a direct corporate negligence claim against Genesis, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Manor Care, Inc., v. Douglas, 234 W.

2018Va. 57 , 763 S.E.2d 73 (2014).

2017Mr. Simmons asserts that, pursuant to State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571 , 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), this Court must remand this case for that hearing.

2017Mr. Simmons asserts that, pursuant to State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571 , 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), this Court must remand this case for that hearing.

2015Id. at 591 , 723 S.E.2d at 416 .

2015Id. at 591 , 723 S.E.2d at 416 .

2014Petitioner argues that his testimony at the evidentiary hearings proves that trial counsel failed to: (1) adequately discuss the consequences of going to trial and the effect of the West Virginia habitual offender statute;3 (2) obtain the mandatory attendance of a co-defendant; (3) obtain exculpatory evidence; and (4) file an appeal with the Supreme Court of the United States.4 West Virginia Code § 53-4A-7(a) states, in relevant part, that [i]f the petition [for writ of habeas corpus], affidavits, exhibits, records and other 2 Petitioner was subsequently appointed counsel and filed a checklist

2014Petitioner argues that his testimony at the evidentiary hearings proves that trial counsel failed to: (1) adequately discuss the consequences of going to trial and the effect of the West Virginia habitual offender statute;3 (2) obtain the mandatory attendance of a co-defendant; (3) obtain exculpatory evidence; and (4) file an appeal with the Supreme Court of the United States.4 West Virginia Code § 53-4A-7(a) states, in relevant part, that [i]f the petition [for writ of habeas corpus], affidavits, exhibits, records and other 2 Petitioner was subsequently appointed counsel and filed a checklist

2014Even though the petitioner did not raise this issue in her appeal, this Court sua sponte notices plain error in the circuit court’s burden shifting. 6 In syllabus point 1, in part, of State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449 , 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998), we held that “[this Court] may, sua sponte, in the interest of justice, notice plain error.” Our plain error analysis involves a four-step test.

2014Even though the petitioner did not raise this issue in her appeal, this Court sua sponte notices plain error in the circuit court’s burden shifting. 6 In syllabus point 1, in part, of State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449 , 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998), we held that “[this Court] may, sua sponte, in the interest of justice, notice plain error.” Our plain error analysis involves a four-step test.

2012As to the first point, the defendants correctly cite Stafford v. Rocky Hollow Coal Company, 198 W.Va. 593 , 482 S.E.2d 210 (1996), a wrongful discharge action, for the principle that, as a condition of admissibility under Rule 404(b), the trial court, itself, must find that the prior bad act actually occurred.

2012As to the first point, the defendants correctly cite Stafford v. Rocky Hollow Coal Company, 198 W.Va. 593 , 482 S.E.2d 210 (1996), a wrongful discharge action, for the principle that, as a condition of admissibility under Rule 404(b), the trial court, itself, must find that the prior bad act actually occurred.

2012This Court has held that “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

2012This Court has held that “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

2012In support of this assignment of error, the petitioner relies on syllabus point 3 of State v. Caudill, 170 W.Va. 74 , 289 S.E.2d 748 (1982), which provides: In a criminal trial an accomplice may testify as a witness on behalf of the State to having entered a plea of guilty to the crime charged against a defendant where such testimony is not for the purpose of proving the guilt of the defendant and is relevant to the issue of the witness-accomplice’s credibility.

2012In support of this assignment of error, the petitioner relies on syllabus point 3 of State v. Caudill, 170 W.Va. 74 , 289 S.E.2d 748 (1982), which provides: In a criminal trial an accomplice may testify as a witness on behalf of the State to having entered a plea of guilty to the crime charged against a defendant where such testimony is not for the purpose of proving the guilt of the defendant and is relevant to the issue of the witness-accomplice’s credibility.

2010A. Enterprise Goodwill v. Personal Goodwill In her first argument, Ms. Wilson states that the circuit court committed reversible error by misapplying this Court's holding in May v. May, 214 W.Va. 394 , 589 S.E.2d 536 (2003), on the issue of enterprise goodwill.

2010A. Enterprise Goodwill v. Personal Goodwill In her first argument, Ms. Wilson states that the circuit court committed reversible error by misapplying this Court's holding in May v. May, 214 W.Va. 394 , 589 S.E.2d 536 (2003), on the issue of enterprise goodwill.

2009This Court has recognized that “[o]n certiorari the circuit court is required to make an independent review of both law and fact in order to render judgment as law and justice may require.” Syllabus Point 3, Harrison v. Ginsberg, 169 W.Va. 162 , 286 S.E.2d 276 (1982).

2009This Court has recognized that “[o]n certiorari the circuit court is required to make an independent review of both law and fact in order to render judgment as law and justice may require.” Syllabus Point 3, Harrison v. Ginsberg, 169 W.Va. 162 , 286 S.E.2d 276 (1982).

2009He further argues that the *428 circuit court erred in finding him “guilty of negligence as a matter of law by turning left without looking effectively to see the passing-vehicle in which [Mr. Cross] was riding as a non-negligent innocent passenger.” Mr. Smith maintains that the situation at hand is factually similar to the case of Howard’s Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Patton, 156 W.Va. 543 , 195 S.E.2d 156 (1973).

2009He further argues that the *428 circuit court erred in finding him “guilty of negligence as a matter of law by turning left without looking effectively to see the passing-vehicle in which [Mr. Cross] was riding as a non-negligent innocent passenger.” Mr. Smith maintains that the situation at hand is factually similar to the case of Howard’s Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Patton, 156 W.Va. 543 , 195 S.E.2d 156 (1973).

2002This Court has held that, “The trial court must instruct the jury on all essential elements of the offenses charged, and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the essential elements deprives the accused of his fundamental right to a fair trial, and constitutes reversible error.” Syllabus, State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 367 , 400 S.E.2d 611 (1990).

2002This Court has held that, “The trial court must instruct the jury on all essential elements of the offenses charged, and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the essential elements deprives the accused of his fundamental right to a fair trial, and constitutes reversible error.” Syllabus, State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 367 , 400 S.E.2d 611 (1990).

1997Va.Code, 29A-5-4(g) [1964], we need not address the DEP's contention that the circuit court committed reversible error by stating, without more, that the Board's findings of fact were not "clearly wrong" and its conclusions of law "not erroneous as a matter of law." See HCCRA, 196 W.Va. at 334-35 , 472 S.E.2d at 419-20 ; Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819 , 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992) ("Because this case is an appeal of an administrative determination, our inquiry is independent of the district court's appellate decision." (citations omitted)); Carl Bolander & Sons v. City of Minneapolis

1997Va.Code, 29A-5-4(g) [1964], we need not address the DEP's contention that the circuit court committed reversible error by stating, without more, that the Board's findings of fact were not "clearly wrong" and its conclusions of law "not erroneous as a matter of law." See HCCRA, 196 W.Va. at 334-35 , 472 S.E.2d at 419-20 ; Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819 , 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992) ("Because this case is an appeal of an administrative determination, our inquiry is independent of the district court's appellate decision." (citations omitted)); Carl Bolander & Sons v. City of Minneapolis

1997Va.Code, 29A-5-4(g) [1964], we need not address the DEP's contention that the circuit court committed reversible error by stating, without more, that the Board's findings of fact were not "clearly wrong" and its conclusions of law "not erroneous as a matter of law." See HCCRA, 196 W.Va. at 334-35 , 472 S.E.2d at 419-20 ; Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819 , 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992) ("Because this case is an appeal of an administrative determination, our inquiry is independent of the district court's appellate decision." (citations omitted)); Carl Bolander & Sons v. City of Minneapolis

1997Va.Code, 29A-5-4(g) [1964], we need not address the DEP's contention that the circuit court committed reversible error by stating, without more, that the Board's findings of fact were not "clearly wrong” and its conclusions of law "not erroneous as a matter of law.” See HCCRA, 196 W.Va. at 334-35 , 472 S.E.2d at 419-20 ; Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819 , 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992) ("Because this case is an appeal of an administrative determination, our inquiry is independent of the district court's appellate decision.” (citations omitted)); Carl Bolander & Sons v. City of Minneapolis

1997In Wager v. Sine, 157 W.Va. 391 , 201 S.E.2d 260 (1973), we discussed where a directed verdict was appropriate in a civil case.

1997In Wager v. Sine, 157 W.Va. 391 , 201 S.E.2d 260 (1973), we discussed where a directed verdict was appropriate in a civil case.