existence of a meritorious defense in Alabama

2017In Jones, we upheld a circuit court's denial of a defendant’s Rule 55(c) motion because, despite demonstrating the existence of a meritorious defense, defendant Jones’s behavior warranted "a finding of intentional ‘conduct evidencing disrespect for the judicial system.’ ” Jones, 524 So.2d at 614 -15 (quoting Ex parte Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 514 So.2d 1283 , 1288 (Ala. 1987)).

1989If the facts in this case were indistinguishable from those in Lee , where the negligence was that of the insurer, not the insured, Appalachian still could not prevail under a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, because it did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense, as set forth in Kirtland , supra. 3 *Page 897 "To meet the meritorious-defense element, [Appalachian] need not satisfy the trial court that [Appalachian] would necessarily prevail at trial on the merits, only that [Appalachian] is prepared to present a plausible defense." Ex parte Illinois Central Gulf R.R. , supra. Wh

2024Such allegations would constitute a 'plausible' defense." " 'Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606 (emphasis added).' 9 CL-2023-0197 " 'Carroll[ v. Williams], 6 So. 3d [463,] 467-68 [Ala. 2008)].' " Ex parte Bhones, 285 So. 3d 740 , 745-46 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Ex parte Ward, 264 So. 3d 52 , 56 (Ala. 2018)); see also Appalachian Stove & Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts, 544 So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 1989) (holding that, "[t]o show the existence of a meritorious defense, [the defendant] had to allege sufficient facts or produce enough evidence to counter the plaintiffs' claims").

2015The existence of a meritorious defense is a ‘threshold prerequisite,’ Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 605 , because without a meritorious defense, a finding that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced and a finding that the defendant was not culpable would matter little.

2017In Jones, we upheld a circuit court's denial of a defendant’s Rule 55(c) motion because, despite demonstrating the existence of a meritorious defense, defendant Jones’s behavior warranted "a finding of intentional ‘conduct evidencing disrespect for the judicial system.’ ” Jones, 524 So.2d at 614 -15 (quoting Ex parte Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 514 So.2d 1283 , 1288 (Ala. 1987)).

2011See Jones v. Hydro-Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524 So.2d 610, 614 (Ala.1988) (“Jones’s affidavit provided the trial court with a sufficient factual basis on which to conclude that Jones presented a genuine issue of material fact, and for this reason, Jones satisfied the requirement of showing the existence of a meritorious defense.”).

2024Such allegations would constitute a 'plausible' defense." " 'Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606 (emphasis added).' 9 CL-2023-0197 " 'Carroll[ v. Williams], 6 So. 3d [463,] 467-68 [Ala. 2008)].' " Ex parte Bhones, 285 So. 3d 740 , 745-46 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Ex parte Ward, 264 So. 3d 52 , 56 (Ala. 2018)); see also Appalachian Stove & Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts, 544 So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 1989) (holding that, "[t]o show the existence of a meritorious defense, [the defendant] had to allege sufficient facts or produce enough evidence to counter the plaintiffs' claims").

2002Cf. Appalachian Stove Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts , 544 So.2d 893 (Ala. 1989), where this Court analyzed the requirements of showing that the defaulting party has a "meritorious defense." In that case, this Court stated: "To show the existence of a meritorious defense, Appalachian had to allege sufficient facts or produce enough evidence to counter the plaintiffs' claims.

2023The trial court eventually entered an order staying that proceeding. 10Generally, "in order to obtain relief under Rule 60(b), the defaulting party must not only show the existence of a meritorious defense, but also must demonstrate the ground under Rule 60(b) justifying relief from the final judgment." DaLee v. Crosby Lumber Co., 561 So. 2d 1086, 1091 (Ala. 1990).

2011However, “a failure to demonstrate that one or both of the second and third Kirtland factors supports the granting of relief from a default judgment is not necessarily fatal to a motion for such relief.” Sumlin v. Sumlin, 931 So.2d 40, 48 (Ala.Civ.App.2005).

2004See Gilley v. Crawford, 549 So.2d 457, 458 (Ala.1989) ("[w]e note that the three-factor analysis requires us to look first at whether the defaulting party has demonstrated `the existence of a meritorious defense.' In her verified motion to set aside the default judgment, [the defendant] set out several defenses to the action, including adverse possession.