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17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1941–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences1989Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 505 Pa. 90, 93 , 477 A.2d 471, 472 (1984). 1989Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 505 Pa. 90, 93 , 477 A.2d 471, 472 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Maruccio v. Houdaille Industries, Inc.green2 sentences1986Maruccio v. Houdaille Industries Inc., 254 Pa.Super. 560, 562-63 , 386 A.2d 91, 93 (1978). 1986Maruccio v. Houdaille Industries Inc., 254 Pa.Super. 560, 562-63 , 386 A.2d 91, 93 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
AB v. Continental Importsgreen2 sentences1978“It is clear that the petition to open must set forth its defenses ‘in precise, specific, clear and unmistaken terms.’ Ab v. Continental Imports, 220 Pa.Super. 5, 9 , 281 A.2d 646, 648 (1971), and must set forth the facts on which the defense is based. 1978“It is clear that the petition to open must set forth its defenses ‘in precise, specific, clear and unmistaken terms.’ Ab v. Continental Imports, 220 Pa.Super. 5, 9 , 281 A.2d 646, 648 (1971), and must set forth the facts on which the defense is based. | 1 | 1 |
Britton v. Continental Mining & Smelting Corp.green2 sentences1956See also Britton v. Continental Mining and Smelting Corporation, 366 Pa. 82, 84 , 76 A. 2d 625 . 1956See also Britton v. Continental Mining and Smelting Corporation, 366 Pa. 82, 84 , 76 A. 2d 625 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Brown-Murray Co.
green
2 sentences1956Before the court could open the judgment it was necessary for the petition to set forth (1) due diligence; *466 (2) the grounds for opening the judgment; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense, by averring the facts upon which the meritorious defense is based: Planters Nut and Chocolate Company v. Brown-Murray Co., Inc., 128 Pa. Superior Ct. 239, 244 , 193 A. 381 . 1956Before the court could open the judgment it was necessary for the petition to set forth (1) due diligence; *466 (2) the grounds for opening the judgment; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense, by averring the facts upon which the meritorious defense is based: Planters Nut and Chocolate Company v. Brown-Murray Co., Inc., 128 Pa. Superior Ct. 239, 244 , 193 A. 381 . | 4 | 1941–1956 |
Young v. Mathews Trucking Corp.
green
2 sentences1972In Young v. Mathews, 383 Pa. 464 , 119 A. 2d 239 (1956), the Supreme Court said at pp. 465-66: “Before the court could open the judgment it was necessary for the petition to set forth (1) due diligence; (2) the grounds for opening the judgment; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense, by averring the facts upon which the meritorious defense is based.” See also, Liberty National Bank of Pittston v. Degillio, 406 Pa. 127 , 176 A. 2d 446 (1962). 1972In Young v. Mathews, 383 Pa. 464 , 119 A. 2d 239 (1956), the Supreme Court said at pp. 465-66: “Before the court could open the judgment it was necessary for the petition to set forth (1) due diligence; (2) the grounds for opening the judgment; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense, by averring the facts upon which the meritorious defense is based.” See also, Liberty National Bank of Pittston v. Degillio, 406 Pa. 127 , 176 A. 2d 446 (1962). | 3 | 1970–1972 |
Kabanow v. Kabanow
green
2 sentences1978It is well established that a petition to open a default judgment should not be granted unless three conditions have been met: (1) the petition must have been promptly filed; (2) the default which led to the judgment must be satisfactorily explained; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense to the cause of action must be shown: Kabanow v. Kabanow, 239 Pa.Super. 23, 24 , 361 A.2d 721 (1976) and decisions therein cited. 1978It is well established that a petition to open a default judgment should not be granted unless three conditions have been met: (1) the petition must have been promptly filed; (2) the default which led to the judgment must be satisfactorily explained; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense to the cause of action must be shown: Kabanow v. Kabanow, 239 Pa.Super. 23, 24 , 361 A.2d 721 (1976) and decisions therein cited. | 2 | 1978–1984 |
Liberty National Bank v. Degillio
green
2 sentences1972In Young v. Mathews, 383 Pa. 464 , 119 A. 2d 239 (1956), the Supreme Court said at pp. 465-66: “Before the court could open the judgment it was necessary for the petition to set forth (1) due diligence; (2) the grounds for opening the judgment; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense, by averring the facts upon which the meritorious defense is based.” See also, Liberty National Bank of Pittston v. Degillio, 406 Pa. 127 , 176 A. 2d 446 (1962). 1972In Young v. Mathews, 383 Pa. 464 , 119 A. 2d 239 (1956), the Supreme Court said at pp. 465-66: “Before the court could open the judgment it was necessary for the petition to set forth (1) due diligence; (2) the grounds for opening the judgment; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense, by averring the facts upon which the meritorious defense is based.” See also, Liberty National Bank of Pittston v. Degillio, 406 Pa. 127 , 176 A. 2d 446 (1962). | 2 | 1971–1972 |
Deer Park Lumber, Inc. v. Major
green
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth
green
2 sentences1983Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580 , 442 A.2d 689 (1982); Academy House Council v. Phillips, 312 Pa.Super. 364 , 458 A.2d 1002 (1983); Jenkins v. Blanchfield, 297 Pa.Super. 95 , 443 A.2d 316 (1982). 1983Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580 , 442 A.2d 689 (1982); Academy House Council v. Phillips, 312 Pa.Super. 364 , 458 A.2d 1002 (1983); Jenkins v. Blanchfield, 297 Pa.Super. 95 , 443 A.2d 316 (1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Academy House Council v. Phillips
green
2 sentences1983Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580 , 442 A.2d 689 (1982); Academy House Council v. Phillips, 312 Pa.Super. 364 , 458 A.2d 1002 (1983); Jenkins v. Blanchfield, 297 Pa.Super. 95 , 443 A.2d 316 (1982). 1983Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580 , 442 A.2d 689 (1982); Academy House Council v. Phillips, 312 Pa.Super. 364 , 458 A.2d 1002 (1983); Jenkins v. Blanchfield, 297 Pa.Super. 95 , 443 A.2d 316 (1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Jenkins v. Blanchfield
green
2 sentences1983Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580 , 442 A.2d 689 (1982); Academy House Council v. Phillips, 312 Pa.Super. 364 , 458 A.2d 1002 (1983); Jenkins v. Blanchfield, 297 Pa.Super. 95 , 443 A.2d 316 (1982). 1983Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Nemeth, 497 Pa. 580 , 442 A.2d 689 (1982); Academy House Council v. Phillips, 312 Pa.Super. 364 , 458 A.2d 1002 (1983); Jenkins v. Blanchfield, 297 Pa.Super. 95 , 443 A.2d 316 (1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Seltzer v. Ashton Hall Nursing & Convalescent Home
green
2 sentences1980We agree with plaintiffs contention that defendant’s petition to open judgment was not timely filed, and that the petition fails to adequately set forth the existence of a meritorious defense: Smith v. Tonon, 231 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 331 A. 2d 662 (1974); Seltzer v. Ashton Hall Nursing and Convalescent Home, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 127 , 289 A. 2d 207 (1972); Crown Construction Co. v. Newfoundland Am. 1980We agree with plaintiffs contention that defendant’s petition to open judgment was not timely filed, and that the petition fails to adequately set forth the existence of a meritorious defense: Smith v. Tonon, 231 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 331 A. 2d 662 (1974); Seltzer v. Ashton Hall Nursing and Convalescent Home, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 127 , 289 A. 2d 207 (1972); Crown Construction Co. v. Newfoundland Am. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Smith v. Tonon
green
2 sentences1980We agree with plaintiffs contention that defendant’s petition to open judgment was not timely filed, and that the petition fails to adequately set forth the existence of a meritorious defense: Smith v. Tonon, 231 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 331 A. 2d 662 (1974); Seltzer v. Ashton Hall Nursing and Convalescent Home, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 127 , 289 A. 2d 207 (1972); Crown Construction Co. v. Newfoundland Am. 1980We agree with plaintiffs contention that defendant’s petition to open judgment was not timely filed, and that the petition fails to adequately set forth the existence of a meritorious defense: Smith v. Tonon, 231 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 331 A. 2d 662 (1974); Seltzer v. Ashton Hall Nursing and Convalescent Home, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 127 , 289 A. 2d 207 (1972); Crown Construction Co. v. Newfoundland Am. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cherry Steel Corp. v. Ashbourne Country Club
green
2 sentences1978Cherry Steel Corp. v. Ashbourne Country Club, 227 Pa.Super. 433 , 323 A.2d 231 (1974). 1978Cherry Steel Corp. v. Ashbourne Country Club, 227 Pa.Super. 433 , 323 A.2d 231 (1974). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Fishman v. Benjamin Noble, Inc.
green
2 sentences1977Indeed, the lower court concedes in its opinion in explanation of its amending order of March 1 that “there is no fatal defect on the face of the record and hence the judgment should not have been stricken.” [ 3] If appellee’s motion of December 19 to strike the judgment of December 8 were to be liberally construed as a motion to open the judgment to permit a defense, it would still fail to justify an opening of the judgment to permit a defense because the petition does not aver the existence of a meritorious defense or explain satisfactorily the failure to file a timely answer to appellant’s 1977Indeed, the lower court concedes in its opinion in explanation of its amending order of March 1 that “there is no fatal defect on the face of the record and hence the judgment should not have been stricken.” [ 3] If appellee’s motion of December 19 to strike the judgment of December 8 were to be liberally construed as a motion to open the judgment to permit a defense, it would still fail to justify an opening of the judgment to permit a defense because the petition does not aver the existence of a meritorious defense or explain satisfactorily the failure to file a timely answer to appellant’s | 1 | 1977–1977 |
ROSE v. Cohen
green
2 sentences1967The practice of petition and answer is well established, Vallish v. Rapoport, 364 Pa. 25 , 70 A. 2d 616 (1950); Rose v. Cohen, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 454 , 165 A. 2d 264 (1960), and the issue raised by such pleadings must be determined at a hearing thereon at which the burden rests upon the one seeking to open the default judgment to prove due diligence, proper grounds for opening the judgment, and generally the existence of a meritorious defense, all of which must be founded on sufficient consistent evidence, D’Amore v. Erthal, 421 Pa. 417 , 219 A. 2d 674 (1966), in which case it is stated that 1967The practice of petition and answer is well established, Vallish v. Rapoport, 364 Pa. 25 , 70 A. 2d 616 (1950); Rose v. Cohen, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 454 , 165 A. 2d 264 (1960), and the issue raised by such pleadings must be determined at a hearing thereon at which the burden rests upon the one seeking to open the default judgment to prove due diligence, proper grounds for opening the judgment, and generally the existence of a meritorious defense, all of which must be founded on sufficient consistent evidence, D’Amore v. Erthal, 421 Pa. 417 , 219 A. 2d 674 (1966), in which case it is stated that | 1 | 1967–1967 |
D'Amore v. Erthal
green
2 sentences1967The practice of petition and answer is well established, Vallish v. Rapoport, 364 Pa. 25 , 70 A. 2d 616 (1950); Rose v. Cohen, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 454 , 165 A. 2d 264 (1960), and the issue raised by such pleadings must be determined at a hearing thereon at which the burden rests upon the one seeking to open the default judgment to prove due diligence, proper grounds for opening the judgment, and generally the existence of a meritorious defense, all of which must be founded on sufficient consistent evidence, D’Amore v. Erthal, 421 Pa. 417 , 219 A. 2d 674 (1966), in which case it is stated that 1967The practice of petition and answer is well established, Vallish v. Rapoport, 364 Pa. 25 , 70 A. 2d 616 (1950); Rose v. Cohen, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 454 , 165 A. 2d 264 (1960), and the issue raised by such pleadings must be determined at a hearing thereon at which the burden rests upon the one seeking to open the default judgment to prove due diligence, proper grounds for opening the judgment, and generally the existence of a meritorious defense, all of which must be founded on sufficient consistent evidence, D’Amore v. Erthal, 421 Pa. 417 , 219 A. 2d 674 (1966), in which case it is stated that | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Vallish v. Rapoport
green
2 sentences1967The practice of petition and answer is well established, Vallish v. Rapoport, 364 Pa. 25 , 70 A. 2d 616 (1950); Rose v. Cohen, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 454 , 165 A. 2d 264 (1960), and the issue raised by such pleadings must be determined at a hearing thereon at which the burden rests upon the one seeking to open the default judgment to prove due diligence, proper grounds for opening the judgment, and generally the existence of a meritorious defense, all of which must be founded on sufficient consistent evidence, D’Amore v. Erthal, 421 Pa. 417 , 219 A. 2d 674 (1966), in which case it is stated that 1967The practice of petition and answer is well established, Vallish v. Rapoport, 364 Pa. 25 , 70 A. 2d 616 (1950); Rose v. Cohen, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 454 , 165 A. 2d 264 (1960), and the issue raised by such pleadings must be determined at a hearing thereon at which the burden rests upon the one seeking to open the default judgment to prove due diligence, proper grounds for opening the judgment, and generally the existence of a meritorious defense, all of which must be founded on sufficient consistent evidence, D’Amore v. Erthal, 421 Pa. 417 , 219 A. 2d 674 (1966), in which case it is stated that | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Page v. Patterson
neutral
1 sentence1945“The mere statement that the failure to file was due to inadvertence or oversight on the part of counsel, is not a sufficiently reasonable explanation or excuse to call for the application of the rule”: Page v. Patterson, 105 Pa. Superior Ct. 438, 440 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.