opening clause in California

2020In answering yes, we held that “Proposition 47’s new petty theft provision, section 490.2, covers the theft form of the Vehicle Code section 10851 offense,” even though Vehicle Code section 10851 was not amended by Proposition 47 and “is not mentioned in the opening clause of section 490.2, subdivision (a).” ( Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1183, 1186.) We explained that “the operative language” of section 490.2 “ ‘stands on its own and means what it says — the act of “obtaining any property by theft where the value . . . does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950)” constitutes petty thef

2019(Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1186 .) “On the contrary: ‘Omitting the opening clause does not alter the meaning of the remainder of the sentence; the independent clause containing the definition of petty theft stands on its own and means what it says—the act of “obtaining any property by theft where the value . . . does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950)” constitutes petty theft and must be charged as a misdemeanor.’” (Ibid.) Thus, the “notwithstanding” clause merely clarifies that statutes defining grand theft do not override the general definition of petty theft in subdivision (a)

2026(City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 .) California Rules of Court, rule 8.204[(a)(1)(C]) provides each brief must ‘[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.’ ” Kaweah Home Health adds: “Further, [Richardson] failed to provide reasoned arguments supported by legal authority … Although the Opening Brief contains a table of [authorities], not one of the [nine] listed cases is cited [anywhere] in the entire Opening Brief[;] in fact the Opening brief lacks citation to any case law or

2026(City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287 .)” Kaweah Home Health’s arguments are well taken.

2025(People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 804.) “Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context. [Citation.] If the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we need not embark on judicial construction. [Citations.] If the statutory language contains no ambiguity, the L

2025(Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster.com Dict., <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unless> (as of December 24, 2025) [“unless” means “except on the condition that[;] under any other 7 Jackson also states he had a right to a jury determination of aggravating factors under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , but he fails to supply cogent argument supported by legal analysis of that case, thus forfeiting the argument.

2024As more fully developed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in later cases, “ ‘[T]he question is whether the statutory attorney fees provision expressly, or the policy of the statute implicitly, overrides the freedom to contract for a different outcome.’ ” (Dorsey v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 583, 594 , quoting County of Sacramento v. Sandison (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 646, 651 .)3 The Fifth District Court of Appeal has reached a similar conclusion, relying on section 3513, which provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit.

2024As more fully developed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in later cases, “ ‘[T]he question is whether the statutory attorney fees provision expressly, or the policy of the statute implicitly, overrides the freedom to contract for a different outcome.’ ” (Dorsey v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 583, 594 , quoting County of Sacramento v. Sandison (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 646, 651 .)3 The Fifth District Court of Appeal has reached a similar conclusion, relying on section 3513, which provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit.

2024As pertinent here, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has described the opening clause of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 as “a limitation on the right of parties to agree to fees entitlements.” (Carver, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 147 .) This is not a blanket limitation on such agreements, however.

2022(Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Harcros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1099 .) But we must nonetheless “give due consideration to the Legislature’s stated views on ‘the prior import of its statutes.’ ” (Ibid.) To the extent the statute’s use of the word “request” twice in the opening clause of the section creates an ambiguity in the language of section 2923.7 as it stood from 2013–2018, we conclude that the Legislature’s 2019 clarification tips the scale in favor of the Mungai line of cases.

2019In summary, Wage Order No. 4's "Definitions" and "Minimum Wages" sections expressly apply to rank-and-file employees of the state government, and Morillion , supra , 22 Cal.4th 575 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 , 995 P.2d 139 , supports an argument that both types of walk time at issue in this case fall within Wage Order No. 4's definition of "[h]ours worked," a definition that focuses on "control." 2.

2019In summary, Wage Order No. 4's "Definitions" and "Minimum Wages" sections expressly apply to rank-and-file employees of the state government, and Morillion , supra , 22 Cal.4th 575 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 , 995 P.2d 139 , supports an argument that both types of walk time at issue in this case fall within Wage Order No. 4's definition of "[h]ours worked," a definition that focuses on "control." 2.

2019(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 423 .) While cannons of interpretation teach us that the absence of an opening clause referring to specific receiving stolen property provisions can be viewed as an indication of intent, I think the ballot materials for Proposition 47 contain stronger evidence.

2017The opening clause of section 490.2 As further support for its conclusion, the Johnston court pointed to the opening clause of section 490.2, which clarifies the definition of petty theft contained therein applies ‘“[n]otwithstanding Section 487’ . . . ‘or any other provision of law defining grand theft.’” ( Johnston, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 255-256.) The court viewed section 10851’s absence from this clause as another indication the drafters intended to 17 exclude the offense from Proposition 47’s purview.

2017(Accord, Van Orden , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 [" Section 1170.18, subdivision (a) lists provisions that establish new misdemeanor penalties , not provisions containing affected substantive offenses."], rev. granted.) 3 *792 *1186 Second, the Attorney General notes that Vehicle Code section 10851 is not mentioned in the opening clause of section 490.2, subdivision (a), quoted again here with added italics: " Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or pe

2017(Accord, Van Orden , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 [" Section 1170.18, subdivision (a) lists provisions that establish new misdemeanor penalties , not provisions containing affected substantive offenses."], rev. granted.) 3 *792 *1186 Second, the Attorney General notes that Vehicle Code section 10851 is not mentioned in the opening clause of section 490.2, subdivision (a), quoted again here with added italics: " Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or pe

2015(Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 30 ; see also People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822 [a defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to misinterpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury 11 understood the instruction in the way the defendant claims].) The court concluded that the word “if” in the instruction’s opening clause—“ ‘If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed’ ”—logically makes the entire clause conditional.

2015Therefore, the court concluded it was “highly unlikely a reasonable juror would have understood the instruction as dictating that ‘the crime was committed.’ ” ( Paysinger, supra, at p. 30 .) Appellant argues that the Paysinger court’s grammatical construction is wrong.

1965Among possible classifications of the many offenses that are based upon the operation of a motor vehicle, some have to do with the physical condition of the operator while driving; others with the manner and speed of driving; others with the operation of unlicensed vehicles; others with the operator's lack of a license or permit to drive, etc. The case of People v. Dinneen, 29 Misc.2d 465 [ 221 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 ], may serve to illustrate the proper application of the statutory bar against multiple prosecution and multiple punishment in vehicular cases.

1965Among possible classifications of the many offenses that are based upon the operation of a motor vehicle, some have to do with the physical condition of the operator while driving; others with the manner and speed of driving; others with the operation of unlicensed vehicles; others with the operator's lack of a license or permit to drive, etc. The case of People v. Dinneen, 29 Misc.2d 465 [ 221 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 ], may serve to illustrate the proper application of the statutory bar against multiple prosecution and multiple punishment in vehicular cases.

1965The State of New York has a statute (§ 1938 of the Penal Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: "An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, but not under more than one." [Italics added.] Cases decided under the New York statute have been cited as authority by the Supreme Court of this state. ( Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) The New York statute is said to be "identical with" California Penal

1965The State of New York has a statute (§ 1938 of the Penal Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: "An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, but not under more than one." [Italics added.] Cases decided under the New York statute have been cited as authority by the Supreme Court of this state. ( Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) The New York statute is said to be "identical with" California Penal

1965The State of New York has a statute (§ 1938 of the Penal Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: "An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, but not under more than one." [Italics added.] Cases decided under the New York statute have been cited as authority by the Supreme Court of this state. ( Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) The New York statute is said to be "identical with" California Penal

1965However] Convictions in a single trial followed by separate sentences for manslaughter and for failing- to stop and render aid were affirmed in People v. Steinbach, 166 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 333 P.2d 147 ], and in People v. McKee, 80 Cal.App. 200 [ 251 P. 675 ]. - The State of New York has a statute (§ 19-38 of the Penal-Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: “An- act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions' of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, 'but' not under inore than one. ” [Italics a

1965However] Convictions in a single trial followed by separate sentences for manslaughter and for failing- to stop and render aid were affirmed in People v. Steinbach, 166 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 333 P.2d 147 ], and in People v. McKee, 80 Cal.App. 200 [ 251 P. 675 ]. - The State of New York has a statute (§ 19-38 of the Penal-Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: “An- act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions' of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, 'but' not under inore than one. ” [Italics a

1965However] Convictions in a single trial followed by separate sentences for manslaughter and for failing- to stop and render aid were affirmed in People v. Steinbach, 166 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 333 P.2d 147 ], and in People v. McKee, 80 Cal.App. 200 [ 251 P. 675 ]. - The State of New York has a statute (§ 19-38 of the Penal-Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: “An- act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions' of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, 'but' not under inore than one. ” [Italics a

1965However] Convictions in a single trial followed by separate sentences for manslaughter and for failing- to stop and render aid were affirmed in People v. Steinbach, 166 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 333 P.2d 147 ], and in People v. McKee, 80 Cal.App. 200 [ 251 P. 675 ]. - The State of New York has a statute (§ 19-38 of the Penal-Law, Consolidated Laws, ch. 40), the opening clause of which is as follows: “An- act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions' of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, 'but' not under inore than one. ” [Italics a

1960(People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Nor do we feel that the trial court’s statement instructing the appellant to disclose “what crimes they were, if any,” was improper since its only logical reference was to the deputy district attorney’s opening inquiry prior thereto requesting a disclosure by the appellant of any prior felony convictions.

1960(People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Nor do we feel that the trial court’s statement instructing the appellant to disclose “what crimes they were, if any,” was improper since its only logical reference was to the deputy district attorney’s opening inquiry prior thereto requesting a disclosure by the appellant of any prior felony convictions.

1949In denying probate, the court referred to Estate of Bernard, 197 Cal. 36 [ 239 P. 404 ], where it was held that the abrupt termination of the document near the middle of the last page was a strong indication that the decedent intended to do something more in order to make it a complete will and compelled the conclusion that decedent had no intention of adopting the name written in the opening clause as the executing signature.

1949In denying probate, the court referred to Estate of Bernard, 197 Cal. 36 [ 239 P. 404 ], where it was held that the abrupt termination of the document near the middle of the last page was a strong indication that the decedent intended to do something more in order to make it a complete will and compelled the conclusion that decedent had no intention of adopting the name written in the opening clause as the executing signature.

1946Appellant’s counsel with commendable frankness at once recognize these rules but contend that the court abused its discretion because the record shows “the real purpose of the motion was not to try the divorce action on its merits, but was to set aside the agreement of property settlement,” and they point to the following statement, made by respondent’s counsel at the opening of the hearing: “. . . we are making this motion to set aside the default, due to the fact that the defendant is unable to make such payments. ...” This, it must be admitted, had nothing to do with the merits of the motio

1944(Estate of Tooley, 170 Cal. 164 [ 149 P. 574 , Ann.Cas. 1917B 516]; Estate of Briggs, 186 Cal. 351 [ 199 P. 322 ]; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal.2d 1 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].) Clause (n) must be interpreted in relation to this concluding clause so as “to form one consistent whole,” if such is possible, and if the concluding clause should be found to be “absolutely irreconcilable” with clause (n), the concluding clause should prevail.

1944(Estate of Tooley, 170 Cal. 164 [ 149 P. 574 , Ann.Cas. 1917B 516]; Estate of Briggs, 186 Cal. 351 [ 199 P. 322 ]; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal.2d 1 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].) Clause (n) must be interpreted in relation to this concluding clause so as “to form one consistent whole,” if such is possible, and if the concluding clause should be found to be “absolutely irreconcilable” with clause (n), the concluding clause should prevail.