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5 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Omerod v. Heirs of Kaheananuigreen1 sentence2021In Omerod v. Heirs of Kaheananui, 116 Hawai#i 239, 262, 172 P.3d 983, 1006 (2007), the Hawai#i Supreme Court disregarded points of error due to noncompliance with HRAP Rule 28(b)(4)(ii) and (iii) and (b)(4)(C), holding that appellants "are required to do more than assert bald points of error," and that "cursory treatment of the points of appeal cannot reasonably be considered compliant with HRAP Rule 28(b)(4)." Similarly, in Nuuanu Valley Ass'n v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 119 Hawai#i 90, 2 HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) states in pertinent part, (b) Opening brief. . . . [T]he appellant shall file an ope | 1 | 1 |
State v. Frisbeegreen2 sentences2007The fact is that, “[ajlthough [Sunderland] did not explicitly phrase [his conviction, despite its article I, section 6 implications,] in terms of plain error, he did raise the issue and argued it as error.” State v. Frisbee, 114 Hawai'i 76, 84 , 156 P.3d 1182, 1190 (2007) (Moon, C.J., concurring) (emphases in original). 2007The fact is that, “[ajlthough [Sunderland] did not explicitly phrase [his conviction, despite its article I, section 6 implications,] in terms of plain error, he did raise the issue and argued it as error.” State v. Frisbee, 114 Hawai'i 76, 84 , 156 P.3d 1182, 1190 (2007) (Moon, C.J., concurring) (emphases in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aplacagreen2 sentences1993State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 66-67 , 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (1992) (footnote and citations omitted). 1993State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 66-67 , 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (1992) (footnote and citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kenoa v. Meekgreen2 sentences1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example 1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1 |
Thurston v. Bishopgreen2 sentences1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example 1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ho
green
2 sentences1994Although both the Soto and Ho courts appear to have assumed, arguendo, that motions for supervised release and/or bail reduction were ex-cludable under HRPP 48(c)(1), see Soto, 63 Haw. at 318-20 , 627 P.2d at 280-81 ; Ho, 7 Haw.App. at 517 , 782 P.2d at 30 , Hoey is correct in his assertion that neither decision proffered any explanation “as to how the bail *30 motions filed in those cases delayed the commencement of trial.” Opening brief at 22. 1994Although both the Soto and Ho courts appear to have assumed, arguendo, that motions for supervised release and/or bail reduction were ex-cludable under HRPP 48(c)(1), see Soto, 63 Haw. at 318-20 , 627 P.2d at 280-81 ; Ho, 7 Haw.App. at 517 , 782 P.2d at 30 , Hoey is correct in his assertion that neither decision proffered any explanation “as to how the bail *30 motions filed in those cases delayed the commencement of trial.” Opening brief at 22. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Soto
green
2 sentences1994Although both the Soto and Ho courts appear to have assumed, arguendo, that motions for supervised release and/or bail reduction were ex-cludable under HRPP 48(c)(1), see Soto, 63 Haw. at 318-20 , 627 P.2d at 280-81 ; Ho, 7 Haw.App. at 517 , 782 P.2d at 30 , Hoey is correct in his assertion that neither decision proffered any explanation “as to how the bail *30 motions filed in those cases delayed the commencement of trial.” Opening brief at 22. 1994Although both the Soto and Ho courts appear to have assumed, arguendo, that motions for supervised release and/or bail reduction were ex-cludable under HRPP 48(c)(1), see Soto, 63 Haw. at 318-20 , 627 P.2d at 280-81 ; Ho, 7 Haw.App. at 517 , 782 P.2d at 30 , Hoey is correct in his assertion that neither decision proffered any explanation “as to how the bail *30 motions filed in those cases delayed the commencement of trial.” Opening brief at 22. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences1993Relying on State v. Foster, 44 Haw. 403 , 354 P.2d 960 (1960), and Crane v. Kentucky, supra, Kelekolio also urges, however, that the jury instructions as a whole were “prejudicially insufficient” because “the [trial] court never instructed the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of [his] confession,” thus depriving the jury of the opportunity “to make the ultimate determination of whether [his] confession was freely and voluntarily made.” Opening brief at 21-22. 1993Relying on State v. Foster, 44 Haw. 403 , 354 P.2d 960 (1960), and Crane v. Kentucky, supra, Kelekolio also urges, however, that the jury instructions as a whole were “prejudicially insufficient” because “the [trial] court never instructed the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of [his] confession,” thus depriving the jury of the opportunity “to make the ultimate determination of whether [his] confession was freely and voluntarily made.” Opening brief at 21-22. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Land Title, Waimalu
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Walton v. Stafford
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Haalelea v. Montgomery
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
In re the Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Kanaina v. Long
neutral
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Harris v. Carter
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Hatton v. Piopio
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Territory ex rel. Bailey v. Gay
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
In re Title of Pa Pelekane
green
1 sentence1940(Opening brief of trustees and tenants, pp. 77, 172.) 14 Walton v. Stafford, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, 1052 . 15 Counsel for the trustees and tenants make the reservation that by the word "appurtenant" as used by them in describing the legal relation existing between a sea fishery and the ahupuaa to which it belongs, they do not mean that a konohiki sea fishery would necessarily pass by deed which only named the ahupuaa on which the fishery fronted, but merely in the sense that fishery A belonged to land A. 16 Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L., c. 339, p. 141. 17 See note 25. 18 For example | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.