quantum meruit claim in Georgia

2005Absent express contractual provisions addressing fees in the event of termination, 2 the discharged attorney is limited to pursuing the equitable remedy of quantum meruit, under which he can recover the “reasonable attorney[ ] fees for his services that have been rendered on behalf of the client.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Overman v. All Cities Transfer Co., 176 Ga. App. 436, 438 ( 336 SE2d 341 ) (1985). 3 *147 Significantly, however, this Court has held that an attorney cannot pursue a quantum meruit claim against co-counsel in order to obtain attorney fees; instead, the attorney is

2005Absent express contractual provisions addressing fees in the event of termination, 2 the discharged attorney is limited to pursuing the equitable remedy of quantum meruit, under which he can recover the “reasonable attorney[ ] fees for his services that have been rendered on behalf of the client.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Overman v. All Cities Transfer Co., 176 Ga. App. 436, 438 ( 336 SE2d 341 ) (1985). 3 *147 Significantly, however, this Court has held that an attorney cannot pursue a quantum meruit claim against co-counsel in order to obtain attorney fees; instead, the attorney is

2018The trial court explicitly found that the July 31, 2012 contract was enforceable and was “legally 5 Cook Pecan Co., 337 Ga. App. at 190 (2) (footnote omitted, citing Hewitt Assocs. v. Rollins, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 600, 602 ( 669 SE2d 551 ) (2008)). 6 See Cook Pecan Co., 337 Ga. App. at 192 (3) (b) (declining to affirm under the right-for-any-reason doctrine in part because McDaniel had not addressed the quantum meruit claim in the trial court). 4 identical” to the contract before the Supreme Court of Georgia in Newman v. Newman.7 The court noted that, because the parties had a legal, enforceable

2018The trial court explicitly found that the July 31, 2012 contract was enforceable and was “legally 5 Cook Pecan Co., 337 Ga. App. at 190 (2) (footnote omitted, citing Hewitt Assocs. v. Rollins, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 600, 602 ( 669 SE2d 551 ) (2008)). 6 See Cook Pecan Co., 337 Ga. App. at 192 (3) (b) (declining to affirm under the right-for-any-reason doctrine in part because McDaniel had not addressed the quantum meruit claim in the trial court). 4 identical” to the contract before the Supreme Court of Georgia in Newman v. Newman.7 The court noted that, because the parties had a legal, enforceable

2018See Cook Pecan Co. , 337 Ga. App. at 192 (3) (b), 786 S.E.2d 852 (declining to affirm under the right-for-any-reason doctrine in part because McDaniel had not addressed the quantum meruit claim in the trial court). 291 Ga. 635 , 732 S.E.2d 77 (2012).

2018See Cook Pecan Co. , 337 Ga. App. at 192 (3) (b), 786 S.E.2d 852 (declining to affirm under the right-for-any-reason doctrine in part because McDaniel had not addressed the quantum meruit claim in the trial court). 291 Ga. 635 , 732 S.E.2d 77 (2012).

2006As noted by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, “the Georgia Supreme Court has never adopted this ‘procuring cause’ element of a quantum meruit claim.” Amend v. 485 Properties, 401 F3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2005).

2006As noted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, "the Georgia Supreme Court has never adopted this `procuring cause' element of a quantum meruit claim." Amend v. 485 Properties, 401 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir.2005).

2006The majority of cases have reiterated the long-held rule that procuring cause is a necessary ingredient in a quantum meruit claim brought by a real estate broker. 1 However, a handful of more recent cases would lead one to a contrary conclusion. 2 It would appear that the contrary view was first expressed in Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 ( 244 SE2d 622 ) (1978).

2006The majority of cases have reiterated the long-held rule that procuring cause is a necessary ingredient in a quantum meruit claim brought by a real estate broker. 1 However, a handful of more recent cases would lead one to a contrary conclusion. 2 It would appear that the contrary view was first expressed in Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 ( 244 SE2d 622 ) (1978).

2025In a different case with different facts, an attorney’s withdrawal could be deemed unwarranted because, for example, it left a client without adequate representation,17 the advice given was out of line with the client’s interests, or the attorney manufactured or exacerbated the conflict to justify a quantum meruit claim.18 Therefore, this case does not stand for the proposition that counsel can always recover fees on a quantum meruit basis after withdrawing from a contingency fee case.19 But we likewise decline to adopt a bright-line rule that attorneys who voluntarily withdraw 17 By contrast,

2025In a different case with different facts, an attorney’s withdrawal could be deemed unwarranted because, for example, it left a client without adequate representation,17 the advice given was out of line with the client’s interests, or the attorney manufactured or exacerbated the conflict to justify a quantum meruit claim.18 Therefore, this case does not stand for the proposition that counsel can always recover fees on a quantum meruit basis after withdrawing from a contingency fee case.19 But we likewise decline to adopt a bright-line rule that attorneys who voluntarily withdraw 17 By contrast,

2023In any event, McLeod now acknowledges that his complaint failed to place Costco and Metheny on notice 9 To the extent that a party may not recover in both contract and tort absent certain circumstances, or that McLeod’s causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel are themselves incompatible, we still are not authorized to affirm because “Georgia law . . . permits a plaintiff to proceed to trial on alternative theories of recovery.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Campbell, 338 Ga. App. at 388 (2); see also Osprey Cove Real Estate, 343 Ga. App. at 442 (5). 13 of a quantu

2023In any event, McLeod now acknowledges that his complaint failed to place Costco and Metheny on notice 9 To the extent that a party may not recover in both contract and tort absent certain circumstances, or that McLeod’s causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel are themselves incompatible, we still are not authorized to affirm because “Georgia law . . . permits a plaintiff to proceed to trial on alternative theories of recovery.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Campbell, 338 Ga. App. at 388 (2); see also Osprey Cove Real Estate, 343 Ga. App. at 442 (5). 13 of a quantu

2021City of Baldwin, 293 Ga. at 22 (1) (b).

2020See Eichholz, 310 Ga. App. at 850-853 (voiding a fee-splitting agreement in which an attorney was to receive a portion of a contingency fee that was earned after he had been discharged, citing case law and GRPC Rule 1.5 (e) (2)); Nelson & Hill, 245 Ga. App. at 65-66 (in an alternative holding, noting that evidence of an oral contingency fee agreement would be inadmissible to support a quantum meruit claim because such an unwritten agreement violated public policy, citing Williams, a then-applicable standard of conduct, and an advisory opinion interpreting that standard); Brandon, 243 Ga. App.

2020See, e.g., TechBios, Inc. v. Champagne, 301 Ga. App. 592, 594 (1) ( 688 SE2d 378 ) (2009) (“actionable fraud cannot be predicated on a promise contained in a contract”). 13 Accordingly, in assessing the amount of damages due under a quantum meruit claim, “the trial court must determine whether [the client] received any benefit from [the attorney’s] services, and if so, the value of those services rendered and received.” Id. at 531-532 (2).

2020See, e.g., TechBios, Inc. v. Champagne, 301 Ga. App. 592, 594 (1) ( 688 SE2d 378 ) (2009) (“actionable fraud cannot be predicated on a promise contained in a contract”). 13 Accordingly, in assessing the amount of damages due under a quantum meruit claim, “the trial court must determine whether [the client] received any benefit from [the attorney’s] services, and if so, the value of those services rendered and received.” Id. at 531-532 (2).

2020See Eichholz, 310 Ga. App. at 850-853 (voiding a fee-splitting agreement in which an attorney was to receive a portion of a contingency fee that was earned after he had been discharged, citing case law and GRPC Rule 1.5 (e) (2)); Nelson & Hill, 245 Ga. App. at 65-66 (in an alternative holding, noting that evidence of an oral contingency fee agreement would be inadmissible to support a quantum meruit claim because such an unwritten agreement violated public policy, citing Williams, a then-applicable standard of conduct, and an advisory opinion interpreting that standard); Brandon, 243 Ga. App.

2020In order to recover under a quantum meruit theory, [Davis] must show (1) his performance as agent of services valuable to [Five Star]; (2) either at the request of [Five Star] or knowingly accepted by [Five Star]; (3) [Five Star’s] receipt of which without compensating [Davis] would be unjust; (4) [and Davis’] expectation of compensation at the time of the rendition of the services.” 1 Although Five Star identifies three separate errors, because we agree with Five Star that its first and third enumeration are “inextricably intertwined” we will address them both here. 4 Artrac Corp. v. Austin K

2020In order to recover under a quantum meruit theory, [Davis] must show (1) his performance as agent of services valuable to [Five Star]; (2) either at the request of [Five Star] or knowingly accepted by [Five Star]; (3) [Five Star’s] receipt of which without compensating [Davis] would be unjust; (4) [and Davis’] expectation of compensation at the time of the rendition of the services.” 1 Although Five Star identifies three separate errors, because we agree with Five Star that its first and third enumeration are “inextricably intertwined” we will address them both here. 4 Artrac Corp. v. Austin K

2020“Under a quantum meruit claim, an attorney is entitled to have his fees valued both in light of the amount of work he has done, and also by the results accomplished.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lewis v. Smith, 274 Ga. App. 528, 531 (2) ( 618 SE2d 32 ) (2005). requires.

2020“Under a quantum meruit claim, an attorney is entitled to have his fees valued both in light of the amount of work he has done, and also by the results accomplished.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lewis v. Smith, 274 Ga. App. 528, 531 (2) ( 618 SE2d 32 ) (2005). requires.

2020See Eichholz, 310 Ga. App. at 850-853 (voiding a fee-splitting agreement in which an attorney was to receive a portion of a contingency fee that was earned after he had been discharged, citing case law and GRPC Rule 1.5 (e) (2)); Nelson & Hill, 245 Ga. App. at 65-66 (in an alternative holding, noting that evidence of an oral contingency fee agreement would be inadmissible to support a quantum meruit claim because such an unwritten agreement violated public policy, citing Williams, a then-applicable standard of conduct, and an advisory opinion interpreting that standard); Brandon, 243 Ga. App.

2019“It has long been the law in Geogia that although a party may plead in alternative counts, no recovery may be had in quantum meruit when a contract governs all claimed rights and responsibilities of the parties.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Graybill v. Attaway Constr. & Assoc., 341 Ga. App. 805, 811-12 (3) ( 802 SE2d 91 ) (2017). 8 We note that where a contract is divisible, such as where services are accepted by successive performances, the statute of limitation runs separately as to each payment when it becomes due.

2019“It has long been the law in Geogia that although a party may plead in alternative counts, no recovery may be had in quantum meruit when a contract governs all claimed rights and responsibilities of the parties.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Graybill v. Attaway Constr. & Assoc., 341 Ga. App. 805, 811-12 (3) ( 802 SE2d 91 ) (2017). 8 We note that where a contract is divisible, such as where services are accepted by successive performances, the statute of limitation runs separately as to each payment when it becomes due.

2019See In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Securities Litigation, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1342 (II) (A) (2) (N.D.

2018See Cook Pecan Co. , 337 Ga. App. at 192 (3) (b), 786 S.E.2d 852 (declining to affirm under the right-for-any-reason doctrine in part because McDaniel had not addressed the quantum meruit claim in the trial court). 291 Ga. 635 , 732 S.E.2d 77 (2012).

2018See Cook Pecan Co. , 337 Ga. App. at 192 (3) (b), 786 S.E.2d 852 (declining to affirm under the right-for-any-reason doctrine in part because McDaniel had not addressed the quantum meruit claim in the trial court). 291 Ga. 635 , 732 S.E.2d 77 (2012).

2016Razavi v. Shackelford, 260 Ga. App. 603, 605-606 (2) ( 580 SE2d 253 ) (2003) (footnote omitted).

2016Razavi v. Shackelford, 260 Ga. App. 603, 605-606 (2) ( 580 SE2d 253 ) (2003) (footnote omitted).

2016See, e.g., Remediation Svcs. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 209 Ga. App. 427, 433-434 (2) ( 433 SE2d 631 ) (1993) (contractor whose officer was a dual agent of both that contractor and the party hiring the contractor could pursue a quantum meruit claim against the hiring party when the contract was not void but “voidable only at the election of the defrauded [hiring party]”).

2016See, e.g., Remediation Svcs. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 209 Ga. App. 427, 433-434 (2) ( 433 SE2d 631 ) (1993) (contractor whose officer was a dual agent of both that contractor and the party hiring the contractor could pursue a quantum meruit claim against the hiring party when the contract was not void but “voidable only at the election of the defrauded [hiring party]”).

2016See, e. g., Tolson v. Sistrunk, 332 Ga. App. 324, 334 ( 772 SE2d 416 ) (2015) (discussing Eichholz, and holding that “[o]rigination or procurement of a case – in other words, rainmaking – is not a service by an attorney that confers value upon a client or that is rendered to or for the benefit of the client.”). 3 But the interest of this or other questions1 should not distract us from the simpler issue before us – that is, whether the Tate firm was entitled to summary judgment on the Eichholz firm’s quantum meruit claim because the Eichholz firm failed to produce any evidence of the reasonable

2016See, e. g., Tolson v. Sistrunk, 332 Ga. App. 324, 334 ( 772 SE2d 416 ) (2015) (discussing Eichholz, and holding that “[o]rigination or procurement of a case – in other words, rainmaking – is not a service by an attorney that confers value upon a client or that is rendered to or for the benefit of the client.”). 3 But the interest of this or other questions1 should not distract us from the simpler issue before us – that is, whether the Tate firm was entitled to summary judgment on the Eichholz firm’s quantum meruit claim because the Eichholz firm failed to produce any evidence of the reasonable

2015(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Ga. Ports Authority, 204 Ga. App. 504, 506 (2) ( 420 SE2d 50 ) (1992); see also Callahan v. Hall, 302 Ga. App. 886, 888 ( 691 SE2d 918 ) (2010) (subcontractor is precluded from pursuing a quantum meruit claim in the absence of a direct contractual relationship).

2015(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Ga. Ports Authority, 204 Ga. App. 504, 506 (2) ( 420 SE2d 50 ) (1992); see also Callahan v. Hall, 302 Ga. App. 886, 888 ( 691 SE2d 918 ) (2010) (subcontractor is precluded from pursuing a quantum meruit claim in the absence of a direct contractual relationship).

2015(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Ga. Ports Authority, 204 Ga. App. 504, 506 (2) ( 420 SE2d 50 ) (1992); see also Callahan v. Hall, 302 Ga. App. 886, 888 ( 691 SE2d 918 ) (2010) (subcontractor is precluded from pursuing a quantum meruit claim in the absence of a direct contractual relationship).

2015(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Ga. Ports Authority, 204 Ga. App. 504, 506 (2) ( 420 SE2d 50 ) (1992); see also Callahan v. Hall, 302 Ga. App. 886, 888 ( 691 SE2d 918 ) (2010) (subcontractor is precluded from pursuing a quantum meruit claim in the absence of a direct contractual relationship).

2014Corp., supra at 243 (2) (d); Bankston v. Warbington, 319 Ga. App. 821, 823 (2) ( 738 SE2d 656 ) (2013); Trotman, LLC, supra; Brewer, supra. 8 the trial court to enter appropriate findings of fact, or even allow additional evidence, . . . . a remand would be inappropriate in this particular case,” because the quantum meruit claim upon which the award was based did not lack substantial justification; the claim for attorney fees was barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel; and fundamental principles of jurisprudence militate against allowing Great Investors multiple attempt