quantum meruit claim in Massachusetts

2008Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, supra at 796-798 (affirming trial judge’s computation of quantum meruit recovery where judge looked in part to provisions of underlying contract); Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, supra at 576 (“In applying a quantum meruit standard, the terms of the abrogated [contingent] fee agreement provide helpful guidance . . .”).

2004“In applying a quantum meruit standard [to the calculation of an attorney’s lien,] . . . the discharged attorney is entitled to consideration not only of the services rendered, but also the contribution of those services to the ultimate result achieved.” Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 576 (1980).

1995See Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 384 Mass. 803 (1981) (rescript opinion).

1994“In applying a quantum meruit standard, the terms of the abrogated fee agreement provide helpful guidance, and the discharged attorney is entitled to consideration not only of the services rendered but also the contribution of those services to the ultimate result achieved.” Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 576 (1980), S.C., 384 Mass. 803 (1981).

2026See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 715 (1991) (“If the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.”) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catret, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) [White, J., concurring]).

2026See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 715 (1991) (“If the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.”) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catret, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) [White, J., concurring]).

2023A constructive trust may be imposed “to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from fraud, a violation of a fiduciary duty or confidential relationship, mistake, or ‘other circumstances’ in which a recipient's acquisition of legal title to property amounts to unjust enrichment.” Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235, 246 (2007), quoting Fortin vv.

2016The case law is clear, however, that the quantum meruit doctrine has no application in the case of an intentional breach by the claimant unless the claimant can prove “both substantial performance of the contract and an endeavor on his part in good faith to perform fully, and the burden is upon him to prove both.” Andre, 305 Mass. at 515 (emphasis added).

2016“In the absence of special exculpating circumstances, an intentional departure from the precise requirements of the contract is not consistent with good faith in the endeavor fully to perform it, and unless such departure is so trifling as to fall within the de minimis rule, it bars all recovery.” Id.

2013See also Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 255 (2013) (holding that the Wage Act is not the exclusive remedy for recovery of unpaid wages and, therefore, the plaintiffs common-law claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit should not have been dismissed).

2008See also Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 135 (1932) (after cancellation of contingent fee contract, terms of contract, although not determinative, may be considered to ascertain quantum meruit).

2008Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, supra at 796-798 (affirming trial judge’s computation of quantum meruit recovery where judge looked in part to provisions of underlying contract); Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, supra at 576 (“In applying a quantum meruit standard, the terms of the abrogated [contingent] fee agreement provide helpful guidance . . .”).

2006MCI Worldcomm Communications v. Department of Telecommunications and Energy, 442 Mass. 103, 116 (2004); Malonis v. Harrington, supra, at 697 .

2004Among the other factors a court may consider “are the customaiy ones applicable in measuring a legal fee: the special skills which may have been brought to bear, the complexity of the case, the size of the case in terms of dollars, the caliber of the services, the fees usually charged for work of the kind involved, the time spent, and the success achieved.” Id. (citations omitted); see Phelps Steel, Inc., 24 Mass.App.Ct. at 595 , citing Mulhern v. Roach, 398 Mass. 18, 24-25 (1986).

2004Among the other factors a court may consider “are the customaiy ones applicable in measuring a legal fee: the special skills which may have been brought to bear, the complexity of the case, the size of the case in terms of dollars, the caliber of the services, the fees usually charged for work of the kind involved, the time spent, and the success achieved.” Id. (citations omitted); see Phelps Steel, Inc., 24 Mass.App.Ct. at 595 , citing Mulhern v. Roach, 398 Mass. 18, 24-25 (1986).

2003See Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 883 (1982) (court did not reach issue of quantum meruit recovery where plaintiff was entitled to commissions pursuant to contract).

2003In Propac-Mass, Lnc., the Supreme Judicial Court criticized as “uninstructive” the previously used “level of rascality” test set out in Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass.App.Ct. 498, 504 (1979).

1996Compare Heil v. McCann, 360 Mass. 507, 511 (1971).

1994Plaintiffs respond that summary judgment and dismissal are inappropriate because (A) plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of contracts between CPCS through the intermediary to themselves; (B) both G.L.c. 211D: 12 and G.L.c. 29:29C create contractual obligations; (C) the performance of plaintiffs and the nonperformance of defendants make the quantum meruit claim appropriate; (D) the violations of statutory provisions are ongoing; and (E) the Commonwealth has waived its immunity as to contract claims. 3 First, though it is true that the Commonwealth cannot be sued in its own courts without i

1994Morash & Sons, Inc., v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 617 (1973).

1986In relying on Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 341 (1979), for support for the proposition that a quantum meruit claim may be brought against the Commonwealth, the judge stated that “[wjhen a contract is broken by one party, the other may disaffirm and seek the fair value of services and material provided under that contract.” Moreover, the judge found that the Commonwealth contributed to the delay in the completion of the project.

1986See Albre Marble & Tile Co., Inc. v. Goverman, 353 Mass. 546 (1968).

1986See Frank Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Pacella Bros., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 242 (1974).

1980Elbaum v. Sullivan, 344 Mass. 662, 666-667 (1962).