28 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Jolliffgreen2 sentences2004Because neither a suspect classification nor fundamental right is at issue, the "appropriate measure" of section 11. 2's constitutionality is "the deferential rational basis test, which asks whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill.2d at 520 , 264 Ill.Dec. 642 , 771 N.E.2d at 352 . 2004Because neither a suspect classification nor fundamental right is at issue, the "appropriate measure" of section 11. 2's constitutionality is "the deferential rational basis test, which asks whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill.2d at 520 , 264 Ill.Dec. 642 , 771 N.E.2d at 352 . | 2 | 6 |
Village of Willowbrook v. Olechgreen2 sentences2022Thus, for Mr. Spiegel to prevail on his equal protection claim, he would have to show that the Village “intentionally treated [him] differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” (Emphasis added.) Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). ¶ 57 Applying that deferential test here, we reject Mr. Spiegel’s equal protection claim for the same reasons the circuit court did: he has failed to provide any evidence that he was treated differently than other property owners. 2022Thus, for Mr. Spiegel to prevail on his equal protection claim, he would have to show that the Village “intentionally treated [him] differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” (Emphasis added.) Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). ¶ 57 Applying that deferential test here, we reject Mr. Spiegel’s equal protection claim for the same reasons the circuit court did: he has failed to provide any evidence that he was treated differently than other property owners. | 2 | 2 |
Majid v. The Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicagogreen2 sentences2017Majid, 2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 48 (“The deferential rational basis test applies to a statutory classification that does not affect fundamental rights or create a suspect classification.”). 2016Majid, 2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 48 (“The deferential rational basis test applies to a statutory classification that does not 16 1-15-3094 affect fundamental rights or create a suspect classification.”). | 2 | 2 |
Trettenero v. POLICE PENSION FUND OF AURORAgreen2 sentences2015Trettenero v. Police Pension Fund, 333 Ill. 2015Trettenero v. Police Pension Fund, 333 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staffgreen2 sentences2013Where, as here, no fundamental right or suspect class is affected by the statute in question, “ ‘the deferential rational basis test’ ” applies. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325 ). 2013Where, as here, no fundamental right or suspect class is affected by the statute in question, “ ‘the deferential rational basis test’ ” applies. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325 ). | 2 | 2 |
Best v. Taylor MacHine Worksgreen2 sentences2002See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337 , 151 Ill. 2002See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337 , 151 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
County of Bureau v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2002See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337 , 151 Ill. 2002See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337 , 151 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Russell v. Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences2002Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill.2d 434, 446 , 233 *355 Ill.Dec. 782, 701 N.E.2d 1056 (1998). 2002Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill.2d 434, 446 , 233 *355 Ill.Dec. 782, 701 N.E.2d 1056 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board
green
2 sentences2013Where, as here, no fundamental right or suspect class is affected by the statute in question, “ ‘the deferential rational basis test’ ” applies. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325 ). 2013Where, as here, no fundamental right or suspect class is affected by the statute in question, “ ‘the deferential rational basis test’ ” applies. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325 ). | 5 | 2007–2013 |
In Re DP
neutral
2 sentences2005The appellate court disagreed with the reasoning of In re D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d 30 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 , noting that the court in D.W. had applied the wrong standard in its due process analysis: "Although the [ D.W. ] court began its analysis by stating that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny and was constitutional only if narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest ( D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d at 47 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 ), its analysis of the issue reads as if it utilized the deferential rational-basis standard, under which a statute is required only to 2005The appellate court disagreed with the reasoning of In re D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d 30 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 , noting that the court in D.W. had applied the wrong standard in its due process analysis: "Although the [ D.W. ] court began its analysis by stating that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny and was constitutional only if narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest ( D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d at 47 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 ), its analysis of the issue reads as if it utilized the deferential rational-basis standard, under which a statute is required only to | 4 | 2004–2005 |
Illinois Collaboration on Youth v. Dimas
neutral
2 sentences2022Where, as here, “neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, the deferential rational basis test applies.” Dimas, 2017 IL App (1st) 162471, ¶ 79 . 2022Where, as here, “neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, the deferential rational basis test applies.” Dimas, 2017 IL App (1st) 162471, ¶ 79 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
AFSCME Council 31 v. State
green
2 sentences2017When neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, the deferential rational basis test applies; the statute “must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. 2017We note that plaintiffs discussed these claims to some degree in their opening brief and responded to defendants’ arguments in plaintiffs’ reply brief. - 32 - 1-16-2471 statute “must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid
green
2 sentences2015Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 322 . ¶ 48 The deferential rational basis test applies to a statutory classification that does not affect fundamental rights or create a suspect classification. 2015Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 322 . ¶ 48 The deferential rational basis test applies to a statutory classification that does not affect fundamental rights or create a suspect classification. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
In Re DW
green
2 sentences2005The appellate court disagreed with the reasoning of In re D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d 30 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 , noting that the court in D.W. had applied the wrong standard in its due process analysis: "Although the [ D.W. ] court began its analysis by stating that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny and was constitutional only if narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest ( D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d at 47 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 ), its analysis of the issue reads as if it utilized the deferential rational-basis standard, under which a statute is required only to 2005The appellate court disagreed with the reasoning of In re D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d 30 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 , noting that the court in D.W. had applied the wrong standard in its due process analysis: "Although the [ D.W. ] court began its analysis by stating that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny and was constitutional only if narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest ( D.W., 344 Ill.App.3d at 47 , 278 Ill.Dec. 692 , 799 N.E.2d 410 ), its analysis of the issue reads as if it utilized the deferential rational-basis standard, under which a statute is required only to | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Allen , 208 Ill. 2d at 22 ; Jolliff , 199 Ill. 2d at 520 . 2005Allen, 208 Ill. 2d at 22 ; Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d at 520 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
In Re AA
green
2 sentences2002In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32 , 37, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998). 2002In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32 , 37, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2002See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337 , 151 Ill. 2002See Best, 179 Ill.2d at 394 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 ; Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 , 125 Ill.Dec. 822 , 531 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Thompson, 139 Ill.2d at 337 , 151 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Jenkins v. Wu
green
2 sentences1990Even under the deferential rational basis test applied by this court, statistics heretofore cited demonstrate that the arbitrary four-year period of repose does not have a “fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” (Emphasis added.) (Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 477 .) It is, therefore, violative of equal protection guarantees and constitutes special legislation. 1990Even under the deferential rational basis test applied by this court, statistics heretofore cited demonstrate that the arbitrary four-year period of repose does not have a " fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." (Emphasis added.) ( Jenkins, 102 Ill.2d at 477 .) It is, therefore, violative of equal protection guarantees and constitutes special legislation. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.