deferential rational basis test in California

2016(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 [ 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 341 P.3d 1075 ] (Johnson); Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838 .) This standard does not depend on whether the Legislature ever actually articulated its purpose, and the underlying rationale need not be empirically substantiated.

2016“A defendant . . . ‘does not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment or 11 in the designation a particular crime receives.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 .) Absent some allegation that sentencing disparity involves a suspect classification, a court addressing such an equal protection challenge must apply the deferential rational basis test.

2022(See People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451-452 [“Civil commitment proceedings ‘are civil in nature and of a character unknown at common law. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘And, in such civil proceedings, unknown to the common law (as distinguished from ordinary civil and criminal cases), the use of a jury is a matter of legislative grant 19 and not of constitutional right.’”].) 5 But even under the more deferential rational basis standard, the People have not met their burden to show a credible justification for disparate treatment of SVP’s with respect to a jury trial advisement.

2021(People v. Bell (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 865, 876-880 (Bell), review granted on another ground on Jan. 11, 2017.) The 14-year-old defendant in Bell argued there was no rational basis for treating him more severely than a juvenile defendant convicted of special circumstances murder.

2019(Compare, e.g., People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 506, 508, fn. 6 [applying strict scrutiny to decide whether denying conduct credit for pretrial jail time violated equal protection]; People v. Lapaille (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168 [applying strict scrutiny to decide whether denying pretrial custody credits for house arrest violated equal protection; “When the equal protection issue involves fundamental interests, such as liberty, our courts have required that the state establish that it has a compelling interest in making such classifications”] with People v. Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Ca

2019(Compare, e.g., People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 506, 508, fn. 6 [applying strict scrutiny to decide whether denying conduct credit for pretrial jail time violated equal protection]; People v. Lapaille (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168 [applying strict scrutiny to decide whether denying pretrial custody credits for house arrest violated equal protection; “When the equal protection issue involves fundamental interests, such as liberty, our courts have required that the state establish that it has a compelling interest in making such classifications”] with People v. Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Ca

2018On the contrary, "preservation in place" is the preferred method of addressing environmental impacts affecting historical resources, unless the lead agency "determines that another form of mitigation is available and provides superior mitigation of the impacts." (Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 87 ; see League for Protection of Oakland's etc. & Historic Resources v. City of Oakland (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 896, 909 [proposed measures to mitigate the demolition of an historical building, including a plaque and documentation of the building's historic

2018On the contrary, "preservation in place" is the preferred method of addressing environmental impacts affecting historical resources, unless the lead agency "determines that another form of mitigation is available and provides superior mitigation of the impacts." (Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 87 ; see League for Protection of Oakland's etc. & Historic Resources v. City of Oakland (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 896, 909 [proposed measures to mitigate the demolition of an historical building, including a plaque and documentation of the building's historic

2016(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 [ 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 341 P.3d 1075 ] (Johnson); Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838 .) This standard does not depend on whether the Legislature ever actually articulated its purpose, and the underlying rationale need not be empirically substantiated.

2016(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 [ 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 341 P.3d 1075 ] (Johnson); Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838 .) This standard does not depend on whether the Legislature ever actually articulated its purpose, and the underlying rationale need not be empirically substantiated.

2010(See generally People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836-838 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 , 94 P.3d 551 ].) I recognize that “this court has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional review . . . .” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20 .) But this court has never considered, in an adversarial setting, whether every detail of involuntary civil commitment procedures should be subjected to strict scrutiny.

2010(See generally People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836-838 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 , 94 P.3d 551 ].) I recognize that "this court has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional review...." ( Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20 .) But this court has never considered, in an adversarial setting, whether every detail of involuntary civil commitment procedures should be subjected to strict scrutiny.

1994(Weber v. City Council, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 961; Scuri v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 400, 404-406 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 18 ].) Furthermore, section 57078 makes a key distinction between inhabited territory and territory deemed uninhabited.

1994(Weber v. City Council, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 961; Scuri v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 400, 404-406 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 18 ].) Furthermore, section 57078 makes a key distinction between inhabited territory and territory deemed uninhabited.

1994(Weber v. City Council, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 961; Scuri v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 400, 404-406 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 18 ].) Furthermore, section 57078 makes a key distinction between inhabited territory and territory deemed uninhabited.

1991(Amador, 22 Cal.3d at p. 233 .) Under that standard, so long as a system of taxation ‘is supported by a rational basis, and is not palpably arbitrary,’ it will be upheld. [Citations.] Further, a state tax law is not arbitrary although it discriminates in favor of a certain class if the discrimination is founded upon ““a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy,’ not in conflict with the Federal Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (Nordlinger, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1272 ; see also Marin, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 501 .) To support their equal protection argument, plaintiffs rely

1991(Amador, 22 Cal.3d at p. 233 .) Under that standard, so long as a system of taxation ‘is supported by a rational basis, and is not palpably arbitrary,’ it will be upheld. [Citations.] Further, a state tax law is not arbitrary although it discriminates in favor of a certain class if the discrimination is founded upon ““a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy,’ not in conflict with the Federal Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (Nordlinger, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1272 ; see also Marin, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 501 .) To support their equal protection argument, plaintiffs rely

1991(Amador, 22 Cal.3d at p. 233 .) Under that standard, so long as a system of taxation ‘is supported by a rational basis, and is not palpably arbitrary,’ it will be upheld. [Citations.] Further, a state tax law is not arbitrary although it discriminates in favor of a certain class if the discrimination is founded upon ““a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy,’ not in conflict with the Federal Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (Nordlinger, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1272 ; see also Marin, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 501 .) To support their equal protection argument, plaintiffs rely

1991(Amador, 22 Cal.3d at p. 233 .) Under that standard, so long as a system of taxation ‘is supported by a rational basis, and is not palpably arbitrary,’ it will be upheld. [Citations.] Further, a state tax law is not arbitrary although it discriminates in favor of a certain class if the discrimination is founded upon ““a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy,’ not in conflict with the Federal Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (Nordlinger, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1272 ; see also Marin, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 501 .) To support their equal protection argument, plaintiffs rely

1990The United States Supreme Court noted: “[I]t has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. [Citations.]” (AlliedStores, supra, 358 U.S. at p. 528 [ 3 L.Ed.2d at p. 486 ].) The court then rejected the constitutional claim, holding “it is obvious that it may reasonably have been the purpose and policy of the State Legislature, in adopting the proviso, to encourage the construction or leasing and operation of wareh

1990The United States Supreme Court noted: “[I]t has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. [Citations.]” (AlliedStores, supra, 358 U.S. at p. 528 [ 3 L.Ed.2d at p. 486 ].) The court then rejected the constitutional claim, holding “it is obvious that it may reasonably have been the purpose and policy of the State Legislature, in adopting the proviso, to encourage the construction or leasing and operation of wareh