28 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2015–2024 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the ‘errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984)). [¶12] With respect to the performance prong, “counsel’s representation of a defendant falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls below what might be expected from an ordinary falli 2023When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires the petitioner to 13 prove that (1) trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the errors of trial counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense. | 8 | 20 |
Richard Watson v. State of Mainegreen2 sentences2023Resulting Prejudice [¶28] Pratt argues that trial counsel’s decision to open the door to evidence about Pratt’s parenting practices and his failure to object at trial to the prosecutorial error, in aggregate, make Pratt’s conviction unreliable and unworthy of confidence. [¶29] If a petitioner proves the first prong of the Strickland test, then the petitioner must next prove that she was prejudiced, i.e., “that the errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Watson, 2020 ME 51, ¶ 29 , 230 A.3d 6 (quotation marks omitted). 2023Resulting Prejudice [¶28] Pratt argues that trial counsel’s decision to open the door to evidence about Pratt’s parenting practices and his failure to object at trial to the prosecutorial error, in aggregate, make Pratt’s conviction unreliable and unworthy of confidence. [¶29] If a petitioner proves the first prong of the Strickland test, then the petitioner must next prove that she was prejudiced, i.e., “that the errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Watson, 2020 ME 51, ¶ 29 , 230 A.3d 6 (quotation marks omitted). | 4 | 6 |
Benjamin H. Hodgdon II v. State of Mainegreen2 sentences2024Under the second prong, to establish prejudice and demonstrate that counsel’s errors had an adverse effect on the defense, “a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 2023Fahnley v. State, 2018 ME 92, 717 ; Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, 911 . | 3 | 5 |
Mark J. Theriault v. State of Mainegreen2 sentences2023On post-conviction review, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-part test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), The petitioner must demonstrate that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “errors of counsel... actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137,914 , 125 A.3d 1163 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ). 2023On post-conviction review, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-part test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), The petitioner must demonstrate that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “errors of counsel... actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137,914 , 125 A.3d 1163 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ). | 1 | 13 |
Ford v. Stategreen2 sentences2024“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the ‘errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984)). [¶12] With respect to the performance prong, “counsel’s representation of a defendant falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls below what might be expected from an ordinary falli 2024In the context of a conviction based on a guilty plea, the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that when giving advice, counsel acts “within the realm of an ordinary competent attorney because the voluntariness of the plea hinges upon whether the advice is that of an ordinary competent attorney.” Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 15 , 748 A.2d 463 ; see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (holding that the issue is not “whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but . . . whether that adv | 1 | 6 |
Bartolo P. Ford v. State of Mainegreen2 sentences2024“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the ‘errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984)). [¶12] With respect to the performance prong, “counsel’s representation of a defendant falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls below what might be expected from an ordinary falli 2024In the context of a conviction based on a guilty plea, the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that when giving advice, counsel acts “within the realm of an ordinary competent attorney because the voluntariness of the plea hinges upon whether the advice is that of an ordinary competent attorney.” Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 15 , 748 A.2d 463 ; see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (holding that the issue is not “whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but . . . whether that adv | 1 | 6 |
Daniel L. Fortune v. State of Mainegreen2 sentences2018When confronted with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ a two-part analysis to determine “(1) whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) whether errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61, ¶ 9 , 158 A.3d 512 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984); Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 ). 2018When confronted with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ a two-part analysis to determine "(1) whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) whether errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Fortune v. State , 2017 ME 61 , ¶ 9, 158 A.3d 512 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Theriault v. State , 2015 ME 137 , ¶¶ 13-14, 125 A.3d 1163 ). | 1 | 3 |
Fortune v. Stategreen2 sentences2018When confronted with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ a two-part analysis to determine “(1) whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) whether errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61, ¶ 9 , 158 A.3d 512 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984); Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 ). 2018When confronted with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ a two-part analysis to determine "(1) whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) whether errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Fortune v. State , 2017 ME 61 , ¶ 9, 158 A.3d 512 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Theriault v. State , 2015 ME 137 , ¶¶ 13-14, 125 A.3d 1163 ). | 1 | 3 |
State of Maine v. Corydon Judkinsgreen1 sentence2024See Judkins v. State, 2024 ME 45, ¶¶ 20, 22 , --- A.3d --- (indicating that, for an error of constitutional dimension to be harmless, we must be confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the outcome). | 1 | 1 |
McMann v. Richardsongreen1 sentence2024In the context of a conviction based on a guilty plea, the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that when giving advice, counsel acts “within the realm of an ordinary competent attorney because the voluntariness of the plea hinges upon whether the advice is that of an ordinary competent attorney.” Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 15 , 748 A.2d 463 ; see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (holding that the issue is not “whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but . . . whether that adv | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Otingergreen1 sentence2024Similarly, in Ex parte Otinger, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a defendant should have been afforded an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea when the trial judge’s indication to defense counsel that defendant would receive a split sentence materially induced the defendant’s guilty plea, but the judge later imposed a straight sentence. 493 So. 2d 1362, 1363-64 (Ala. 1986) 37 [¶50] The errors committed by Gordon’s attorney clearly had an adverse effect on the defense. | 1 | 1 |
Mario Gordon v. State of Mainegreen1 sentence2024See Gordon, 2024 ME 7, ¶ 12 , 308 A.3d 228 . | 1 | 1 |
Jed R. Middleton v. State of Mainegreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164, ¶ 13 , 129 A.3d 962 . 2021See, e.g., Middleton v. State, 2015 ME 164, ¶ 13 , 129 A.3d 962 . | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. Fryegreen2 sentences2015Manley v. State, 2015 ME 117, ¶ 12 , 123 A.3d 219 . 3 The federal constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and so the.'Strickland standards govern ineffectiveness claims in state court post-conviction proceedings. [¶ 14] To prevail in a post-conviction proceeding based on an alleged constitutional deprivation of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate two points: first, “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective stan 2015Manley v. State, 2015 ME 117, ¶ 12 , 123 A.3d 219 . 3 The federal constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and so the.'Strickland standards govern ineffectiveness claims in state court post-conviction proceedings. [¶ 14] To prevail in a post-conviction proceeding based on an alleged constitutional deprivation of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate two points: first, “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective stan | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James A. Philbrook v. State of Maine
green
2 sentences2024“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the ‘errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984)). [¶12] With respect to the performance prong, “counsel’s representation of a defendant falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls below what might be expected from an ordinary falli 2023Counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below “an objective standard of reasonableness,” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (quotation marks omitted), i.e., if the performance falls below what is expected of “an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook v. State, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶7] To prove resulting prejudice, a petitioner must show that the “errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Ford, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). | 5 | 2018–2024 |
Philbrook v. State
green
2 sentences2024“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the ‘errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984)). [¶12] With respect to the performance prong, “counsel’s representation of a defendant falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if it falls below what might be expected from an ordinary falli 2023Counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below “an objective standard of reasonableness,” Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (quotation marks omitted), i.e., if the performance falls below what is expected of “an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook v. State, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶7] To prove resulting prejudice, a petitioner must show that the “errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Ford, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). | 4 | 2018–2024 |
John Fahnley v. State of Maine
green
2 sentences2019The test requires the claimant to prove that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and ... [that] errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Fahnley v. State , 2018 ME 92 , ¶ 17, 188 A.3d 871 (quotation marks omitted). 2019Nowhere in Petgrave's petition is there any suggestion as to who the "unspecified" witnesses might be, what testimony they might have offered, or how prior counsel failed to present a "proper defense." [¶31] The Strickland standards, as we articulated them in Fahnley , 2018 ME 92 , ¶ 17, 188 A.3d 871 , require a finding that the "errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Petgrave's bare bones petition failed to articulate a prima facie case even for this minimal "adverse effect on the defense" standard. | 4 | 2019–2023 |
McGowan v. State
green
2 sentences2019"The burden is on [the petitioner] to prove both prongs." McGowan , 2006 ME 16 , ¶ 12, 894 A.2d 493 . 2019"The burden is on [the petitioner] to prove both prongs." McGowan , 2006 ME 16 , ¶ 12, 894 A.2d 493 . | 4 | 2018–2019 |
Dennis F. Winchester v. State of Maine
green
2 sentences2024“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Winchester v. State, 2023 ME 23, ¶ 7 , 291 A.3d 707 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). [¶30] Weidul contended (and maintains on appeal) that his counsel were ineffective in part because they failed to explore and develop facts and theories that could have raised reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 2024“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Winchester v. State, 2023 ME 23, ¶ 7 , 291 A.3d 707 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). [¶30] Weidul contended (and maintains on appeal) that his counsel were ineffective in part because they failed to explore and develop facts and theories that could have raised reasonable doubt as to his guilt. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Pineo v. State
green
2 sentences2024We have stated that “strategic and tactical decisions by defense counsel must be manifestly unreasonable to result in a new trial based on ineffective assistance 11 of counsel,” Pineo v. State, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 . 2024We have stated that “strategic and tactical decisions by defense counsel must be manifestly unreasonable to result in a new trial based on ineffective assistance 11 of counsel,” Pineo v. State, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Aldus v. State
green
2 sentences2024In the context of a conviction based on a guilty plea, the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that when giving advice, counsel acts “within the realm of an ordinary competent attorney because the voluntariness of the plea hinges upon whether the advice is that of an ordinary competent attorney.” Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 15 , 748 A.2d 463 ; see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (holding that the issue is not “whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but . . . whether that adv 2024In the context of a conviction based on a guilty plea, the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that when giving advice, counsel acts “within the realm of an ordinary competent attorney because the voluntariness of the plea hinges upon whether the advice is that of an ordinary competent attorney.” Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 15 , 748 A.2d 463 ; see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (holding that the issue is not “whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but . . . whether that adv | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2019Because we expressly modify the holding of State v. Nichols , 1997 ME 178 , ¶¶ 4-5, 698 A.2d 521 , and confirm that we will now entertain a discretionary appeal taken directly from a probation revocation judgment asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petgrave need not invoke the statutory habeas corpus process, 14 M.R.S. §§ 5501 -5546 (2018), to pursue his claim. 2019Because we expressly modify the holding of State v. Nichols , 1997 ME 178 , ¶¶ 4-5, 698 A.2d 521 , and confirm that we will now entertain a discretionary appeal taken directly from a probation revocation judgment asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petgrave need not invoke the statutory habeas corpus process, 14 M.R.S. §§ 5501 -5546 (2018), to pursue his claim. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Fahnley v. State
green
2 sentences2019The test requires the claimant to prove that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and ... [that] errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Fahnley v. State , 2018 ME 92 , ¶ 17, 188 A.3d 871 (quotation marks omitted). 2019Nowhere in Petgrave's petition is there any suggestion as to who the "unspecified" witnesses might be, what testimony they might have offered, or how prior counsel failed to present a "proper defense." [¶31] The Strickland standards, as we articulated them in Fahnley , 2018 ME 92 , ¶ 17, 188 A.3d 871 , require a finding that the "errors of counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Petgrave's bare bones petition failed to articulate a prima facie case even for this minimal "adverse effect on the defense" standard. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State of Maine v. Joel A. Hayden
green
1 sentence2017As the Law Court concluded, "the evidence against Hayden, including evidence that he acted intentionally or knowingly, was overwhelming." Hayden, 2014 ME 31 , ! 13, 86 A.3d 122I°. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Gauthier v. State
green
2 sentences2015THE STRICKLAND TWO-PART TEST [¶ 51] The Court’s opinion states: “To prevail in a post-conviction proceeding based on an alleged constitutional deprivation of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate two points: first, ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and second, that ‘errors of counsel ... actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’ ” (¶ 14, citing and quoting Strickland). [¶ 52] Previously, we have described the petitioner’s burden on ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a two-part test: “First, we consider ‘whether there has been 2015THE STRICKLAND TWO-PART TEST [¶ 51] The Court’s opinion states: “To prevail in a post-conviction proceeding based on an alleged constitutional deprivation of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate two points: first, ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and second, that ‘errors of counsel ... actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’ ” (¶ 14, citing and quoting Strickland). [¶ 52] Previously, we have described the petitioner’s burden on ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a two-part test: “First, we consider ‘whether there has been | 1 | 2015–2015 |
James M. Manley v. State of Maine
green
2 sentences2015Manley v. State, 2015 ME 117, ¶ 12 , 123 A.3d 219 . 3 The federal constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and so the.'Strickland standards govern ineffectiveness claims in state court post-conviction proceedings. [¶ 14] To prevail in a post-conviction proceeding based on an alleged constitutional deprivation of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate two points: first, “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective stan 2015Manley v. State, 2015 ME 117, ¶ 12 , 123 A.3d 219 . 3 The federal constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404 , 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and so the.'Strickland standards govern ineffectiveness claims in state court post-conviction proceedings. [¶ 14] To prevail in a post-conviction proceeding based on an alleged constitutional deprivation of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate two points: first, “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective stan | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.