adverse effect defense in Tennessee

2026To meet this burden, a petitioner must clearly and convincingly establish facts to support a conclusion that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).

2025To meet his burden, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly establish facts to support a conclusion that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).

2026To meet this burden, a petitioner must clearly and convincingly establish facts to support a conclusion that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).

2025To meet his burden, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly establish facts to support a conclusion that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).

2022Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tenn. 2001). -4- Before a petitioner will be granted post-conviction relief based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record must affirmatively establish, via facts clearly and convincingly established by the petitioner, that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466

2021Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tenn. 2001). -3- Before a petitioner will be granted post-conviction relief based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record must affirmatively establish, via facts clearly and convincingly established by the petitioner, that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washington, 466

1996Before an accused is entitled to a new trial on the ground that trial counsel's representation was ineffective, the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) the services rendered or advice given by counsel fell below the "range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,"6 and (b) the unprofessional conduct or errors of counsel "actually had an adverse effect on the defense."7 In determining whether the accused has factually established a deprivation of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, we recognize that neither the State nor Fede

1988When an accused seeks to vitiate a conviction on the ground an attorney’s representation was ineffective, the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) the services rendered or advice given by counsel fell below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn.1975), and (b) the unprofessional conduct or errors of counsel “actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697 (1984); Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tenn.Crim

2010In other words, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 . -9- In the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must establish that “counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

2004Ed. 2d 674 (1984). -4- In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S. Ct. 366 , 88 L.

2021See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957). -4- Before a petitioner will be granted post-conviction relief based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record must affirmatively establish, via facts clearly and convincingly established by the petitioner, that “the advice given, or the services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” Strickland v. Washingt

2010“When a petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or present -2- witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should be presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing.” Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim.

2003Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996).

2000Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim.

1996App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1980). 8 Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982); Vermilye, 754 S.W.2d at 85 .

1995First, the standard created by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Baxter v. Rose4 does not require perfect representation.5 Second, it is not this Court's function to "second guess" trial counsel's tactical and strategic choices pertaining to matters of defense unless these choices are made without knowledge of the relevant facts or the law applicable to the issue.6 As the Supreme Court said in Hellard v. State: "[T]he defense 1 Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 932, 933-34 (Tenn. Crim.