Portee claim in New Jersey

2022We reasoned that because a Portee claim requires "all of the same proofs on liability as the underlying negligence/products liability action," "[i]t A-4314-19 10 would make little or no sense to allow, much less effectively to require, separate lawsuits." Id. at 604 .

2022We reasoned that because a Portee claim requires "all of the same proofs on liability as the underlying negligence/products liability action," "[i]t A-4314-19 10 would make little or no sense to allow, much less effectively to require, separate lawsuits." Id. at 604 .

2018Our dissenting colleague "interpreted the Portee requirement of a 'familial relationship' as one restricted to marriage or blood ties." Dunphy, 136 N.J. at 104 (citing Dunphy, 261 N.J.

2018Our dissenting colleague "interpreted the Portee requirement of a 'familial relationship' as one restricted to marriage or blood ties." Dunphy , 136 N.J. at 104 , 642 A.2d 372 (citing Dunphy , 261 N.J.

2014The 13 A-0186-13T1 Court, in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division, impliedly acknowledged the soundness of the Evers [v. Dolinger, 95 N.J. 399 (1989)] standard of causation [which] can be understood to entail the inquiry whether "the increased risk of suicide by [the patient] caused by [the defendant's] failure to provide adequate medical treatment was itself a substantial factor that contributed to [the patient's] suicide." [Ibid.] Here, plaintiff did not plead an aggravation of a pre- existing mental condition in asserting his Portee claim.

2014The 13 A-0186-13T1 Court, in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division, impliedly acknowledged the soundness of the Evers [v. Dolinger, 95 N.J. 399 (1989)] standard of causation [which] can be understood to entail the inquiry whether "the increased risk of suicide by [the patient] caused by [the defendant's] failure to provide adequate medical treatment was itself a substantial factor that contributed to [the patient's] suicide." [Ibid.] Here, plaintiff did not plead an aggravation of a pre- existing mental condition in asserting his Portee claim.

2006Only the parents' own Portee claim, arising out of the death of the first child, was held to be time-barred. [9] Ibid. *343 Having concluded that the statute of limitations on Mansour's bystander liability claim against Farberware and Leviton (and any other defendants) was tolled by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.1, it is obvious that Mansour cannot prove damages against Bierman.

2006Only the parents' own Portee claim, arising out of the death of the first child, was held to be time-barred. [9] Ibid. *343 Having concluded that the statute of limitations on Mansour's bystander liability claim against Farberware and Leviton (and any other defendants) was tolled by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.1, it is obvious that Mansour cannot prove damages against Bierman.

2011In the interest of consistency, we assume the surname of the family is Abouzaid. 3 The Abouzaids, Osmans, and Kandil are not parties to this appeal, although it was their original complaint that initiated the present insurance litigation between Mansard and GNY. 4 See Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 62 , 622 A.2d 1279 (1993) (requiring a plaintiff to show her emotional distress was so extreme that it “resulted in physical manifestations or ... destroyed ... basic emotional security” (emphasis added)); see also Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-08 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (restating narrow applicat

2011In the interest of consistency, we assume the surname of the family is Abouzaid. 3 The Abouzaids, Osmans, and Kandil are not parties to this appeal, although it was their original complaint that initiated the present insurance litigation between Mansard and GNY. 4 See Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 62 , 622 A.2d 1279 (1993) (requiring a plaintiff to show her emotional distress was so extreme that it “resulted in physical manifestations or ... destroyed ... basic emotional security” (emphasis added)); see also Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-08 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (restating narrow applicat

1995For example, in Polikoff v. Catabro, 209 N.J.Super. 110 , 506 A.2d 1285 (App.Div.1986), the defendant anesthesiologist’s misplacement of a catheter in a child’s jugular vein during surgery resulted in the accumulation of hyper-alimentation fluid in the child’s pericardial sac, causing her death.

1987We do not withdraw from our holding in Polikoff, supra, but find this case distinguishable in that mere advice and failure to properly diagnose and treat does not satisfy the Portee requirement *546 of an "incident." While the viewing of the infant in his death-like state may itself be classified as an incident, we do not find it to be of the nature contemplated by the Portee Court.

2021The Portee factors "were intended to limit recovery where the plaintiff suffers distress from witnessing an accident resulting from the breach of a duty owed another," ibid., and "only when defendant's duty to the bystander originates in a duty to a third party," id. at 536 .

2021The Portee factors "were intended to limit recovery where the plaintiff suffers distress from witnessing an accident resulting from the breach of a duty owed another," ibid., and "only when defendant's duty to the bystander originates in a duty to a third party," id. at 536 .

2020We held that "[t]hese facts, viewed most favorably towards [the] plaintiff, do not implicate [the] plaintiff's contemporaneous perception of his daughter's fatal injury for purposes of asserting a Portee claim." Id. at 148 .

2020We held that "[t]hese facts, viewed most favorably towards [the] plaintiff, do not implicate [the] plaintiff's contemporaneous perception of his daughter's fatal injury for purposes of asserting a Portee claim." Id. at 148 .

2014Tichenor, supra, 218 N.J.Super. 165 , 527 A.2d 78 .

2014Tichenor, supra, 218 N.J.Super. 165 , 527 A.2d 78 .

2014Plaintiffs rely on Milacci v. Mato Realty Co., 217 N.J.Super. 297 , 525 A.2d 1120 (App.Div.1987) in support of its contention that a husband’s per quod claim substantially complies with the notice requirements of the TCA.

2014Plaintiffs rely on Milacci v. Mato Realty Co., 217 N.J.Super. 297 , 525 A.2d 1120 (App.Div.1987) in support of its contention that a husband’s per quod claim substantially complies with the notice requirements of the TCA.

2011Bank, 311 N.J.Super. 396, 406 , 709 A.2d 1375 (App.Div.1998) (denying recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff failed to show "physical illness or serious psychological sequelae” (emphasis added) (quoting Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., *79 300 N.J.Super. 22, 27 , 692 A.2d 61 (App.Div. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 See 3-19 Sherilyn Pastor, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 19.04 at n. 63 (citing Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.

2011Bank, 311 N.J.Super. 396, 406 , 709 A.2d 1375 (App.Div.1998) (denying recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff failed to show "physical illness or serious psychological sequelae” (emphasis added) (quoting Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., *79 300 N.J.Super. 22, 27 , 692 A.2d 61 (App.Div. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 See 3-19 Sherilyn Pastor, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 19.04 at n. 63 (citing Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.

2011Bank, 311 N.J.Super. 396, 406 , 709 A.2d 1375 (App.Div.1998) (denying recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff failed to show "physical illness or serious psychological sequelae” (emphasis added) (quoting Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., *79 300 N.J.Super. 22, 27 , 692 A.2d 61 (App.Div. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 See 3-19 Sherilyn Pastor, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 19.04 at n. 63 (citing Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.

2011Bank, 311 N.J.Super. 396, 406 , 709 A.2d 1375 (App.Div.1998) (denying recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff failed to show "physical illness or serious psychological sequelae” (emphasis added) (quoting Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., *79 300 N.J.Super. 22, 27 , 692 A.2d 61 (App.Div. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 See 3-19 Sherilyn Pastor, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 19.04 at n. 63 (citing Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.

2011Id. at 177-78 , 607 A.2d 1255 .

2011Id. at 177-78 , 607 A.2d 1255 .

2011Id. at 177-78 , 607 A.2d 1255 .

2011Id. at 177-78 , 607 A.2d 1255 .

2011The panel reasoned that nothing in Portee or its subsequent jurisprudence demands “a physical manifestation as a required element of [a negligent infliction of emotional distress] cause of action.” As such, the panel found that GNY was not obligated to defend Mansard until plaintiffs amended Count III to include an allegation of “physical impact.” We granted Mansard’s petition for certification, Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Associates, LLC, 205 N.J. 14 , 11 A.3d 373 (2010), and now reverse.

2011The panel reasoned that nothing in Portee or its subsequent jurisprudence demands “a physical manifestation as a required element of [a negligent infliction of emotional distress] cause of action.” As such, the panel found that GNY was not obligated to defend Mansard until plaintiffs amended Count III to include an allegation of “physical impact.” We granted Mansard’s petition for certification, Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Associates, LLC, 205 N.J. 14 , 11 A.3d 373 (2010), and now reverse.

2011In the interest of consistency, we assume the surname of the family is Abouzaid. 3 The Abouzaids, Osmans, and Kandil are not parties to this appeal, although it was their original complaint that initiated the present insurance litigation between Mansard and GNY. 4 See Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 62 , 622 A.2d 1279 (1993) (requiring a plaintiff to show her emotional distress was so extreme that it “resulted in physical manifestations or ... destroyed ... basic emotional security” (emphasis added)); see also Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-08 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (restating narrow applicat

2011In the interest of consistency, we assume the surname of the family is Abouzaid. 3 The Abouzaids, Osmans, and Kandil are not parties to this appeal, although it was their original complaint that initiated the present insurance litigation between Mansard and GNY. 4 See Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 62 , 622 A.2d 1279 (1993) (requiring a plaintiff to show her emotional distress was so extreme that it “resulted in physical manifestations or ... destroyed ... basic emotional security” (emphasis added)); see also Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-08 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (restating narrow applicat

2008Jablonowska v. Suther, 390 N.J.Super. 395, 398 , 915 A. 2d 617 (App. Div.2007).

2008Jablonowska v. Suther, 390 N.J.Super. 395, 398 , 915 A. 2d 617 (App. Div.2007).

2008Co., 224 N.J.Super. 348, 351-54 , 540 A. 2d 871 (App.Div.) (differentiating per quod claims arising out of "grief from losing a loved one," which are subsumed in action under Wrongful Death Act, from independent, derivative Portee claims, which are based on "the trauma of seeing a loved one suffer or die," and holding that insurance policy language that limited recovery for wrongful death operated to limit plaintiffs' per quod claim), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 654 , 546 A. 2d 562 (1988); see also DeFelice v. Beall, 274 N.J.Super. 592, 599 , 644 A. 2d 1136 (App.Div.) ("[T]he [Wrongful Death Act]

2008Co., 224 N.J.Super. 348, 351-54 , 540 A. 2d 871 (App.Div.) (differentiating per quod claims arising out of "grief from losing a loved one," which are subsumed in action under Wrongful Death Act, from independent, derivative Portee claims, which are based on "the trauma of seeing a loved one suffer or die," and holding that insurance policy language that limited recovery for wrongful death operated to limit plaintiffs' per quod claim), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 654 , 546 A. 2d 562 (1988); see also DeFelice v. Beall, 274 N.J.Super. 592, 599 , 644 A. 2d 1136 (App.Div.) ("[T]he [Wrongful Death Act]

2008Co., 224 N.J.Super. 348, 351-54 , 540 A. 2d 871 (App.Div.) (differentiating per quod claims arising out of "grief from losing a loved one," which are subsumed in action under Wrongful Death Act, from independent, derivative Portee claims, which are based on "the trauma of seeing a loved one suffer or die," and holding that insurance policy language that limited recovery for wrongful death operated to limit plaintiffs' per quod claim), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 654 , 546 A. 2d 562 (1988); see also DeFelice v. Beall, 274 N.J.Super. 592, 599 , 644 A. 2d 1136 (App.Div.) ("[T]he [Wrongful Death Act]

2008Co., 224 N.J.Super. 348, 351-54 , 540 A. 2d 871 (App.Div.) (differentiating per quod claims arising out of "grief from losing a loved one," which are subsumed in action under Wrongful Death Act, from independent, derivative Portee claims, which are based on "the trauma of seeing a loved one suffer or die," and holding that insurance policy language that limited recovery for wrongful death operated to limit plaintiffs' per quod claim), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 654 , 546 A. 2d 562 (1988); see also DeFelice v. Beall, 274 N.J.Super. 592, 599 , 644 A. 2d 1136 (App.Div.) ("[T]he [Wrongful Death Act]