fugitive disentitlement doctrine in New York

2023Because "there is a nexus between the appellant's fugitive status and the appellate proceedings" ( Wechsler v Wechsler , 45 AD3d 470, 472 [1st Dept 2007]), we dismiss this civil appeal pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine ( see People v Aceved o, 195 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 915 [2021]).

2022Because defendant has absconded from parole supervision, he has forfeited his right to appeal, and we dismiss the appeal pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine ( see People v Acevedo , 195 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 915 [2021]; Wechsler v Wechsler , 45 AD3d 470, 472 [1st Dept 2007]).

2016As the mother correctly asserts, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine precludes the father from maintaining this appeal, in light of the fact that the father is not presently available to obey a mandate of the Court in the event of an affirmance, under the circumstances presented (see Matter of Allain v Oriola-Allain, 123 AD3d 138 [2014]; Matter of Shehatou v Louka, 118 AD3d 1357, 1358 [2014]; Matter of Christie S. v Marqueo S., 106 AD3d 592 [2013]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 473-474 [2007]; Matter of Joshua M. v Dimari N., 9 AD3d 617, 619 [2004]; Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD

2014The court refused to sign the order to show cause seeking to vacate the orders and, in its “order of dismissal,” determined that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies to respondent inasmuch as respondent—a California resident who is now the subject of an arrest warrant in this State, but who refuses to return to this State—was attempting to “evade the law while simultaneously seeking its protection” (Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD2d 751, 752-753 [2003]; see Matter of Gerald G.

2014On appeal, we consider whether it is proper in the context of this child support proceeding to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which permits a court, under certain circumstances, to dismiss an appeal where the party seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending (see Degen v United States, 517 US 820, 824 [1996]; Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD2d 751 [2003]).

2010Finally, proceeding in this limited fashion to preserve the timeliness of the presentment agency’s application is consistent with the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, a policy which precludes a litigant who refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of a court from seeking affirmative relief or from interposing a defense, as the absent litigant is unavailable to comply with any mandates which the court may issue (see Degen v United States, 517 US 820, 824 [1996]; Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD2d 751, 752 [2003]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 472 [2007]; Matter of Tradale CC., 52 AD3d

2025We decline to dismiss defendant's appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine ( see People v Tavares , 10 NY3d 227, 232 [2008]) even though he absconded and has not been contactable for more than two years.

2025We decline to dismiss defendant's appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine ( see People v Tavares , 10 NY3d 227, 232 [2008]) even though he absconded and has not been contactable for more than two years.

2016As the mother correctly asserts, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine precludes the father from maintaining this appeal, in light of the fact that the father is not presently available to obey a mandate of the Court in the event of an affirmance, under the circumstances presented (see Matter of Allain v Oriola-Allain, 123 AD3d 138 [2014]; Matter of Shehatou v Louka, 118 AD3d 1357, 1358 [2014]; Matter of Christie S. v Marqueo S., 106 AD3d 592 [2013]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 473-474 [2007]; Matter of Joshua M. v Dimari N., 9 AD3d 617, 619 [2004]; Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD

2014Contrary to respondent’s contention, the court properly determined that the fugitive disentitlement theory applied to his application (see Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 473 [2007]), and we conclude that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine also applies to this appeal (see id. at 474 ; Matter of Joshua M. v Dimari N., 9 AD3d 617, 619 [2004]).

2014Several rationales have been advanced for disentitling fugitives, including: “1) assuring the enforceability of any decision that may be rendered against the fugitive; 2) imposing a penalty for flouting the judicial process; 3) discouraging flights from justice and promoting the efficient operation of the courts; and 4) avoiding prejudice to the other side caused by the defendant’s escape” (Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v Finkelstein, 111 F3d 278, 280 [2d Cir 1997]; see People v Taveras, 10 NY3d at 232 ; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d at 472 ). *143 To apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrin

2007“The fugitive disentitlement doctrine permits a court to ‘dismiss an appeal ... if the party seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending’ (Degen v United States, 517 US 820, 824 [1996]; see Ortega-Rodriguez v United States, 507 US 234, 242 [1993]).

2021Although a SORA appeal is a civil appeal, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine remains applicable ( People v Rodriguez , 67 AD3d 596, 596 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 472 [1st Dept 2007]).

2014No such considerations are relevant here; defendant is an involuntary deportee, not an absconder (compare People v Rodriguez, 67 AD3d 596, 597 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]).

2014The court refused to sign the order to show cause seeking to vacate the orders and, in its “order of dismissal,” determined that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies to respondent inasmuch as respondent — a California resident who is now the subject of an arrest warrant in this State, but who refuses to return to this State — was attempting to “evade the law while simultaneously seeking its protection” (Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD2d 751, 752-753 ; see Matter of Gerald G.G., 46 NY2d 813, 813 ).

2014G., 46 NY2d 813, 813 [1978]).

2014“It has been settled for well over a century that an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his [or her] appeal” (Ortega- Rodriguez v United States, 507 US 234, 239 [1993]; see Smith v United States, 94 US 97 [1876]).

2008Considerations underlying the doctrine include, among other things, that the courts should not expend resources hearing an appeal when any judgment they would issue could not be enforced (see Smith v United States, 94 US 97, 97 [1876]), nor should courts be required to “adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction” (Molinaro, 396 US at 366 ).

2018That doctrine permits a court to dismiss an appeal in civil cases where the party seeking relief is a fugitive evading the law whose absence frustrates the enforcement of a judgment or order ( see People v Edwards , 117 AD3d 418, 418 [1st Dept 2014]).

2016The First Department *73 has reasoned that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which permits dismissal of civil appeals where a party evades the law while seeking its protection, does not apply in SORA cases where the defendant has been involuntarily deported (see People v Edwards, 117 AD3d 418 [2014]).

2016As the mother correctly asserts, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine precludes the father from maintaining this appeal, in light of the fact that the father is not presently available to obey a mandate of the Court in the event of an affirmance, under the circumstances presented (see Matter of Allain v Oriola-Allain, 123 AD3d 138 [2014]; Matter of Shehatou v Louka, 118 AD3d 1357, 1358 [2014]; Matter of Christie S. v Marqueo S., 106 AD3d 592 [2013]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 473-474 [2007]; Matter of Joshua M. v Dimari N., 9 AD3d 617, 619 [2004]; Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD

2014The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, also relied on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to dismiss an appeal by a California resident subject to arrest for the willful violation of a New York support order who refused to return to this state (see Matter of Shehatou v Louka, 118 AD3d 1357 [2014]).

2025Because "disposition of the discrete [weight of the evidence] issue[] would result in either an affirmance or outright dismissal of the convictions, neither outcome would require the continued legal participation of defendants" ( People v Ventura , 17 NY3d 675, 682 [2011]).

2025Because "disposition of the discrete [weight of the evidence] issue[] would result in either an affirmance or outright dismissal of the convictions, neither outcome would require the continued legal participation of defendants" ( People v Ventura , 17 NY3d 675, 682 [2011]).

2017Pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, defendant forfeited his right to make this motion by absconding after the motion was filed, but before the court issued its decision (see People v Panico, 130 AD2d 777, 778 [2d Dept 1987]; see also People v Taveras, 10 NY3d 227, 232 [2008]).

2016Moreover, the First Department noted in those cases that the People had not established that the defendant’s absence from the country rendered the appeal academic (see People v Edwards, 117 AD3d at 419 ; People v Gudino-Sanchez, 116 AD3d at 566 ; People v Scott, 113 AD3d at 492 ; see also People v Gudino, 134 AD3d 468 [2015]).

2014Several rationales have been advanced for disentitling fugitives, including: “1) assuring the enforceability of any decision that may be rendered against the fugitive; 2) imposing a penalty for flouting the judicial process; 3) discouraging flights from justice and promoting the efficient operation of the courts; and 4) avoiding prejudice to the other side caused by the defendant’s escape” (Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v Finkelstein, 111 F3d 278, 280 [2d Cir 1997]; see People v Taveras, 10 NY3d at 232 ; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d at 472 ). *143 To apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrin

2010Finally, proceeding in this limited fashion to preserve the timeliness of the presentment agency’s application is consistent with the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, a policy which precludes a litigant who refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of a court from seeking affirmative relief or from interposing a defense, as the absent litigant is unavailable to comply with any mandates which the court may issue (see Degen v United States, 517 US 820, 824 [1996]; Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD2d 751, 752 [2003]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 45 AD3d 470, 472 [2007]; Matter of Tradale CC., 52 AD3d

2008Analysis Neither of these appeals implicate the so-called fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals of fugitive defendants who are at large while their appeals are pending, the rationale being that the defendant’s escape “disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims” (see Molinaro v New Jersey, 396 US 365, 366 [1970]; see also Estelle v Dorrough, 420 US 534, 537 [1975], reh denied 421 US 921 [1975]).

2008Considerations underlying the doctrine include, among other things, that the courts should not expend resources hearing an appeal when any judgment they would issue could not be enforced (see Smith v United States, 94 US 97, 97 [1876]), nor should courts be required to “adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction” (Molinaro, 396 US at 366 ).

2008Analysis Neither of these appeals implicate the so-called fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals of fugitive defendants who are at large while their appeals are pending, the rationale being that the defendant’s escape “disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims” (see Molinaro v New Jersey, 396 US 365, 366 [1970]; see also Estelle v Dorrough, 420 US 534, 537 [1975], reh denied 421 US 921 [1975]).

2008The doctrine “permits a court to dismiss civil appeals where the party seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending, provided that there is a nexus between the appellant’s fugitive status and the matter being appealed” (Matter of Morgaine JJ., 31 AD3d 931, 932 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Skiff-Murray v Murray, 305 AD2d 751, 752 [2003]).

2008Analysis Neither of these appeals implicate the so-called fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals of fugitive defendants who are at large while their appeals are pending, the rationale being that the defendant’s escape “disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims” (see Molinaro v New Jersey, 396 US 365, 366 [1970]; see also Estelle v Dorrough, 420 US 534, 537 [1975], reh denied 421 US 921 [1975]).