fugitive disentitlement doctrine in Tennessee

2018More recently, our supreme court discussed this practice, known as the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, in Searle v. Juvenile Court for Williamson County, 188 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2006).

2012In Searle v. Juvenile Court for Williamson County, 188 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2006), the Tennessee Supreme Court discussed the fugitive disentitlement doctrine as follows: The fugitive disentitlement doctrine bars an individual from -3- calling upon the resources of the court while at the same time “thumbing his nose” at its orders.

2012Initially, the fact that the juvenile court’s determinations of delinquency and violation of probation were not criminal in nature is not dispositive based upon the specific holding in Searle that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is “not limited to criminal cases.” Id. (citing In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 1995)).

2012See, e.g., Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250 , -4- 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing an ICARA appeal where the appellant had continuously refused to comply with court orders, had been found guilty of contempt, and had a warrant for her arrest); Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 , 562–67 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing the appellant's Hague Convention appeal where he fled the country with his wife and child to avoid criminal charges and lived in France); Guerin v. Guerin, 116 Nev. 210 , 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000) (dismissing the appeal under the doctrine “in light of [appellant]'s fugitive status and c

2022We have explained that “[a] determination of Grandparents filed a motion to dismiss Father’s appeal with this Court pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, but the motion was denied. -4- visitation ‘often hinges on subtle factors such as the [parties’] demeanor and credibility during the trial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Battleson v. Battleson, 223 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)).

2022Accordingly, when determinations of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, “considerable deference must be afforded to the trial court when the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witness’[s] demeanor and to hear in-court testimony.” Id. (quoting Morris v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011)).

2022Accordingly, when determinations of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, “considerable deference must be afforded to the trial court when the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witness’[s] demeanor and to hear in-court testimony.” Id. (quoting Morris v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011)).

2012Courts applying this doctrine have uniformly held that “a fugitive from justice need not be a fugitive in a criminal matter.” Finkelstein, 111 F.3d at 281 ; United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997).

2012See, e.g., Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250 , -4- 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing an ICARA appeal where the appellant had continuously refused to comply with court orders, had been found guilty of contempt, and had a warrant for her arrest); Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 , 562–67 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing the appellant's Hague Convention appeal where he fled the country with his wife and child to avoid criminal charges and lived in France); Guerin v. Guerin, 116 Nev. 210 , 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000) (dismissing the appeal under the doctrine “in light of [appellant]'s fugitive status and c

2012See, e.g., Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250 , -4- 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing an ICARA appeal where the appellant had continuously refused to comply with court orders, had been found guilty of contempt, and had a warrant for her arrest); Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 , 562–67 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing the appellant's Hague Convention appeal where he fled the country with his wife and child to avoid criminal charges and lived in France); Guerin v. Guerin, 116 Nev. 210 , 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000) (dismissing the appeal under the doctrine “in light of [appellant]'s fugitive status and c

2012See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 , 116 S.Ct. 1777 , 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) (considering the doctrine in a civil forfeiture case); Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the doctrine in a civil RICO Act appeal).

2012Courts applying this doctrine have uniformly held that “a fugitive from justice need not be a fugitive in a criminal matter.” Finkelstein, 111 F.3d at 281 ; United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997).

2012See, e.g., Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250 , -4- 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing an ICARA appeal where the appellant had continuously refused to comply with court orders, had been found guilty of contempt, and had a warrant for her arrest); Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 , 562–67 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing the appellant's Hague Convention appeal where he fled the country with his wife and child to avoid criminal charges and lived in France); Guerin v. Guerin, 116 Nev. 210 , 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000) (dismissing the appeal under the doctrine “in light of [appellant]'s fugitive status and c

2012See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 , 116 S.Ct. 1777 , 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) (considering the doctrine in a civil forfeiture case); Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the doctrine in a civil RICO Act appeal).

2012See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 , 116 S.Ct. 1777 , 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) (considering the doctrine in a civil forfeiture case); Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the doctrine in a civil RICO Act appeal).

2011While it is established that a defendant “waive[s] his right to pursue a direct appeal from his convictions and sentences [if] he escaped and remained on escape status during the time in which a direct appeal should have been pursued,” see Curtis v. State, 909 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tenn. Crim.

2011The defendant’s claim of error is based on his assertions that (1) the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision establishing the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, Bradford v. State, 202 S.W.2d 647, 648-49 (1947), should not be applied on the facts of this case and was, in essence, wrongly decided, and (2) there is no evidence in the record that the defendant’s absence from the trial court’s hearing on his motion for a new trial was voluntary.

2006Relying on March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 470 (6th Cir.2001) and Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st Cir.2000), Searle contends that “applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine would impose too severe a sanction in a case involving parental rights.” While March and Walsh both present issues concerning parental rights, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case.

2006March, 249 F.3d at 470 ; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 215 .

2006Relying on March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 470 (6th Cir.2001) and Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st Cir.2000), Searle contends that “applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine would impose too severe a sanction in a case involving parental rights.” While March and Walsh both present issues concerning parental rights, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case.

2006March, 249 F.3d at 470 ; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 215 .