fugitive disentitlement doctrine in California

2020DISCUSSION “ ‘It has long been recognized that a convicted defendant who becomes a fugitive from justice forfeits the right to appeal that conviction.’ ” (People v. Kubby (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 619, 622 (Kubby), quoting People v. Perez (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 .) “Appellate disentitlement based on fugitive status is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may be applied when the balance of the equitable concerns makes it a proper sanction for a party’s flight.

2014The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 . . . , in which the Supreme Court dismissed an escaped defendant’s appeal because ‘[i]t would be a farce to proceed in a criminal cause, unless the Court had control over the person charged, so that its judgment might be made effective.’ ” (Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 531 ; People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894, 896 ; People v. Kubby (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 619, 622-623 .) However, the record here does not establish that Ochoa is a fugitive from

2026(Redinger, supra, 55 Cal. at p. 298 .) For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 4 DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed.

2014The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 . . . , in which the Supreme Court dismissed an escaped defendant’s appeal because ‘[i]t would be a farce to proceed in a criminal cause, unless the Court had control over the person charged, so that its judgment might be made effective.’ ” (Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 531 ; People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894, 896 ; People v. Kubby (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 619, 622-623 .) However, the record here does not establish that Ochoa is a fugitive from

2024(See People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894, 897 [“disentitlement based on fugitive status is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may be applied when the balance of the equitable concerns make it a proper sanction for a party’s flight”].) According to records submitted with the motion, Bernoski was released from prison to postrelease community supervision in April 2023.

2014The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 . . . , in which the Supreme Court dismissed an escaped defendant’s appeal because ‘[i]t would be a farce to proceed in a criminal cause, unless the Court had control over the person charged, so that its judgment might be made effective.’ ” (Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 531 ; People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894, 896 ; People v. Kubby (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 619, 622-623 .) However, the record here does not establish that Ochoa is a fugitive from

2013That statute was enacted in response to Degen v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 820 [ 135 L.Ed.2d 102 , 116 S.Ct. 1777 ], in which the United States Supreme Court held that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not apply in a civil forfeiture action when the claimant is a fugitive from a related criminal prosecution.

2013That statute was enacted in response to Degen v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 820 [ 135 L.Ed.2d 102 , 116 S.Ct. 1777 ], in which the United States Supreme Court held that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not apply in a civil forfeiture action when the claimant is a fugitive from a related criminal prosecution.

2013(Collazos v. U.S. (2d Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 190 , 198; see Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 282 [distinguishing Degen saying, “We hold that we have discretion to dismiss the appeal of a civil litigant who becomes a fugitive to escape the effect of the civil judgment.”].) The United States Supreme Court has said, “the justifications we have advanced for allowing appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals all assume some connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reasonable re

2013(Collazos v. U.S. (2d Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 190 , 198; see Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 282 [distinguishing Degen saying, “We hold that we have discretion to dismiss the appeal of a civil litigant who becomes a fugitive to escape the effect of the civil judgment.”].) The United States Supreme Court has said, “the justifications we have advanced for allowing appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals all assume some connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reasonable re

2013(Collazos v. U.S. (2d Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 190 , 198; see Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 282 [distinguishing Degen saying, “We hold that we have discretion to dismiss the appeal of a civil litigant who becomes a fugitive to escape the effect of the civil judgment.”].) The United States Supreme Court has said, “the justifications we have advanced for allowing appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals all assume some connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reasonable re

2013(Collazos v. U.S. (2d Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 190 , 198; see Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 282 [distinguishing Degen saying, “We hold that we have discretion to dismiss the appeal of a civil litigant who becomes a fugitive to escape the effect of the civil judgment.”].) The United States Supreme Court has said, “the justifications we have advanced for allowing appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals all assume some connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reasonable re

2009In 1876, in Smith v. United States (1876) 94 U.S. 97 [ 24 L.Ed. 32 ], the United States Supreme Court declared, “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” (Id. at p. 97.) The defendant’s escape “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy,” but “it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” (Molinaro v. New Jersey (1970) 396 U.S. 365, 366 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 5

2009In 1876, in Smith v. United States (1876) 94 U.S. 97 [ 24 L.Ed. 32 ], the United States Supreme Court declared, “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” (Id. at p. 97.) The defendant’s escape “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy,” but “it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” (Molinaro v. New Jersey (1970) 396 U.S. 365, 366 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 5

2009Although some courts have expressed skepticism that the disentitlement doctrine serves a deterrent purpose (see Kang, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“any consideration that dismissal discourages escape is speculative at best”]), the trial court observed that the long-standing public fascination with this case increased its deterrent potential.

2009As the People put it, “It was an affront to the authority of this Court and of the superior court for Petitioner to say that he should not have to voluntarily get on a plane and surrender himself to this Court’s jurisdiction in order to have his dismissal motion heard; it is an even more egregious affront and a waiver of the issue presented, to affirmatively fight return to the jurisdiction of this Court while seeking relief from it at the same time.” While there is no constitutional bar to forcing a fugitive to decide between fighting extradition and obtaining legal benefits that are denied t

2009Polanski is still not here and shows no signs of appearing anytime soon, so the question of whether he is entitled to relief from afar has not been rendered “ ‘abstract or academic’ ” by subsequent events, nor is there any indication that a decision in Polanski’s favor would now be “without practical effect.” (People v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 578 ].) Although the People characterize their argument as concerning mootness, in fact they advocate appellate application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.

2009Polanski is still not here and shows no signs of appearing anytime soon, so the question of whether he is entitled to relief from afar has not been rendered “ ‘abstract or academic’ ” by subsequent events, nor is there any indication that a decision in Polanski’s favor would now be “without practical effect.” (People v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 578 ].) Although the People characterize their argument as concerning mootness, in fact they advocate appellate application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.

2009The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ruled That Polanski Was Subject to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine A. The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: History and Policies “That the court, independent of statutory authority, has power to dismiss the appeal of an appellant who is a fugitive from justice has long been accepted as a proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the appellate courts of this state.” (People v. Clark (1927) 201 Cal. 474, 477 [ 259 P. 47 ].) The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 (Redin

2009The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ruled That Polanski Was Subject to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine A. The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: History and Policies “That the court, independent of statutory authority, has power to dismiss the appeal of an appellant who is a fugitive from justice has long been accepted as a proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the appellate courts of this state.” (People v. Clark (1927) 201 Cal. 474, 477 [ 259 P. 47 ].) The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 (Redin

2009The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ruled That Polanski Was Subject to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine A. The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: History and Policies “That the court, independent of statutory authority, has power to dismiss the appeal of an appellant who is a fugitive from justice has long been accepted as a proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the appellate courts of this state.” (People v. Clark (1927) 201 Cal. 474, 477 [ 259 P. 47 ].) The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 (Redin

2009The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ruled That Polanski Was Subject to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine A. The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: History and Policies “That the court, independent of statutory authority, has power to dismiss the appeal of an appellant who is a fugitive from justice has long been accepted as a proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the appellate courts of this state.” (People v. Clark (1927) 201 Cal. 474, 477 [ 259 P. 47 ].) The fugitive disentitlement doctrine dates back to 1880 in California with People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290 (Redin