pivotal inquiry in Pennsylvania

2018The pivotal inquiry is whether, in light of the facts and circumstances identified above, “a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought (he was being restrained) had he been in the defendant’s shoes.” Id. at 840 (citation omitted).

2017In fixing the moment at which a detention has occurred, “the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing the exercise of force, a reasonable [person] would have thought he was being restrained.” Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 489 , 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977)); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reas

2017In fixing the moment at which a detention has occurred, “the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing the exercise of force, a reasonable [person] would have thought he was being restrained.” Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 489 , 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977)); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reas

2017In fixing the moment at which a detention has occurred, “the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing the exercise of force, a reasonable [person] would have thought he was being restrained.” Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 489 , 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977)); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reas

2021Gory Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 855 A.2d 669, 678 (Pa. 2004) (Gory), that “the pivotal factors to be looked at are whether the entity operates on a statewide basis and is predominantly controlled by the state.” (Answer to Preliminary Objections ¶5; PIOGA’s Br. at 17 n.37.) Because POCS operates across Pennsylvania, and because the UULPL imposes duties upon POCS, PIOGA argues that POCS may be deemed to be an agency of the Commonwealth.

2021Although PIOGA stresses our Supreme Court’s statement that “the pivotal factors to be looked at are whether the entity operates on a statewide basis and is predominantly controlled by the state,” Gory, 855 A.2d at 678 , as noted above, these considerations are most pivotal in distinguishing between state and local agencies, which was the dispositive issue in T&R Painting Co., Gory, and Blount.

2022“The pivotal inquiry is whether, in light of the facts and circumstances[,] a reasonable [citizen], innocent of any crime, would have thought he[, or she,] was being restrained had he[, or she,] been in the defendant's shoes.” Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. Super. 2019).

2020“The pivotal inquiry is whether, in light of the facts and circumstances, a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought he was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.” Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

2017In fixing the moment at which a detention has occurred, “the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing the exercise of force, a reasonable [person] would have thought he was being restrained.” Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 489 , 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977)); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reas

2017In fixing the moment at which a detention has occurred, “the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing the exercise of force, a reasonable [person] would have thought he was being restrained.” Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 489 , 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373 , 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977)); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reas

1981Once this factual examination has been made, the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all of the facts and circumstances evidencing an exercise of force, “a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought [he was being restrained] had he been in the defendant’s shoes.” United States v. McKethan, 247 F.Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C.1965), aff’d by order No. 20,059 (D.C.

1977Once this factual examination has been made, the pivotal inquiry is' whether, considering all of the facts *373 and circumstances evidencing an exercise of force, “a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought [he was being restrained] had he been in the defendant’s shoes.” United States v. McKethan, 247 F.Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965), aff’d by order No. 20,059 (D.C.Cir.1966). 7 Instantly, we believe the totality of the circumstances would have led a reasonable man to conclude he was being restrained or stopped for investigatory purposes by Hoffman’s initial exercise of force whe

2025See Commonwealth v. Giffin, 595 A.2d 101, 107 (Pa. Super. 1991). - 19 - J-S42022-24 that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).

2025See Commonwealth v. Giffin, 595 A.2d 101, 107 (Pa. Super. 1991). - 19 - J-S42022-24 that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).

2018See Packer, 168 A.3d at 163 n.2. [J-88-2017] - 22 It has become customary for a defendant in his argument before an Appellate Court to base his claims and contentions upon his own testimony or that of his witnesses even after a jury has found him guilty.

2018See Packer , 168 A.3d at 163 n.2.

2017Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (“the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”); Commonwealth v. Mathis, 2017 WL 5617623 , at *10 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. 1998)) (“the pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances evidencing the exercise of force, a reasonable person would have thought he was being restrained.”).

2010“In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. Super. 1995) citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124 , 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 481 , 533 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 1987), Commonwealth v. Reed, 583 A.2d 459, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 1990).

2010“In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. Super. 1995) citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124 , 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 481 , 533 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 1987), Commonwealth v. Reed, 583 A.2d 459, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 1990).

2010“In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. Super. 1995) citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124 , 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 481 , 533 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 1987), Commonwealth v. Reed, 583 A.2d 459, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 1990).

2010“In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. Super. 1995) citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124 , 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 481 , 533 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 1987), Commonwealth v. Reed, 583 A.2d 459, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 1990).

2010“In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. Super. 1995) citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124 , 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 481 , 533 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 1987), Commonwealth v. Reed, 583 A.2d 459, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 1990).

2010“In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial interrogation is whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by said interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. Super. 1995) citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124 , 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 481 , 533 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 1987), Commonwealth v. Reed, 583 A.2d 459, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 1990).

1994Strain v. Ferroni, 405 Pa.Super. 349, 360 , 592 A.2d 698, 704 (1991).

1994Strain v. Ferroni, 405 Pa.Super. 349, 360 , 592 A.2d 698, 704 (1991).

1994Relying on Alumni Association , our court has stated that “the pivotal inquiry is not whether a social host ‘intentionally and substantially aided and encouraged the consumption of alcohol by a minor guest’, but only whether a party had actual knowledge rather than imputed knowledge based on the party’s relationship to the minor.” Muntz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 514, 516, 630 A.2d 524, 525 (1993). 4 .