proposed mitigating factors in Pennsylvania

2025In addition, we have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[T]he court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994, 996 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining that an allegat

2024However, “[t]hat the court refused to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [the a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 175 .10 Turning to the second attempt to raise a substantial question, Appellant argues that the court violated sentencing norms by remarking that K.W.’s behavior was consistent with that of a sexual abuse victim.

2025In addition, we have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[T]he court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994, 996 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining that an allegat

2016Furthermore, where, as here, the trial court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, we will presume it was “aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

2024Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted) (The sentencing court may merely choose not to give the proposed mitigating factors much weight and decide that the facts of the case do not warrant imposition of a sentence lower than the standard range, and, on appeal, we cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.).

2018See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”). 4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“The failure to set forth adequate reasons for the sentence imposed has been held to raise a substantial question.”) (citation omitted). -5- J-S78027-17 circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.”).

2020See McNabb, supra. Since this is all Ibrahim claims, it does not warrant our consideration. -7- J-S69022-19 Even if we were to consider the merits of this claim, we would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Ibrahim.

2010See McNabb, supra; Wellor, supra. Given the nature of Appellant’s crimes, the court’s decision to impose these two sentences consecutively likewise does not fall within Dodge II.

2025In addition, we have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[T]he court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994, 996 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining that an allegat

2025In addition, we have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[T]he court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994, 996 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining that an allegat

2024It is well-settled that “the weight accorded to the mitigating factors or aggravating factors presented to the sentencing court is within the court’s exclusive domain.” Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 10 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 283 A.3d 792 (Pa. 2022) (citation -9- J-S12036-24 omitted); see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 175 (“That the court refused to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [the a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”).

2024Moreover, the trial court had, and considered, a presentence report and a mental health evaluation; thus, “it is presumed the court was aware of and weighed all relevant information contained in the report along with any mitigating sentencing factors.” Velez, 273 A.3d at 10 (cleaned up).

2024Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted) (The sentencing court may merely choose not to give the proposed mitigating factors much weight and decide that the facts of the case do not warrant imposition of a sentence lower than the standard range, and, on appeal, we cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.).

2021Moury, 992 A.2d at 175 (“court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as [a]ppellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”). - 12 - J-S08014-21 excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011).

2020Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2016See Commonwealth v. Wright, 832 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (a bald claim of excessiveness does not raise a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 2010) (concluding argument “[t]hat the court refused to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as Appellant wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.”).

2015Additionally, we have held “[t]hat the court[’s] refus[al] to weigh the proposed mitigating factors as Appellant ____________________________________________ 1 “A substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, G., 873 A.2d 704, 709 (Pa. Super. 2005). -5- J-S44021-15 wished, absent more, does not raise a substantial question.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 175 (citations omitted).