28 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baker v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)); see also Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406 (explaining that “even though a statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed at trial, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e., the ‘fruits’ of the statement) need not be suppressed”) (q 2024Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)); see also Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406 (explaining that “even though a statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed at trial, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e., the ‘fruits’ of the statement) need not be suppressed”) (q | 9 | 12 |
Oregon v. Elstadgreen2 sentences2024Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)); see also Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406 (explaining that “even though a statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed at trial, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e., the ‘fruits’ of the statement) need not be suppressed”) (q 2020Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)). 37 Both Tucker and Elstad involved a failure to give the required warnings rather than the failure to scrupulously honor warnings given. | 5 | 13 |
Michigan v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2024Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)); see also Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406 (explaining that “even though a statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed at trial, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e., the ‘fruits’ of the statement) need not be suppressed”) (q 2020Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)). 37 Both Tucker and Elstad involved a failure to give the required warnings rather than the failure to scrupulously honor warnings given. | 5 | 13 |
In Re HVgreen2 sentences2012In the absence of actual coercion, the fruits of a statement taken in violation of Miranda need not be suppressed under the ‘fruits’ doctrine of Wong Sun.”); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327–29 (Tex. 2008) (explaining same). 2012In the absence of actual coercion, the fruits of a statement taken in violation of Miranda need not be suppressed under the ‘fruits’ doctrine of Wong Sun .”); see also In re H.V. , 252 S.W.3d 319 , 327–29 (Tex. 2008) (explaining same). | 4 | 4 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. 2015Page 4 of 5 HARM ANALYSIS The admission into evidence of a statement taken in violation of Miranda rights is constitutional error subject to Harmless Error Review under Tex.Rules App. Proc. 44.2(a); Jones 119 SW3d at 777 . | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Patanegreen2 sentences2020United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639, 641-42, 644 (2004) (The police do not violate the Fifth Amendment or Miranda by negligent or even deliberate failures to 4 Simmons did not claim in the trial court, nor does he contend on appeal, that there was “actual coercion,” or that he was tortured. 2015See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 , 634–44 (2004) (plurality opinion); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003); see also Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22–24 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 448–49 (1974)); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 329 (Tex. 2008); Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 583 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Contreras v. Stategreen2 sentences2015App. 1997) .............................................................6, 10 Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198 (Mass. 2005) ................................................................................... 6 Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. Crim. 2015See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 , 634–44 (2004) (plurality opinion); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003); see also Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22–24 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 448–49 (1974)); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 329 (Tex. 2008); Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 583 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2 |
Kivean Deshai Coffey v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Not that long, I bet you,” was not prompted by any questioning from Malwitz, while the threats made in Mason were prompted by the officer’s questions, “[A]re you threatening to assault me?”; “Why’s that, sir?”; and “[H]ow do you propose to do that?” Id. at *1–2. 19 The erroneous denial of a motion to suppress a statement taken in violation of Miranda is constitutional error subject to review under the standard set forth in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a).16 Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 843 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d); In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Tex. App.—El Pas | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of J.T.M., a Juvenilegreen1 sentence2024Not that long, I bet you,” was not prompted by any questioning from Malwitz, while the threats made in Mason were prompted by the officer’s questions, “[A]re you threatening to assault me?”; “Why’s that, sir?”; and “[H]ow do you propose to do that?” Id. at *1–2. 19 The erroneous denial of a motion to suppress a statement taken in violation of Miranda is constitutional error subject to review under the standard set forth in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a).16 Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 843 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d); In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Tex. App.—El Pas | 1 | 1 |
Gonzales v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Code Ann. § 51.17 (c). 8 Gonzales, 67 S.W.3d at 912-13 (recognizing that § 52.02(b) of the Family Code does not contain an independent exclusionary mechanism but that a statement taken in violation of § 52.02(b) could be excluded under Article 38.23(a) if there is a causal connection between the violation and the statement). 9 Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Romero v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Code Ann. § 51.17 (c). 8 Gonzales, 67 S.W.3d at 912-13 (recognizing that § 52.02(b) of the Family Code does not contain an independent exclusionary mechanism but that a statement taken in violation of § 52.02(b) could be excluded under Article 38.23(a) if there is a causal connection between the violation and the statement). 9 Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Chavez v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2015See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 , 634–44 (2004) (plurality opinion); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003); see also Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22–24 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 448–49 (1974)); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 329 (Tex. 2008); Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 583 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6094, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9962 United States of America v. Miguel Polancogreen1 sentence2003See id. [33] United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 562-63 (9th Cir.1996) (analyzing Miranda - Elstad error and finding it harmless because of "substantial other evidence" to prove the same fact as that contained within the defendant's improperly admitted statement). | 1 | 1 |
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen2 sentences2003See id. [33] United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 562-63 (9th Cir.1996) (analyzing Miranda - Elstad error and finding it harmless because of "substantial other evidence" to prove the same fact as that contained within the defendant's improperly admitted statement). 2003See id. . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wong Sun v. United States
green
1 sentence2020Thus, “while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the “fruits” of the statement) need not be suppressed.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974)). 37 Both Tucker and Elstad involved a failure to give the required warnings rather than the failure to scrupulously honor warnings given. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Akins v. State
green
1 sentence2019Instead, “the fruits of a defendant’s statement” need to be suppressed “only when the statement was obtained through actual coercion.” Akins, 202 S.W.3d at 891 ; see Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 23 (explaining that “[i]n the absence of actual coercion, the fruits of a statement taken in violation of Miranda need not be suppressed under the ‘fruits’ doctrine”). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
1 sentence2015App. 1997) .............................................................6, 10 Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198 (Mass. 2005) ................................................................................... 6 Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ashcraft v. State
green
1 sentence2015This Court should protect an arrestee’s right to stop an interrogation, by invoking the right to counsel, and exclude the fruits of a statement taken in violation of that right. ........................... 5 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER................................................................................ 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4(e) ....................................... 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................... 14 APPENDIX .................................................................................. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2015Appellant alternatively asks the Court to extend the exclusionary rule in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23 to fruits of a statement taken in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 485–86 (1981). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Arizona v. Roberson
green
1 sentence2015This Court should protect an arrestee’s right to stop an interrogation, by invoking the right to counsel, and exclude the fruits of a statement taken in violation of that right. ........................... 5 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER................................................................................ 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4(e) ....................................... 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................... 14 APPENDIX .................................................................................. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2002Likewise, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the Court held that a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility. 2002Likewise, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the Court held that a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Harris v. New York
green
2 sentences2002Likewise, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the Court held that a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility. 2002Likewise, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the Court held that a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.