statement taken violation in California

2022The United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 (Harris) decided that a statement taken in violation of Miranda is inadmissible at trial in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but is admissible to impeach the defendant’s credibility as a witness, so long as the statement otherwise is voluntary.

2013(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224-226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 ]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1187-1188 ; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461 , 471- 474.) The impeachment evidence is properly admitted because “[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d at p. 5 ].) A statement is voluntary when it is “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception

2022(Harris, at pp. 225–226; accord, Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714 , 723–724 [a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes]; People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 970 ; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1 , 29–30; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1188 [statement taken in violation of Miranda is otherwise admissible to impeach the defendant’s credibility as a witness].) Under our California Constitution, statements taken in violation of Miranda are to be excluded from ev

1998(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 [ 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 646 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (Harris) [a statement taken without proper Miranda advisements may be admitted for impeachment purposes]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714, 722 [ 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1220-1221 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 ] [pursuant to the Harris rule, a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes].) Provisions of the California Constitution establish that statements taken in violation of Miranda are to be excluded from evi

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

2022(Harris, at pp. 225–226; accord, Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 714 , 723–724 [a statement taken after the police fail to honor the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation is admissible for impeachment purposes]; People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 970 ; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1 , 29–30; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1188 [statement taken in violation of Miranda is otherwise admissible to impeach the defendant’s credibility as a witness].) Under our California Constitution, statements taken in violation of Miranda are to be excluded from ev

2013(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224-226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 ]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1187-1188 ; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461 , 471- 474.) The impeachment evidence is properly admitted because “[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d at p. 5 ].) A statement is voluntary when it is “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception

1998As the high court has declared: "The prosecution must not be allowed to build its case against a criminal defendant with evidence acquired in contravention of constitutional guarantees and their corresponding judicially created protections." ( Michigan v. Harvey, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 351 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 1180 ].) The rule that a statement taken in violation of Edwards may be admissible for impeachment purposes is founded not upon any recognition that the police legitimately may interrogate a suspect despite the suspect's demand for counsel.

1998As the high court has declared: "The prosecution must not be allowed to build its case against a criminal defendant with evidence acquired in contravention of constitutional guarantees and their corresponding judicially created protections." ( Michigan v. Harvey, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 351 [ 110 S.Ct. at p. 1180 ].) The rule that a statement taken in violation of Edwards may be admissible for impeachment purposes is founded not upon any recognition that the police legitimately may interrogate a suspect despite the suspect's demand for counsel.

2013(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224-226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 ]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1187-1188 ; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461 , 471- 474.) The impeachment evidence is properly admitted because “[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d at p. 5 ].) A statement is voluntary when it is “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception

2013(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224-226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 ]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1187-1188 ; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461 , 471- 474.) The impeachment evidence is properly admitted because “[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d at p. 5 ].) A statement is voluntary when it is “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception

2005As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting the same argument, Miranda , unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, "safeguards `a fundamental trial right.'" ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 691 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 .) "By bracing against `the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' Miranda serves to guard against `the use of unreliable statements at trial.'" ( Id. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745 .) While a statement taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily involuntary, the presence or absence of Miranda advisements and

2005As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting the same argument, Miranda , unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, "safeguards `a fundamental trial right.'" ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 691 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 .) "By bracing against `the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' Miranda serves to guard against `the use of unreliable statements at trial.'" ( Id. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745 .) While a statement taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily involuntary, the presence or absence of Miranda advisements and

2005As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting the same argument, Miranda , unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, "safeguards `a fundamental trial right.'" ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 691 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 .) "By bracing against `the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' Miranda serves to guard against `the use of unreliable statements at trial.'" ( Id. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745 .) While a statement taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily involuntary, the presence or absence of Miranda advisements and

2005As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting the same argument, Miranda , unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, "safeguards `a fundamental trial right.'" ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 691 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 .) "By bracing against `the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' Miranda serves to guard against `the use of unreliable statements at trial.'" ( Id. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745 .) While a statement taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily involuntary, the presence or absence of Miranda advisements and

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

2003(E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 [Jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and offered only to impeach].) Indeed, we and others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow instructions as "[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury." ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ; see Francis v. Frank

1974(Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) “A principal objective of [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure confessions or admissions.” (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 717 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 81

1974(Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) “A principal objective of [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure confessions or admissions.” (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 717 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 81

1974(Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) “A principal objective of [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure confessions or admissions.” (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 717 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 81

1974(Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) “A principal objective of [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure confessions or admissions.” (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 717 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 81

1974(Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 544 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 , 81 S.Ct. 735 ]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 439 P.2d 623 ]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 384 P.2d 16 ].) “A principal objective of [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure confessions or admissions.” (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 717 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 81