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27 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Holmanred2 sentences2023Additionally, under a Holman analysis, “a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the defendant had the ‘opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.’ ” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 23 , 100 N.E.3d 577 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 49 ); see also Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (finding the juvenile - 23 - defendant’s de facto discretionary life sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller, where defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to and the 2023Additionally, under a Holman analysis, “a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the defendant had the ‘opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.’ ” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 23 , 100 N.E.3d 577 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 49 ); see also Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (finding the juvenile - 23 - defendant’s de facto discretionary life sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller, where defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to and the | 2 | 7 |
People v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2021See People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 47 (stating the young adult offender in that case was required to “make a preliminary showing” that Miller applies in the first place before a court may undertake a Holman analysis); People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 20 (“[The defendant] has to make a preliminary showing before the court undertakes a Holman analysis.”). ¶ 61 In Ruiz, the First District relied on Harris for the proposition that “young adult defendants are not entitled to a presumption that Miller applies to them.” Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52 . 2021See People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 47 (stating the young adult offender in that case was required to “make a preliminary showing” that Miller applies in the first place before a court may undertake a Holman analysis); People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 20 (“[The defendant] has to make a preliminary showing before the court undertakes a Holman analysis.”). ¶ 61 In Ruiz, the First District relied on Harris for the proposition that “young adult defendants are not entitled to a presumption that Miller applies to them.” Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52 . | 2 | 3 |
People v. Lusbygreen2 sentences2023Additionally, under a Holman analysis, “a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the defendant had the ‘opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.’ ” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 23 , 100 N.E.3d 577 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 49 ); see also Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (finding the juvenile - 23 - defendant’s de facto discretionary life sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller, where defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to and the 2023Additionally, under a Holman analysis, “a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the defendant had the ‘opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.’ ” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 23 , 100 N.E.3d 577 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 49 ); see also Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (finding the juvenile - 23 - defendant’s de facto discretionary life sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller, where defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to and the | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 47 (stating the young adult offender in that case was required to “make a preliminary showing” that Miller applies in the first place before a court may undertake a Holman analysis); People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 20 (“[The defendant] has to make a preliminary showing before the court undertakes a Holman analysis.”). ¶ 61 In Ruiz, the First District relied on Harris for the proposition that “young adult defendants are not entitled to a presumption that Miller applies to them.” Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52 . 2021See People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 47 (stating the young adult offender in that case was required to “make a preliminary showing” that Miller applies in the first place before a court may undertake a Holman analysis); People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 20 (“[The defendant] has to make a preliminary showing before the court undertakes a Holman analysis.”). ¶ 61 In Ruiz, the First District relied on Harris for the proposition that “young adult defendants are not entitled to a presumption that Miller applies to them.” Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52 . | 2 | 2 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2018Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court considered the type of evidence Miller requires and the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed. ¶ 62 In our initial, now-vacated opinion, we found the trial court's reasoning conveyed its belief defendant was "one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime showed a life sentence is appropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Stafford , 2016 IL App (4th) 140309 , ¶ 52, 406 Ill.Dec. 790 , 61 N.E.3d 1058 ; see Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller did bar life without parole * * * for all but the rarest of juvenile 2018Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court considered the type of evidence Miller requires and the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed. ¶ 62 In our initial, now-vacated opinion, we found the trial court's reasoning conveyed its belief defendant was "one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime showed a life sentence is appropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Stafford , 2016 IL App (4th) 140309 , ¶ 52, 406 Ill.Dec. 790 , 61 N.E.3d 1058 ; see Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller did bar life without parole * * * for all but the rarest of juvenile | 2 | 2 |
People v. Croftgreen2 sentences2023Additionally, under a Holman analysis, “a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the defendant had the ‘opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.’ ” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 23 , 100 N.E.3d 577 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 49 ); see also Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (finding the juvenile - 23 - defendant’s de facto discretionary life sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller, where defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to and the 2023Additionally, under a Holman analysis, “a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the defendant had the ‘opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.’ ” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 23 , 100 N.E.3d 577 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 49 ); see also Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (finding the juvenile - 23 - defendant’s de facto discretionary life sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller, where defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to and the | 1 | 12 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2021Id. ¶¶ 32-33. ¶ 82 Accepting Ruiz’s contention, which I do not agree with, that Miller applies to an 18-year- old (see Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25 (at this stage we must accept Ruiz’s allegations as true)), the majority simply fails to recognize that Ruiz had a Miller compliant sentencing hearing. 2021Id. ¶¶ 32-33. ¶ 82 Accepting Ruiz’s contention, which I do not agree with, that Miller applies to an 18-year- old (see Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25 (at this stage we must accept Ruiz’s allegations as true)), the majority simply fails to recognize that Ruiz had a Miller compliant sentencing hearing. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 43 ; see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 43 (explaining Holman’s exception for true Miller claims: “All of the facts and circumstances necessary to decide the defendant’s Miller claim were already in the record.”). ¶ 49 A proportionate-penalties claim is not, and never has been, a Miller claim, if for no other reason because it is not based on the eighth amendment. 2020Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 43-45 . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2020This court reached the same conclusion in People v. Johnson, holding that “ ‘the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed’ and ‘we cannot say that defendant’s sentencing hearing was constitutionally defective.’ ” 2018 IL App (1st) 153266, ¶ 26 (quoting Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 32 ). 2020This court reached the same conclusion in People v. Johnson, holding that “ ‘the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed’ and ‘we cannot say that defendant’s sentencing hearing was constitutionally defective.’ ” 2018 IL App (1st) 153266, ¶ 26 (quoting Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 32 ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mooregreen1 sentence2025See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 ; People v. Robert Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 ; Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Nieto
green
2 sentences2018Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court considered the type of evidence Miller requires and the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed. ¶ 62 In our initial, now-vacated opinion, we found the trial court's reasoning conveyed its belief defendant was "one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime showed a life sentence is appropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Stafford , 2016 IL App (4th) 140309 , ¶ 52, 406 Ill.Dec. 790 , 61 N.E.3d 1058 ; see Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller did bar life without parole * * * for all but the rarest of juvenile 2018Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court considered the type of evidence Miller requires and the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed. ¶ 62 In our initial, now-vacated opinion, we found the trial court's reasoning conveyed its belief defendant was "one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime showed a life sentence is appropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Stafford , 2016 IL App (4th) 140309 , ¶ 52, 406 Ill.Dec. 790 , 61 N.E.3d 1058 ; see Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller did bar life without parole * * * for all but the rarest of juvenile | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Stafford
green
2 sentences2018Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court considered the type of evidence Miller requires and the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed. ¶ 62 In our initial, now-vacated opinion, we found the trial court's reasoning conveyed its belief defendant was "one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime showed a life sentence is appropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Stafford , 2016 IL App (4th) 140309 , ¶ 52, 406 Ill.Dec. 790 , 61 N.E.3d 1058 ; see Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller did bar life without parole * * * for all but the rarest of juvenile 2018Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court considered the type of evidence Miller requires and the Holman factors were sufficiently addressed. ¶ 62 In our initial, now-vacated opinion, we found the trial court's reasoning conveyed its belief defendant was "one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime showed a life sentence is appropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Stafford , 2016 IL App (4th) 140309 , ¶ 52, 406 Ill.Dec. 790 , 61 N.E.3d 1058 ; see Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller did bar life without parole * * * for all but the rarest of juvenile | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Dorsey
green
1 sentence2025See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 ; People v. Robert Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 ; Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Clark
green
1 sentence2025See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 ; People v. Robert Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 ; Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2025People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 43 ; see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 43 (explaining Holman’s exception for true Miller claims: “All of the facts and circumstances necessary to decide the defendant’s Miller claim were already in the record.”). ¶ 49 A proportionate-penalties claim is not, and never has been, a Miller claim, if for no other reason because it is not based on the eighth amendment. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Moore
green
2 sentences2021To file a successive petition, these defendants had to show cause for and prejudice from failing to raise the claim sooner, a “higher burden than the frivolous or patently without merit standard applied at first-stage proceedings.” People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶ 15 . 2021To file a successive petition, these defendants had to show cause for and prejudice from failing to raise the claim sooner, a “higher burden than the frivolous or patently without merit standard applied at first-stage proceedings.” People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶ 15 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2020On this point, the court highlighted the fact that Holman’s challenge to his life without parole sentence pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2016), (which prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder) raised “purely legal issues” leaving only a determination of whether the trial court adequately considered the Miller factors at the original sentencing hearing which could be determined on the cold record. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Holman
green
1 sentence2020Holman, 2014 IL App (3d) 120905, ¶ 59 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Leamons
green
1 sentence1988App. 3d 1056 , 469 N.E.2d 1137 .) We find Holman’s challenge to the trial judge’s conduct in selecting the jury herein to be without merit. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Howell
green
2 sentences1984This court has held, however, that the fashioning of a remedy is a legislative rather than a judicial matter. ( People v. Howell (1975), 60 Ill.2d 117, 122-23 .) As of the time the trial court passed on Holman's motion to dismiss the indictment, the legislature had not acted on this subject, although it has since (Pub. 1984(People v. Howell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 117, 122-23 .) As of the time the trial court passed on Holman’s motion to dismiss the indictment, the legislature had not acted on this subject, although it has since (Pub. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.