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27 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hilliergreen2 sentences2022People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 , 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010). 2022People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 , 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sargentgreen2 sentences2023The State asserts no error occurred because Barr’s motion contained a conclusory allegation of bias, and thus Judge Tucker was not required to transfer the case to a different judge. ¶ 20 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred -8- and that error is so serious that it affecte 2023The State asserts no error occurred because Barr’s motion contained a conclusory allegation of bias, and thus Judge Tucker was not required to transfer the case to a different judge. ¶ 20 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred -8- and that error is so serious that it affecte | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2018Relying upon People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 505 (2004), the State asserts that a claim not raised in a postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 2017Relying upon People v. Jones , 213 Ill. 2d 498 , 505, 290 Ill.Dec. 519 , 821 N.E.2d 1093 (2004), the State asserts that a claim not raised in a postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Huffgreen1 sentence2025See People v. Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 18 (any issue raised and decided on direct appeal is barred by res judicata). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Colemangreen1 sentence2024In contrast, the State asserts that the standard of review should be de novo when reviewing the interpretation of a statute (see People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 22 ) and otherwise believes the manifest error standard applies as the “typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial judge” (People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998)). ¶ 58 Furthermore, the parties dispute the burdens of proof and production and with whom they rest in an evidentiary hearing following a Commission referral for judicial review. | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen1 sentence2024Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Anne G.green1 sentence2024See, e.g., In re B.G., 407 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Caingreen1 sentence2023The petitioner therefore asserts that in violation of Rule 431(b) the circuit court never 20 No. 1-22-1064 affirmatively ascertained if juror Luna understood and accepted that principle. 4 ¶ 74 Under this record, the State concedes, as it must, that the circuit court committed an error under Rule 431(b) when admonishing juror Luna. 5 See People v. Ticey, 2021 IL App (1st) 181002, ¶¶ 6, 41 (finding that the circuit court committed a Rule 431(b) error where the trial judge “made no mention at all” of the fourth principle); People v. Cain, 2021 IL App (1st) 191921, ¶¶ 5, 21 (same); see also Peopl | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ticeygreen1 sentence2023The petitioner therefore asserts that in violation of Rule 431(b) the circuit court never 20 No. 1-22-1064 affirmatively ascertained if juror Luna understood and accepted that principle. 4 ¶ 74 Under this record, the State concedes, as it must, that the circuit court committed an error under Rule 431(b) when admonishing juror Luna. 5 See People v. Ticey, 2021 IL App (1st) 181002, ¶¶ 6, 41 (finding that the circuit court committed a Rule 431(b) error where the trial judge “made no mention at all” of the fourth principle); People v. Cain, 2021 IL App (1st) 191921, ¶¶ 5, 21 (same); see also Peopl | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2023The petitioner therefore asserts that in violation of Rule 431(b) the circuit court never 20 No. 1-22-1064 affirmatively ascertained if juror Luna understood and accepted that principle. 4 ¶ 74 Under this record, the State concedes, as it must, that the circuit court committed an error under Rule 431(b) when admonishing juror Luna. 5 See People v. Ticey, 2021 IL App (1st) 181002, ¶¶ 6, 41 (finding that the circuit court committed a Rule 431(b) error where the trial judge “made no mention at all” of the fourth principle); People v. Cain, 2021 IL App (1st) 191921, ¶¶ 5, 21 (same); see also Peopl | 1 | 1 |
People v. Villarrealgreen1 sentence2022“To allow a defendant to use the exact ruling or action procured in the trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal would offend notions of fair play and encourage defendants to become duplicitous. [Citation.] It would also deprive the State of the opportunity to cure the alleged defect.” People v. Harding, 2012 IL App (2d) 101011, ¶ 17 . “[A] defendant's invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harveygreen1 sentence2022“To allow a defendant to use the exact ruling or action procured in the trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal would offend notions of fair play and encourage defendants to become duplicitous. [Citation.] It would also deprive the State of the opportunity to cure the alleged defect.” People v. Harding, 2012 IL App (2d) 101011, ¶ 17 . “[A] defendant's invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Detention of Swopegreen1 sentence2022Instead, the State asserts that the doctrine of invited error precludes respondent 8 from presently raising this issue after counsel below expressly declined to object to the plans’ admission. ¶ 33 “The rule of invited error or acquiescence is a procedural default sometimes described as estoppel. [Citation.] Simply stated, a party cannot complain of error which that party induced the court to make or to which that party consented.” In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill.2d 210, 217 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rinehartgreen1 sentence2022See People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 16 , 962 N.E.2d 444 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rinehartgreen1 sentence2022See People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 16 , 962 N.E.2d 444 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Phillipsgreen1 sentence2020The State asserts the error was harmless as the evidence in this case was overwhelming. ¶ 40 A violation of a ruling on a motion in limine will constitute grounds for a mistrial “only when the violation effectively deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial.” People v. Phillips, 383 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Naylorgreen2 sentences2012However, the State asserts that the error was not reversible, “because the record does not rebut the presumption that the trial court acted properly and considered only competent evidence.” We agree. ¶ 15 “Absent reversible error, there can be no plain error.” People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584 , -5- 602 (2008). 2012Thus, before we would reach the issue of whether the evidence was closely balanced, “we must determine whether the error is such that would require reversal of defendant’s convictions.” Id. at 603 ; see also id. at 605 (“Having concluded that the trial court committed reversible error, we must next determine whether the evidence presented at defendant’s trial was closely balanced.”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Enochgreen2 sentences2002See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). 2002See People v. Enoch , 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2011Even if not forfeited, the State asserts the claim has no merit because the precise claim was rejected in People v. Smith, 383 Ill. 2011Even if not forfeited, the State asserts the claim has no merit because the precise claim was rejected in People v. Smith, 383 Ill. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Casler
green
1 sentence2024In contrast, the State asserts that the standard of review should be de novo when reviewing the interpretation of a statute (see People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 22 ) and otherwise believes the manifest error standard applies as the “typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial judge” (People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998)). ¶ 58 Furthermore, the parties dispute the burdens of proof and production and with whom they rest in an evidentiary hearing following a Commission referral for judicial review. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Joyce
green
1 sentence2023Citing the supreme court’s ruling in People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. 2d 225 (1953), the State maintains that it may appeal the grant of a new trial pursuant to the Act and therefore Rule 604(a) had no applicability here. ¶ 32 Mr. Harris filed a reply to the State and also addressed the matter in his appellee brief. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Harding
green
1 sentence2022“To allow a defendant to use the exact ruling or action procured in the trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal would offend notions of fair play and encourage defendants to become duplicitous. [Citation.] It would also deprive the State of the opportunity to cure the alleged defect.” People v. Harding, 2012 IL App (2d) 101011, ¶ 17 . “[A] defendant's invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Heritsch
green
1 sentence2019E.g., People v. Heritsch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151157, ¶ 8 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1994The relevant standard for determining the performance of counsel is found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L. 1994The relevant standard for determining the performance of counsel is found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1990The State is correct; defendant waived his Batson claim by voicing his objection and moving for a mistrial in an untimely manner, not doing so until after the jury had been sworn. ( People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 457 , 139 Ill.Dec. 469 , 548 N.E.2d 1025 ; People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 170-71 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 .) Nonetheless, we consider defendant's Batson claim because, for its part, the State's right to raise defendant's waiver was itself waived when the prosecution neglected to argue the untimeliness of defendant's motion *1247 at the time the motion w 1990The State is correct; defendant waived his Batson claim by voicing his objection and moving for a mistrial in an untimely manner, not doing so until after the jury had been sworn. ( People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 457 , 139 Ill.Dec. 469 , 548 N.E.2d 1025 ; People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 170-71 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 .) Nonetheless, we consider defendant's Batson claim because, for its part, the State's right to raise defendant's waiver was itself waived when the prosecution neglected to argue the untimeliness of defendant's motion *1247 at the time the motion w | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Cummings
green
1 sentence1990People v. Cummings (1988), 176 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Andrews
green
2 sentences1990The State is correct; defendant waived his Batson claim by voicing his objection and moving for a mistrial in an untimely manner, not doing so until after the jury had been sworn. ( People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 457 , 139 Ill.Dec. 469 , 548 N.E.2d 1025 ; People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 170-71 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 .) Nonetheless, we consider defendant's Batson claim because, for its part, the State's right to raise defendant's waiver was itself waived when the prosecution neglected to argue the untimeliness of defendant's motion *1247 at the time the motion w 1990The State is correct; defendant waived his Batson claim by voicing his objection and moving for a mistrial in an untimely manner, not doing so until after the jury had been sworn. ( People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 457 , 139 Ill.Dec. 469 , 548 N.E.2d 1025 ; People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 170-71 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 .) Nonetheless, we consider defendant's Batson claim because, for its part, the State's right to raise defendant's waiver was itself waived when the prosecution neglected to argue the untimeliness of defendant's motion *1247 at the time the motion w | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Adkins
neutral
1 sentence1987The circuit court refused to allow defendant to answer two questions: “Did you feel you had a choice to lie to them?” and “Were you acting under duress and in fear of your life?” Both questions were leading (see People v. Harris (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 431, 436-37 , 134 N.E.2d 315 ; People v. Adkins (1973), 16 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Alejos
green
2 sentences1987The State asserts that its instruction correctly states the law in Illinois and cites the following language from the previously discussed case of People v. Alejos: “The two essential elements of armed violence are being armed with a dangerous weapon and committing a felony, and while they must coincide, the mere presence of a weapon of the proscribed character is sufficient; the defendant need not actually use the weapon in the commission of the felony.” 97 Ill. 2d 502, 508 , 455 N.E.2d 48, 50 . 1987The State asserts that its instruction correctly states the law in Illinois and cites the following language from the previously discussed case of People v. Alejos: “The two essential elements of armed violence are being armed with a dangerous weapon and committing a felony, and while they must coincide, the mere presence of a weapon of the proscribed character is sufficient; the defendant need not actually use the weapon in the commission of the felony.” 97 Ill. 2d 502, 508 , 455 N.E.2d 48, 50 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
The People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1987The circuit court refused to allow defendant to answer two questions: “Did you feel you had a choice to lie to them?” and “Were you acting under duress and in fear of your life?” Both questions were leading (see People v. Harris (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 431, 436-37 , 134 N.E.2d 315 ; People v. Adkins (1973), 16 Ill. 1987The circuit court refused to allow defendant to answer two questions: “Did you feel you had a choice to lie to them?” and “Were you acting under duress and in fear of your life?” Both questions were leading (see People v. Harris (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 431, 436-37 , 134 N.E.2d 315 ; People v. Adkins (1973), 16 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| The PEOPLE v. Watson green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| The People v. Storer green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.