sua sponte instruction in California

2015(People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 , overruled on other grounds by In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777 .) Substantial evidence is evidence "sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 (Barton).) But the evidence will not compel a sua sponte instruction on a lesser included offense unless it is "substantial enough to merit consideration." (People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684, fn. 12 .) "[S]peculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence." (Pe

2015(People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 , overruled on other grounds by In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777 .) Substantial evidence is evidence "sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 (Barton).) But the evidence will not compel a sua sponte instruction on a lesser included offense unless it is "substantial enough to merit consideration." (People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684, fn. 12 .) "[S]peculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence." (Pe

1998After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we agreed, explaining that such an instruction must be given "if there is any evidence of manslaughter deserving of consideration," even if such evidence consists of the defendant's "incredible" testimony. ( Id. at pp. 727, 729, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 382 P.2d 33 .) Modesto 's conclusion in this regard was reaffirmed in People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 , where the trial court failed to give a sua sponte instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

1998After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we agreed, explaining that such an instruction must be given "if there is any evidence of manslaughter deserving of consideration," even if such evidence consists of the defendant's "incredible" testimony. ( Id. at pp. 727, 729, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 382 P.2d 33 .) Modesto 's conclusion in this regard was reaffirmed in People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 , where the trial court failed to give a sua sponte instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

2025(See People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 156 [“in assessing prejudice, ‘it does not matter that the jury chose to convict the defendant of the greater offense over acquittal or that the defendant was convicted of the greater offense on sufficient evidence’ ” because to “hold otherwise would undermine the very purpose of the sua sponte rule”], citing Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178, fn. 25 .) We thus conclude there is a reasonable probability that Johnson would have achieved a better outcome at trial had the court instructed the jury regarding the lesser included offense of simpl

2025(See People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 156 [“in assessing prejudice, ‘it does not matter that the jury chose to convict the defendant of the greater offense over acquittal or that the defendant was convicted of the greater offense on sufficient evidence’ ” because to “hold otherwise would undermine the very purpose of the sua sponte rule”], citing Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178, fn. 25 .) We thus conclude there is a reasonable probability that Johnson would have achieved a better outcome at trial had the court instructed the jury regarding the lesser included offense of simpl

2006There, we stated in dictum that “a sua sponte instruction on provocation and second degree murder must be given ‘where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately’ to carry it out.” (Id. at pp. 42-43, quoting People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ]; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ] [no sua sponte duty to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.73 where no evidence suppo

2006There, we stated in dictum that “a sua sponte instruction on provocation and second degree murder must be given ‘where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately’ to carry it out.” (Id. at pp. 42-43, quoting People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ]; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ] [no sua sponte duty to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.73 where no evidence suppo

2017(People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1130 [fact that counsel requested and obtained heat of passion manslaughter instruction does not establish evidence necessitated sua sponte instructions; such instructions are often given out of abundance of caution].) Indeed, the court’s comments suggested that the state of the evidence was such as did not warrant a sua sponte instruction.

2006There, we stated in dictum that “a sua sponte instruction on provocation and second degree murder must be given ‘where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately’ to carry it out.” (Id. at pp. 42-43, quoting People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ]; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ] [no sua sponte duty to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.73 where no evidence suppo

1983The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ].) The sua sponte rule "`... [is] undoubtedly designed to promote the ends of justice by providing some judicial safeguards for defendants from the possible vagaries of ineptness of counsel under the adversary system....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 683 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ].

1983The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ].) The sua sponte rule "`... [is] undoubtedly designed to promote the ends of justice by providing some judicial safeguards for defendants from the possible vagaries of ineptness of counsel under the adversary system....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 683 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ].

2015(People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 , overruled on other grounds by In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777 .) Substantial evidence is evidence "sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 (Barton).) But the evidence will not compel a sua sponte instruction on a lesser included offense unless it is "substantial enough to merit consideration." (People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684, fn. 12 .) "[S]peculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence." (Pe

2015(People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 , overruled on other grounds by In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777 .) Substantial evidence is evidence "sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 (Barton).) But the evidence will not compel a sua sponte instruction on a lesser included offense unless it is "substantial enough to merit consideration." (People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684, fn. 12 .) "[S]peculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence." (Pe

2015(People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 , overruled on other grounds by In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 777 .) Substantial evidence is evidence "sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 (Barton).) But the evidence will not compel a sua sponte instruction on a lesser included offense unless it is "substantial enough to merit consideration." (People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684, fn. 12 .) "[S]peculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence." (Pe

2015In a preliminary discussion of jury instructions, the court indicated that it found ―insufficient evidence to justify either a sua sponte instruction, or one at the request of counsel for defendant.‖ Defense counsel‘s only response was to ask whether that ―includes the 5/6/95 incident,‖ which was the murder of Tuan Pham. ―Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted withou

1987Code, § 22, subd. (b).) “[T]he mere fact that a defendant may have been drinking prior to the commission of a crime does not establish intoxication or require the giving of even a requested instruction thereon. [Citation.] Evidence of intoxication which calls for a sua sponte instruction must be substantial.” (People v. Cram, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 44 .

1983The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ].) The sua sponte rule "`... [is] undoubtedly designed to promote the ends of justice by providing some judicial safeguards for defendants from the possible vagaries of ineptness of counsel under the adversary system....' [Citation.]" ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 683 [ 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ].

1987Another question presented is whether appellant Williams was entitled to a sua sponte instruction on voluntary intoxication since voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to his defense of nonparticipation. ( People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 718, 735 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 671 ].) However, since the enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7 must be reversed under part I of this dissent, appellant Williams should at any retrial be entitled to an instruction on the effect of voluntary intoxication as it relates to the section 12022.7 enhancement and any defense he may raise on retrial. *1

1987Another question presented is whether appellant Williams was entitled to a sua sponte instruction on voluntary intoxication since voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to his defense of nonparticipation. ( People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 718, 735 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 671 ].) However, since the enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7 must be reversed under part I of this dissent, appellant Williams should at any retrial be entitled to an instruction on the effect of voluntary intoxication as it relates to the section 12022.7 enhancement and any defense he may raise on retrial. *1

2025(People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 , 958–959 (Housley).) In Housley, the Court of Appeal “conclude[d] that because of the potential for misuse of CSAAS evidence, and the potential for great prejudice to the defendant in the event such evidence is misused, it is appropriate to impose upon the courts a duty to render a sua sponte instruction limiting the use of such evidence.

2023(See Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074 [even assuming court erred in failing to give limiting instruction on CSAAS, error was harmless under Watson standard]; Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 959 [reaching similar conclusion].) The Mateo court concluded no prejudice was shown by the failure to instruct, reasoning that “[w]here, as here, the expert testifies regarding the behavior of abused children as a class, there is little, if any, chance the jury will misunderstand or misapply the evidence.” (Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074 .) In Housley, we concluded that, even if a sua

2020In short, the evidence indisputably showed that Son “deliberately engaged in a type of aggravated assault the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, thus satisfying the objective component of implied malice as a matter of law, and no material issue [was] presented as to whether [he] subjectively appreciated the danger to human life [that his] conduct posed.” (Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 .) Accordingly, a sua sponte instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not warranted and the trial court did not err in omitting one.

2020In short, the evidence indisputably showed that Son “deliberately engaged in a type of aggravated assault the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, thus satisfying the objective component of implied malice as a matter of law, and no material issue [was] presented as to whether [he] subjectively appreciated the danger to human life [that his] conduct posed.” (Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 .) Accordingly, a sua sponte instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not warranted and the trial court did not err in omitting one.

2025(See People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 746, fn. 3 ; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 63–64; accord, People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 533 .) This principle has been held specifically to apply to limiting instructions regarding the admission of a defendant’s previous uncharged misconduct, including on the use of evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1109.

2014Code, § 355; 12 People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 533 .) However, with respect to CSAAS evidence, People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 (Housley) held that "it is appropriate to impose upon the courts a duty to render a sua sponte instruction limiting the use of such evidence.

1970“These are not the actions of a man too drank to form a specific intent to rob. [Citations.]” (People v. Spencer, 60 Cal.2d 64, 89 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 383 P.2d 134 ].) While an exhaustive review of the cases involving the quantum of proof of intoxication necessary to call for a sua sponte instruction on the subject would only unduly prolong this already overlong opinion, a representative few might be noted: In People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.2d 264 [74 Ca.Rptr. 385, 449 P.2d 449 ], two qualified experts testified that the defendant had diminished capacity due to pathological intoxication.

1970“These are not the actions of a man too drank to form a specific intent to rob. [Citations.]” (People v. Spencer, 60 Cal.2d 64, 89 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 383 P.2d 134 ].) While an exhaustive review of the cases involving the quantum of proof of intoxication necessary to call for a sua sponte instruction on the subject would only unduly prolong this already overlong opinion, a representative few might be noted: In People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.2d 264 [74 Ca.Rptr. 385, 449 P.2d 449 ], two qualified experts testified that the defendant had diminished capacity due to pathological intoxication.

2025(See People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 746, fn. 3 ; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 , 63–64; accord, People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 533 .) This principle has been held specifically to apply to limiting instructions regarding the admission of a defendant’s previous uncharged misconduct, including on the use of evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1109.

2000(People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 533 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680 , 950 P.2d 1035 ]; People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 746, fn. 3 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 ]; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63-64 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 , 23 A.L.R.4th 776 ].) This principle has been held specifically to apply to limiting instructions regarding the admission of a defendant’s previous uncharged misconduct.

2021A. No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct “[A] claim that a court failed to properly instruct on the applicable principles of law is reviewed de novo.” (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 .) The Supreme Court has “consistently held that where, as here, a defendant fails to request an instruction, a trial court ‘generally [has] no duty to instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 139 (Valdez).)6 In People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 (Collie), the Supreme Court recognized a “narrow exception” where a sua sponte instruction is required

2021A. No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct “[A] claim that a court failed to properly instruct on the applicable principles of law is reviewed de novo.” (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 .) The Supreme Court has “consistently held that where, as here, a defendant fails to request an instruction, a trial court ‘generally [has] no duty to instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 139 (Valdez).)6 In People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 (Collie), the Supreme Court recognized a “narrow exception” where a sua sponte instruction is required

1997(People v. Castillo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 264, 270 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 449 P.2d 449 ] [the trial court’s decision to give certain instructions establishes a strong presumption the evidence supports such instructions].) However, the court gave that instruction because defense counsel requested it, and “[t]he fact that [defense counsel] requested a heat of passion instruction for manslaughter does not establish that the evidence would have necessitated a sua sponte instruction.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1130 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ].) In determining whether sufficient evi

1997(People v. Castillo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 264, 270 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 449 P.2d 449 ] [the trial court’s decision to give certain instructions establishes a strong presumption the evidence supports such instructions].) However, the court gave that instruction because defense counsel requested it, and “[t]he fact that [defense counsel] requested a heat of passion instruction for manslaughter does not establish that the evidence would have necessitated a sua sponte instruction.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1130 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ].) In determining whether sufficient evi

2025(Housley, at p. 957.) However, the court observed that “[t]he frequency with which defendants recently have challenged the alleged misuse of CSAAS evidence suggests this type of testimony may be unusually susceptible of being misunderstood and misapplied by a jury. . . . [W]here the case boils down to the victim’s word against the word of the accused, such evidence could unfairly tip the balance in favor of the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 958.) The court concluded “that because of the potential for misuse of CSAAS evidence, and the potential for great prejudice to the defendant in the event such

2023(See Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074 [even assuming court erred in failing to give limiting instruction on CSAAS, error was harmless under Watson standard]; Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 959 [reaching similar conclusion].) The Mateo court concluded no prejudice was shown by the failure to instruct, reasoning that “[w]here, as here, the expert testifies regarding the behavior of abused children as a class, there is little, if any, chance the jury will misunderstand or misapply the evidence.” (Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074 .) In Housley, we concluded that, even if a sua

2023“The accident defense is a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a crime.” (People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 , disapproved in People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, fn. 3 [“to the extent [it] hold[s] a sua sponte instruction on accident is required when the defense is raised to negate the intent or mental element of the charged crime”].) “In each case, the defense of accident was raised to rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was charged.

2014In People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 992 , our Supreme Court held that "a trial court has no obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where . . . the defendant's theory of accident is an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime." "[A]s explained in Anderson, the trial court's sua sponte instructional duties do not apply to defenses that serve only to negate the mental state element of the charged offense when the jury is properly instructed on the mental state element, even when substantial evidence supports the defense and it is consistent with the d

2019In reviewing cases involving a failure to instruct on a sua sponte defense, our high court has assumed the more rigorous Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies.

2019In reviewing cases involving a failure to instruct on a sua sponte defense, our high court has assumed the more rigorous Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies.

2019(E.g., People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984 .) Assuming that Chapman standard applies in this case, we conclude the inclusion of the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘“In determining whether error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a whole [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’” [Citation.]” (Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172 .) Here, the jury was instructed that “[t]he purpose of the court’s instructions

2019(E.g., People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984 .) Assuming that Chapman standard applies in this case, we conclude the inclusion of the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘“In determining whether error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a whole [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’” [Citation.]” (Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172 .) Here, the jury was instructed that “[t]he purpose of the court’s instructions

2002We need not decide whether the court must give such an instruction sua sponte when the evidence warrants (compare People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 778 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 928 P.2d 485 , with People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 43 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 , and People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ), for here no evidence of provocation existed. ( People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1129-1130, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 .) "The fact that the prosecutor requested a heat of passion instruction for manslaughter does not e

2002We need not decide whether the court must give such an instruction sua sponte when the evidence warrants (compare People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 778 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 928 P.2d 485 , with People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 43 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 , and People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 ), for here no evidence of provocation existed. ( People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1129-1130, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577 , 831 P.2d 1159 .) "The fact that the prosecutor requested a heat of passion instruction for manslaughter does not e

1998After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we agreed, explaining that such an instruction must be given "if there is any evidence of manslaughter deserving of consideration," even if such evidence consists of the defendant's "incredible" testimony. ( Id. at pp. 727, 729, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 382 P.2d 33 .) Modesto 's conclusion in this regard was reaffirmed in People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 , where the trial court failed to give a sua sponte instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

1998After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we agreed, explaining that such an instruction must be given "if there is any evidence of manslaughter deserving of consideration," even if such evidence consists of the defendant's "incredible" testimony. ( Id. at pp. 727, 729, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 382 P.2d 33 .) Modesto 's conclusion in this regard was reaffirmed in People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 , where the trial court failed to give a sua sponte instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

1991(See, e.g., People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 576 [ 268 P.2d 705 ]; People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 527-528 [ 219 P.2d 9 ]; People v. Robinson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 43, 48 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 796 ]; People v. Arriola (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 430, 435 .) . . .

1991(See, e.g., People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 576 [ 268 P.2d 705 ]; People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 527-528 [ 219 P.2d 9 ]; People v. Robinson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 43, 48 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 796 ]; People v. Arriola (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 430, 435 .) . . .