12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nathalia L. Brown v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services and Potomac Electrical Power Companygreen1 sentence2017Further, even though petitioner raises an important concern regarding the CRB’s authority to raise issues sua sponte, see Brown v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 83 A.3d 739, 746 (D.C. 2014), we do not need to examine this argument because any prejudice that petitioner suffered from the CRB’s sua sponte analysis is remedied by our reversal. | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1152-1158 (D.C.1985) (noting that in cases where there is particular danger of “jury confusion,” a sua sponte instruction may be required). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998See Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1088 (D.C.1978) (en banc) (holding there is no “absolute sua sponte obligation to issue an immediate cautionary instruction whenever evidence is brought in which is admissible only for a limited purpose,” and concluding that plain error will occur only if the failure to give such cautionary instruction denies defendant “a fair trial” by “clearly and prejudicially” infringing “substantial rights”). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 564941green2 sentences1993But even when the courts have elected to do so, as in a sua sponte analysis of harmless error, see supra note 20, they have done so only when a statute required it [21] or when the record was not complex and resolution of the issue was easy, "beyond serious debate." United States v. Pryce, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 89 , 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1991) (per Williams, J.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1488 , 1679, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 , 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992), supra note 20. 1993But even when the courts have elected to do so, as in a sua sponte analysis of harmless error, see supra note 20, they have done so only when a statute required it 21 or when the record was not complex and resolution of the issue was easy, “beyond serious debate.” United States v. Pryce, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 89 , 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1991) (per Williams, J.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1488 , 1679, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 , 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992), supra note 20. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Dapolitogreen1 sentence1991As a result of a sua sponte inquiry by the court at oral argument regarding the finality of the Director’s order of January 18, 1990, see Customers Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 562 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C.1989); In re Estate of Dapolito, 331 A.2d 327, 328 (D.C.1975), the parties filed supplemental memoranda. | 1 | 1 |
Customers Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence1991As a result of a sua sponte inquiry by the court at oral argument regarding the finality of the Director’s order of January 18, 1990, see Customers Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 562 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C.1989); In re Estate of Dapolito, 331 A.2d 327, 328 (D.C.1975), the parties filed supplemental memoranda. | 1 | 1 |
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commissiongreen2 sentences1985See generally Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). 1985See generally Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Jernigan v. Economy Exterminating Co.green2 sentences1985See generally Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). 1985See generally Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985See generally Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). 1985See generally Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 2474 , 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Massey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 1151 , 1153 n.3 (1977); Massey v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 296, 300 (1974). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 1151 , 1153 n.3 (1977); Massey v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 296, 300 (1974). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Ta.L.
green
2 sentences2016In fact, as the division recognized, the goal change was advantageous to the biological parents because “[t]he trial court, by changing the permanency goal to adoption, provided the impetus for CFSA to become involved in providing services to [the aunt] and thus effectively helped facilitate [the biological parents’] goal of placing the children with [her].”14 We shall see that the lack of record support also undermines key factual assertions made in the majority opinion to justify its legal conclusions regarding goal changes.15 (….continued) easy, beyond serious debate.”) (internal punctuatio 2016In fact, as the division recognized, the goal change was advantageous to the biological parents because “[t]he trial court, by changing the permanency goal to adoption, provided the impetus for CFSA to become involved in providing services to [the aunt] and thus effectively helped facilitate [the biological parents’] goal of placing the children with [her].”14 We shall see that the lack of record support also undermines key factual assertions made in the majority opinion to justify its legal conclusions regarding goal changes.15 (….continued) easy, beyond serious debate.”) (internal punctuatio | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Woodward v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Our subsequent holding in Woodward, supra, 626 A.2d at 915 , makes clear that appellant misreads Boyd . . 1995Our subsequent holding in Woodward, supra, 626 A.2d at 915 , makes clear that appellant misreads Boyd . . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Boyd v. United States
green
1 sentence1995Appellant further argues that, in any event, the trial court had a duty to engage in a sua sponte inquiry into the waiver of the right, analogizing to the asserted holding in Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670 (D.C.1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United States v. Pryce
green
2 sentences1993But even when the courts have elected to do so, as in a sua sponte analysis of harmless error, see supra note 20, they have done so only when a statute required it [21] or when the record was not complex and resolution of the issue was easy, "beyond serious debate." United States v. Pryce, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 89 , 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1991) (per Williams, J.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1488 , 1679, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 , 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992), supra note 20. 1993But even when the courts have elected to do so, as in a sua sponte analysis of harmless error, see supra note 20, they have done so only when a statute required it 21 or when the record was not complex and resolution of the issue was easy, “beyond serious debate.” United States v. Pryce, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 89 , 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1991) (per Williams, J.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1488 , 1679, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 , 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992), supra note 20. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Ogunleye v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
green
2 sentences1993But even when the courts have elected to do so, as in a sua sponte analysis of harmless error, see supra note 20, they have done so only when a statute required it [21] or when the record was not complex and resolution of the issue was easy, "beyond serious debate." United States v. Pryce, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 89 , 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1991) (per Williams, J.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1488 , 1679, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 , 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992), supra note 20. 1993But even when the courts have elected to do so, as in a sua sponte analysis of harmless error, see supra note 20, they have done so only when a statute required it 21 or when the record was not complex and resolution of the issue was easy, “beyond serious debate.” United States v. Pryce, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 89 , 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (1991) (per Williams, J.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1488 , 1679, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 , 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992), supra note 20. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Clyburn v. United States
green
2 sentences1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant’s right to represent himself. 1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant's right to represent himself. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Thomas W. Whalem v. United States
green
2 sentences1979So, our query is whether in this case there was a combination of factors which required the trial judge to inject the insanity issue for, if such factors existed, his failure to do so is an abuse of discretion and constitutes error. [ Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C., at 337-38 , 346 F.2d at 819-20 ; emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] We have previously rejected the contention that Faretta overrules Whalem in the matter of a sua sponte hearing. 1979So, our query is whether in this case there was a combination of factors which required the trial judge to inject the insanity issue for, if such factors existed, his failure to do so is an abuse of discretion and constitutes error. [ Id. 120 U.S.App.D.C., at 337-38 , 346 F.2d at 819-20 ; emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] We have previously rejected the contention that Faretta overrules Whalem in the matter of a sua sponte hearing. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Jackson v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant’s right to represent himself. 1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant's right to represent himself. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Clyburn v. United States
green
2 sentences1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant’s right to represent himself. 1979We said in Clyburn v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 260 , 263-64 n.7 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978): Faretta does not hold that a court must recognize an incompetent or insane defendant's right to represent himself. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1972Even in jurisdictions, such as Ohio and Michigan, which have required immediate cautionary instructions when certain types of evidence have been introduced, e. g., People v. Askar, 8 Mich.App. 95 , 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Baxter v. State, 91 Ohio St. 167 , 110 N.E. 456 (1914), the courts have recently been reluctant to find plain error where a sua sponte instruction was not given immediately, unless the appropriate instruction was also omitted from the general charge to the jury, People v. Kelly, 26 Mich.App. 148 , 182 N.W.2d 8 (1970); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.2d 160 , 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968 1972Even in jurisdictions, such as Ohio and Michigan, which have required immediate cautionary instructions when certain types of evidence have been introduced, e. g., People v. Askar, 8 Mich.App. 95 , 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Baxter v. State, 91 Ohio St. 167 , 110 N.E. 456 (1914), the courts have recently been reluctant to find plain error where a sua sponte instruction was not given immediately, unless the appropriate instruction was also omitted from the general charge to the jury, People v. Kelly, 26 Mich.App. 148 , 182 N.W.2d 8 (1970); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.2d 160 , 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968 | 1 | 1972–1972 |
People v. Askar
green
2 sentences1972Even in jurisdictions, such as Ohio and Michigan, which have required immediate cautionary instructions when certain types of evidence have been introduced, e. g., People v. Askar, 8 Mich.App. 95 , 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Baxter v. State, 91 Ohio St. 167 , 110 N.E. 456 (1914), the courts have recently been reluctant to find plain error where a sua sponte instruction was not given immediately, unless the appropriate instruction was also omitted from the general charge to the jury, People v. Kelly, 26 Mich.App. 148 , 182 N.W.2d 8 (1970); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.2d 160 , 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968 1972Even in jurisdictions, such as Ohio and Michigan, which have required immediate cautionary instructions when certain types of evidence have been introduced, e. g., People v. Askar, 8 Mich.App. 95 , 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Baxter v. State, 91 Ohio St. 167 , 110 N.E. 456 (1914), the courts have recently been reluctant to find plain error where a sua sponte instruction was not given immediately, unless the appropriate instruction was also omitted from the general charge to the jury, People v. Kelly, 26 Mich.App. 148 , 182 N.W.2d 8 (1970); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.2d 160 , 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968 | 1 | 1972–1972 |
State v. Crafton
green
2 sentences1972Even in jurisdictions, such as Ohio and Michigan, which have required immediate cautionary instructions when certain types of evidence have been introduced, e. g., People v. Askar, 8 Mich.App. 95 , 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Baxter v. State, 91 Ohio St. 167 , 110 N.E. 456 (1914), the courts have recently been reluctant to find plain error where a sua sponte instruction was not given immediately, unless the appropriate instruction was also omitted from the general charge to the jury, People v. Kelly, 26 Mich.App. 148 , 182 N.W.2d 8 (1970); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.2d 160 , 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968 1972Even in jurisdictions, such as Ohio and Michigan, which have required immediate cautionary instructions when certain types of evidence have been introduced, e. g., People v. Askar, 8 Mich.App. 95 , 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Baxter v. State, 91 Ohio St. 167 , 110 N.E. 456 (1914), the courts have recently been reluctant to find plain error where a sua sponte instruction was not given immediately, unless the appropriate instruction was also omitted from the general charge to the jury, People v. Kelly, 26 Mich.App. 148 , 182 N.W.2d 8 (1970); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.2d 160 , 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968 | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.