natural and probable consequences doctrine in California

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[ ] and limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) While the bill narrowed the scope of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine and other forms of imputed malice as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder, “a defendant may s

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[ ] and limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) While the bill narrowed the scope of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine and other forms of imputed malice as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder, “a defendant may s

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2026(Italics added.) Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine “[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843 , superseded on other grounds as stated in People v. Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362 , 369-370.) 3 Prima Facie Showing Requirement and

2026(People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451 , 458; People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942 , 947; People v. Allison (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 449 , 461, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 718, fn. 3 .) Rather, Senate Bill 1437 was designed to allow defendants to seek relief if the legal basis for their murder conviction was rendered invalid “because of” the changes ushered in by that bill. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) As explained above, those changes related to the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the felony-murder rule, and any other theory of

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[ ] and limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) While the bill narrowed the scope of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine and other forms of imputed malice as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder, “a defendant may s

2026(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440 .) In particular, Senate Bill 1437 “narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule” and “eliminate[d] liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” ( Curiel, supra, pp. 448, 449 .) “Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murde

2026(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440 .) In particular, Senate Bill 1437 “narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule” and “eliminate[d] liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” ( Curiel, supra, pp. 448, 449 .) “Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murde

2026Petitioner Luis Martinez petitions for habeas relief under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), which held an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2026Shortly after issuance of remittitur, our Supreme Court held in Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2026Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also ‘for any other offense that was a 14 “natural and probable consequence” of the crime aided and abetted.’” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 .) ‘“The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]’’ [Citation.] Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine ‘‘is measured by whethe

2026Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also ‘for any other offense that was a 14 “natural and probable consequence” of the crime aided and abetted.’” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 .) ‘“The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]’’ [Citation.] Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine ‘‘is measured by whethe

2025Broadway contended, inter alia, that the jury “instructions allowed the jury to impute malice based on his participation in a lesser offense, as is underscored by the Court of Appeal opinion affirming his conviction which was based on the same principles that allowed the jury to impute malice (prior to a 2001 Supreme Court opinion that changed the governing legal authority)”—namely, People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy).6 6 In McCoy, our Supreme Court explained that “outside of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor’s mental state must be at least that re

2025(People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262 .) The natural and probable consequences doctrine is the only theory of liability on which section 1172.6 relief is permitted for the crime of attempted murder.

2025Bill 1437) was enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 .) Senate Bill 1437 did this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder.

2025Senate Bill 1437 also adds . . . section [1172.6], which allows those ‘convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).) “An offender may file a petition under section [1172.6] where all three of the following conditions are met: ‘(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theor

2026“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017– 2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added [former] section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6,]

2026(See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 .) As noted in connection with his prior petition, Nguyen was not convicted of first degree murder under felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of vicarious liability.

2025Senate Bill 1437 and the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “ ‘A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.’ ” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 .) A finder of fact relying on the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not concerned with whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the nontarget crime,

2025(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849 (Gentile).)2 Under current law and with exceptions not relevant here, “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act 2 Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a “‘person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended [target] crime . . . but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits . . . that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.’” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 .) 3 with malice aforethought.

2025(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1181 , quoting § 187, subd. (a).) Until 2019, the felony murder rule provided an exception that made “a killing while committing 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 certain felonies murder without the necessity of further examining the defendant’s mental state.” (Chun, at p. 1182.) Under a separate rule known as the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a person who knowingly aids and abets the criminal conduct of another person is guilty of not only the intended crime but also of any other crime the other person actually c

2025(Gentile, at p. 845 [natural and probable consequences doctrine]; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 (Chun) [felony murder rule].) In 2014, the California Supreme Court eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for convicting a defendant of first degree murder.

2024(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 970 .) Applying the test for prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Lewis, at p. 973; Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1239), we conclude that this error was not harmless because “ ‘ “it is reasonably probable that if [he] had been afforded assistance of counsel his . . . petition would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” 6 (Lewis, at p. 974, quoting People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666 , 676.) The jury instructions include a natural and probable consequences instruction that applies to the murder and

2023(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.) The Legislature also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959 ; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 .) Under subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition” with the sentencing court to have his or her murder co

2025The McCoy court clarified the situation, stating: “Our discussion in People v. Croy, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 12 , footnote 5, contained language that has caused some confusion: ‘It is the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent that is an element of the target offense, which Beeman holds must be found by the jury.’ This statement [in Croy] was part of a discussion of liability for an unintended crime under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2024As both Beck and Cruz and Medrano I make clear, the natural and probable consequences instruction as applied to a conspiracy (CALCRIM No. 417) is problematic in this context only where a defendant is convicted of murder or attempted murder based on a conspiracy to commit “a lesser crime that resulted in murder.” (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 645 ; see also Medrano I, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 184 [“First degree murder was the object of the conspiracy, not the natural and probable consequence of an act committed to further the object of the conspiracy.”].) Here, where Lovejoy was fou

2025(People v. Smith (2005) 37 20 Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith).) “Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the intent to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 .) Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th

2024Rather, the Attorney General contends that “[e]ven if there were insufficient evidence supporting an aiding and abetting theory of first degree murder, the court’s specific reasoning is not essential to its ultimate decision as there was substantial evidence supporting the denial under a currently valid theory of murder.” The Attorney General further contends “the statutory framework and the applicable standard of review permit this court to hold that substantial evidence supports the denial of the petition on a theory that [Agaton-Hernandez] was guilty of murder under a conspiracy theory” and

2025(See People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879-880 .) Nevertheless, Ramirez’s jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2025(See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 839 .) Senate Bill 775 also abrogates [the] holding in People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 880 , that ‘[u]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, there is no requirement that an aider and abettor reasonably foresee an attempted premeditated murder as the natural and probable consequence of the target offense.’ (See Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1, subd. (a), 2, subds. (a), (g).)” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 441–442.) 5.

2026(People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653 .) Thus, to establish that defendant was not convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the record of conviction must conclusively establish that defendant had the intent to kill the victim of the attempted murder.

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653 [“Express malice is an intent to kill”].) Therefore, Stuart was not convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory which permitted the jury to impute malice to him based solely on his participation in a crime.

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2025Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill

2025This procedure allows eligible defendants to have convictions based on an abrogated theory of vicarious liability vacated and be resentenced for other crimes charged or for the intended crime. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (d).) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate Bill 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) expanded Senate Bill 1437’s petition process to include individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “a defendant who aids and abets a confederate in committing

2025(People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942 .) And under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor could be found “guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but 4 also of any other crime a principal in the target crime actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of the target crime.” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611 .) In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetti

2026(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 .) “Prior to the enactment of Senate Bills Nos. 1437 [citations] and 775 [citations], the natural and probable consequences doctrine provided an avenue for finding an aider and abettor acted with malice. [Citation.] Under this doctrine, an aider and abettor who lacked a specific intent to kill could be found guilty of attempted murder solely due to their participation in a different target crime, if attempted murder was the natural and probable consequence of the target crime.” (Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 456.) When a defendant was “foun

2025(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 .) “Prior to the enactment of Senate Bills Nos. 1437 [citations] and 775 [citations], the natural and probable consequences doctrine provided an avenue for finding an aider and abettor acted with malice. [Citation.] Under this doctrine, an aider and abettor who lacked a specific intent to kill could be found guilty of attempted murder solely due to their participation in a different target crime, if attempted murder was the natural and probable consequence of the target crime.” (Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 456.) When a defendant was “foun

2023DISCUSSION Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed liability for murder under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrines. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e); People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1147 (Anthony).) Senate Bill 1437 addressed aspects of felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “redefin[ing] ‘malice’ in section 188.

2023DISCUSSION Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed liability for murder under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrines. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e); People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1147 (Anthony).) Senate Bill 1437 addressed aspects of felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “redefin[ing] ‘malice’ in section 188.

2025Broadway contended, inter alia, that the jury “instructions allowed the jury to impute malice based on his participation in a lesser offense, as is underscored by the Court of Appeal opinion affirming his conviction which was based on the same principles that allowed the jury to impute malice (prior to a 2001 Supreme Court opinion that changed the governing legal authority)”—namely, People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy).6 6 In McCoy, our Supreme Court explained that “outside of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor’s mental state must be at least that re

2025Broadway contended, inter alia, that the jury “instructions allowed the jury to impute malice based on his participation in a lesser offense, as is underscored by the Court of Appeal opinion affirming his conviction which was based on the same principles that allowed the jury to impute malice (prior to a 2001 Supreme Court opinion that changed the governing legal authority)”—namely, People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy).6 6 In McCoy, our Supreme Court explained that “outside of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor’s mental state must be at least that re

2026(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) In 19 other words, “the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life- endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468 .) “Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110 (Nieto Benitez).) Thus, Senate Bill No. 1437 abo

2023Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” Thus, following enactment of Senate Bill 1437, and where felony murder is not at issue (see § 189, subd. (e)), a person must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64 , 83; In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144 .) 4 Senate Bill 1437 also created a mechanism, through what is now section 1172.6, for individuals convicted of felony murder or murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for re

2025(People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 874 .) The natural and probable consequences doctrine thus “imposes vicarious liability for any offense committed by the direct perpetrator that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.” (People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 852 .) Defendant argues the expansion of Senate Bill 775 “clarified that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine are also permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the sam

2024That verdict established he had an unlawful intent to kill (i.e., express malice) and the 1 The natural and probable consequences doctrine “imposes vicarious liability for any offense committed by the direct perpetrator that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. [Citation.] Because the nontarget offense is unintended, the mens rea of the [accomplice] with respect to that offense is irrelevant and culpability is imposed simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the nontarget crime.” (People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 852 .) 9 i

2025(See, e.g., People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 , 158–159 (Chiu); People v. Rivera (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1357 (Rivera).) Her plea also followed the operative date of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine of accomplice liability and expressly provided that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on . . . her participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2, 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. p. 6675 [amending §§ 188 and 189].) In 2023, however, Arriaga pe

2025He cites People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86 , People v. Rivera (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1350 , and People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548 , but those decisions each examine instructions that expressly refer to the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2024(People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450 , 1462–1463.) Liability for intentional, target offenses is known as “direct” aider and abettor liability; liability for unintentional, nontarget offenses was formerly known as “‘the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine.’” (People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055 .) Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual kill

2022(People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1462-1463 .) Liability for intentional, target offenses is known as “direct” aider and abettor liability; liability for unintentional, nontarget offenses is known as the ““‘natural and probable consequences” doctrine.’” (People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055 .) Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the a

2026Section 1172.6 Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417 , quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f); see § 189, subd. (e)(1).) The bill limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder.

2025(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The bill amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez- Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417 , quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f); see § 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate Bill 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence is commensurate with his individual criminal culpabili

2025(People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942 .) And under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor could be found “guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but 4 also of any other crime a principal in the target crime actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of the target crime.” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611 .) In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetti

2025(People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942 .) Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor could be found “guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target crime actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of the target crime.” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611 .) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the statutes defining malice (§ 188) and felony murder (§ 189, subd. (e)) to “eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and