natural and probable consequences doctrine in California

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2025Actual killer In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which enacted the predecessor to section 1172.6,2 “the Legislature found it ‘necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830 , 846–847, italics added, abrogated by statute on another point

2024Instead, he was convicted of attempted murder, for which resentencing is available if the conviction was based on the now-proscribed natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§§ 1172.6, subd. (a); 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 [latter section “amend[ed] the natural and probable consequences doctrine”], abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839 , 869.) Nothing in these statutory provisions regarding the natural and 8 probable consequences doctrine expresses a similar bar to resentencing relief that sec

2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the Legisla

2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1.) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 188 to require that a principal act with express or implied malice (§ 188, as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2), and amended section 189 to state that a person can be liable for felony murder only if: (1) the “person was the actual killer”; (2) the person, with an intent to kill, was an aider or abettor in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the “person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 101

2026The aider and abettor must know the direct perpetrator intends to commit the murder or life endangering act and intend to aid the direct perpetrator in its commission.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468 .) The Curiel jury’s instructions on the natural and probable consequences doctrine allowed a murder conviction based on a finding that the defendant 5 “knew that [the direct perpetrator] intended to commit one of the underlying target offenses [disturbing the peace or carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member]” and that the defendant “intended to aid [the direct perpetrator] in that off

2026Second, [it] imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) 2 ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ (Ibid.) One effect of this [second] requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel).) Section 1172.6 sets forth the procedure for defendants convicted under prior law to petit

2026(See People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 , 158–159 [“hold[ing] that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”], superseded by statute, as noted in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 , 445; see also Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, fn. 3 [recognizing Chiu “abrogated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to prove first degree premeditated murder, but it did not change the law regarding its application to second degree murder”].) 15 DISPOSITION We remand the matter to the trial

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The legislation bars murder convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the Legisla

2026(People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666 , 676; see People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941 , 945-948 [concluding that the jury instructions “as a whole” rendered the defendant ineligible for relief under § 1172.6’s predecessor as a matter of law]; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 , 599 [“if the jury did not receive an instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on that basis, and the [§ 1172.6] petition should be summarily denied”].) Our independent review of the record demonstrates that Nellum did not make a

2026(See, e.g., People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666 , 677 [defendant ineligible for relief where the jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and, therefore, was not convicted on any theory involving the imputation of malice].) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

2026Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also ‘for any other offense that was a 14 “natural and probable consequence” of the crime aided and abetted.’” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 .) ‘“The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]’’ [Citation.] Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine ‘‘is measured by whethe

2026Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended crime, but also ‘for any other offense that was a 14 “natural and probable consequence” of the crime aided and abetted.’” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 , 24 P.3d 1210 .) ‘“The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]’’ [Citation.] Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine ‘‘is measured by whethe

2026(See, e.g., People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 254 [describing the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a theory of aiding and abetting liability], superseded in part by Sen.

2025(See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 273 [because neither party referenced the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “it is highly unlikely that the jury relied on [it]”].) 7 the jury to find a specific intent to kill, and the jury convicted appellant on all five counts of attempted murder.

2025Senate Bill 1437 also adds . . . section [1172.6], which allows those ‘convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).) “An offender may file a petition under section [1172.6] where all three of the following conditions are met: ‘(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theor

2025Bill 1437) was enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 .) Senate Bill 1437 did this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder.

2026(See People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 , 158–159 [“hold[ing] that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”], superseded by statute, as noted in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 , 445; see also Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, fn. 3 [recognizing Chiu “abrogated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to prove first degree premeditated murder, but it did not change the law regarding its application to second degree murder”].) 15 DISPOSITION We remand the matter to the trial

2026(See People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 , 158–159 [“hold[ing] that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”], superseded by statute, as noted in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 , 445; see also Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, fn. 3 [recognizing Chiu “abrogated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to prove first degree premeditated murder, but it did not change the law regarding its application to second degree murder”].) 15 DISPOSITION We remand the matter to the trial

2023(Aug. 4, 2008, C054011, C054462) (nonpub. opn.) (O’Brien).2 On January 31, 2019, defendant sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.63 in light of changes brought about by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which “ ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §

2022That means the jury could have convicted defendant of 5 Johnson’s murder only as a direct aider and abettor,4 and that means he is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as to his first degree murder conviction as a matter of law. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3); People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320 , 330 [the record of conviction may establish that defendant “is ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he or she was convicted on a ground that remains valid notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to sections 188 and 189”], disapproved on another ground by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th

2026(See People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941 , 948 [considering prosecution argument to jury].) A direct perpetrator of attempted murder “could not have been convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022 , 1029; see also Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 563, 567.) Moreover, the blue jury, which adjudicated the guilt of both Itehua and Harris, was instructed on only two theories of guilt potentially applicable to Itehua: a direct perpetrator theory and a theory of direct aiding and abetting with the intent to kill the victim.

2026Second, [it] imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) 2 ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ (Ibid.) One effect of this [second] requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel).) Section 1172.6 sets forth the procedure for defendants convicted under prior law to petit

2025(Id. at pp. 971-972.) The “authority to make determinations without conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section [1172.6], subd[ivision] (d) is limited to readily ascertainable facts from the record (such as the crime of conviction), rather than factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion (such as determining whether the petitioner showed reckless indifference to human life in the commission of the crime).” (People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 , 980, disapproved on other grounds in Lewis, at p. 963.) Medina concedes his jury was not instructed

2025Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967 , 974.) In other words, “[a] person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) “A person convicted of . . . murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, . . . may file a petition with the court that sentenced the pet

2026(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 5 1055, abrogated on other grounds in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952; see People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 943-944, 946 [jury instructions showed trial court never instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine; summary denial of petition affirmed].) “We independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) II.

2026This is so because the jurors were not provided any instruction on which they could have found [appellant] guilty of [attempted] murder under that doctrine.” (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043 , 1055.) 4 Appellant argues, “The jury could have convicted him based on a flawed kill zone theory that permitted the imputation of malice . . . , which was the functional equivalent of the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” Based on the firing of multiple shots into the house, the trial court gave CALJIC No. 8.66.1 expounding a “kill zone” theory of attempted murder.

2026“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017– 2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added [former] section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6,]

2026(See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 .) As noted in connection with his prior petition, Nguyen was not convicted of first degree murder under felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of vicarious liability.

2026We have no reservations regarding the quantum of evidence supporting the five murder convictions in this case.” (Palaminos I, supra, F054625.) SENATE BILL 1437’s AMENDMENTS Senate Bill 1437 went into effect on January 1, 2019, and “amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony a

2026We have no reservations regarding the quantum of evidence supporting the five murder convictions in this case.” (Palaminos I, supra, F054625.) SENATE BILL 1437’s AMENDMENTS Senate Bill 1437 went into effect on January 1, 2019, and “amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony a

2026(See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 , 986; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830 , 842-843 (Gentile).) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) expanded resentencing eligibility to persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or manslaughter.

2026(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) In 19 other words, “the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life- endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468 .) “Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110 (Nieto Benitez).) Thus, Senate Bill No. 1437 abo

2021(See Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 329–330 [noting that, “because a petitioner is not eligible for relief under section 1170.95 unless he or she was convicted of first or second degree murder based on a charging document that permitted the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine [citation], the court must at least examine the complaint, information or indictment filed against the petitioner; the verdict form or factual basis documentation for a negotiated plea; and the abstract of judgment”]; People v. Cornel

2021(See People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154 , 1167–1168 [§ 1170.95 petition properly denied where defendant did not discuss how he could have been convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences doctrine and identified no underlying felony or target offense that would have made either of these theories viable at the time of his conviction and not today but instead used petition to argue there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted murder]; People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , 1138 [“‘if the petition contains sufficient summary allegations tha

2025Senate Bill 1437 and the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “ ‘A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.’ ” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 .) A finder of fact relying on the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not concerned with whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the nontarget crime,

2025Senate Bill 1437 and the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “ ‘A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.’ ” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 .) A finder of fact relying on the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not concerned with whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the nontarget crime,

2026(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846 .) “Senate Bill No. 775 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)] expanded the scope of those changes to encompass, among other things, murder convictions ‘under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)” (People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 , 978, italics omitted; see Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Section 1172.6 creates a petition process for an eligible defendant to seek to be

2026(Id. at pp. 843– 844.) Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ended this form of liability for murder.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449 .) “Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, which created a procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief’ where the two substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s conviction.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449 .) Two years later, by the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 on October 5, 2021, the Legislature expanded the scope of the law “to encompas

2026The generic murder charge in the information did not limit the People to prosecuting defendant under any particular theory of murder because “neither felony murder nor murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine need be separately pleaded.” (People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 , 233, review granted June 9, 2021, S268405.) And defendant’s plea by itself establishes only that “a murder with malice was committed and that [he] committed an act with the necessary intent to render him liable for that murder under then-existing law.” (People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967 ,

2025(See, e.g., People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 , 231, fn. omitted [“Before Senate Bill No. 1437, ‘the natural and probable consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice (Fn. is continued on the next page.) 6 5.

2025Statutory Background Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule7 and the natural and probable consequences doctrine.8 (§§ 188, 189, 7 Prior to Senate Bill 1437’s enactment, “ ‘[t]he felony-murder rule impute[d] the requisite malice for a murder conviction to those who commit[ted] a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ” (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 76 .) 8 Prior to Senate Bill 1437’s enactment, “ ‘ “[a] person who knowingly aid[ed] and abet[ed] criminal conduct [was] guilty of not

2024Legal Background A. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine, as Applied Here Before the passage of S.B. 1437, “the natural and probable consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.” (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 , 248.) In this case the prosecutor expressly relied on this doctrine in seeking defendants’ conviction

2026(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) “With the goal of ‘more equitably sentenc[ing] offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides’ [citation], Senate Bill 1437 significantly changed the scope of murder liability for defendants who did not actually kill or intend to kill anyone, including those prosecuted on a felony-murder theory.” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839 , 868 (Wilson).) “The bill also altered murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Id. at p. 868, fn. 8; see § 188.) 8 According to the Garcia opinion, “Robert Jacome testified at the p

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2022DISCUSSION “Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 .) The bill also “added section 1170.95 to provide a procedure for those convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief

2022(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-844 .) Prior to the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a defendant was “liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense, committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.” (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 , 248; People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738 , 749, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234.) Senate Bill No.

2025(See People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868 , 879–880, abrogated by statute as stated in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 , 442.) The People were not required to separately plead an aiding and abetting, felony murder, or natural and probable consequences theory.

2025(People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 874 , abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 , 442.) After legislative changes to the murder statutes took effect in January 2019, the natural and probable consequences doctrine could no longer be used to convict someone of attempted murder, among other crimes.

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.

2025“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816 , 824; People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 .) For purposes of the offense, “[i]ntent to unlawfully kill and express malice are, in essence, ‘one and the same.’ ” ( Smith, supra, at p. 739 .) At the time of defendant’s trial, the jury either had to find defendant harbored express malice or it had to i

2026(See People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434 [noting split in authority].) The Legislature resolved the dispute by enacting Senate Bill No. 775, which took effect on January 1, 2022, “to make clear the natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer supplies accomplice liability to attempted murder.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 193.) When Randle and Broadnax entered their pleas in 2020, the law remained unsettled as to the impact of Senate Bill No. 1437 on attempted murder, and Randle and Broadnax still could have been convicted of that offense pursuant to the nat

2026Accordingly, the natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191 , 196.) Section 1172.6 thus “permits a defendant convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing.” (Rodriguez, at p. 457.) 8 Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, under current law, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (People v.