complaint as alleged violation in New York

2011Here, in support of the branches of their respective motions which were for summary judgment with respect to so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6), neither the plaintiff nor the defendant established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hasp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

2000Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the City’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6) (see, Nowlin v City of New York, supra; cf., Deloach v City of New York, 258 AD2d 384 ; see generally, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 ).

2011The plaintiff correctly concedes that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009]).

2010The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against the defendant Vasap Development Corp. (hereinafter the appellant) (see Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599 [2009]; Razzak v NHS Community Dev.

2015The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that he was engaged in work within the ambit of the statute and that his injuries were proximately caused by “the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 268 [2001]; see McCallister v 200 Park, L.P., 92 AD3d 927, 929 [2012]; cf. McLean v 405 Webster Ave.

2010The plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since there remain issues of fact as to whether the rail “fell, while being hoisted . . . because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 268 [2001]; see Ienco v RFD Second Ave., LLC, 41 AD3d 537, 539 [2007]; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]).

2013Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Donadic’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it (see Acosta v Hadjigavriel, 18 AD3d 406, 407 [2005]).

2013Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Donadic’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it (see Acosta v Hadjigavriel, 18 AD3d 406, 407 [2005]).

2010Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 561-562 [1993]; Rivera v 800 Ala. Ave., LLC, 70 AD3d 798 [2010]; Yin Min Zhu v Triple L.

2009Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 562 [1993]; Gilhooly v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 51 AD3d 719, 720 [2008]; Ricciardi v Bernard Janowitz Constr.

2009Here, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) through the submission of his deposition testimony, which demonstrated that the subject ladder failed to afford him proper protection for the work being performed, and that this failure was a proximate cause of the accident (see Gilhooly v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 51 AD3d 719, 720 [2008]; Ricciardi v Bernard Janowitz Constr.

2009Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 562 [1993]; Gilhooly v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 51 AD3d 719, 720 [2008]; Ricciardi v Bernard Janowitz Constr.

2015The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that he was engaged in work within the ambit of the statute and that his injuries were proximately caused by “the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 268 [2001]; see McCallister v 200 Park, L.P., 92 AD3d 927, 929 [2012]; cf. McLean v 405 Webster Ave.

2015The Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6) on the ground that the injured plaintiff’s work was not covered under that provision (see 12 NYCRR 23-1.4 [b] [13]; Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]; Becker v ADN Design Corp., 51 AD3d 834 [2008]).

2012Auth., 57 AD3d at 702).

2012Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a determination of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled under Real Property Law § 442-e and, thereafter, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that Gnosis is not entitled to compensation arising from its contract with the plaintiff (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]).

2011“When a premises condition is at issue, a property owner is liable under Labor Law § 200 when the owner created the dangerous condition causing an injury or when the owner failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which he or she had actual or constructive notice” (Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 128 [2008]; see Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]).

2011“When a premises condition is at issue, a property owner is liable under Labor Law § 200 when the owner created the dangerous condition causing an injury or when the owner failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which he or she had actual or constructive notice” (Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 128 [2008]; see Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]).

2011In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to this claim (see Settimo v City of New York, 61 AD3d 840, 841 [2009]; Heizman v Long Is.

2011Labor Law § 241 (6) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to “ ‘provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers’ ” (Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 515 [2009], quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

2010Rather, they accrued at the time the plaintiffs became aware of the defendants’ actions and suffered mental anguish as a result (see Melfi v Mount Sinai Hosp., 64 AD3d 26, 32-40 [2009]; Schultes v Kane, 50 AD3d 1277, 1278 [2008]; Long v Sowande, 27 AD3d 247, 249 [2006]; Yong Wen Mo v Gee Ming Chan, 17 AD3d 356, 358-359 [2005]; Dana v Oak Park Marina, 230 AD2d 204, 209-210 [1997]).