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27 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1903–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Claim of Neville v. Magazine Distributors, Inc.green2 sentences2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt 2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt | 2 | 2 |
Claim of Petitt v. Eaton & Van Winklegreen2 sentences2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt 2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt | 2 | 2 |
Claim of Kane v. PPG Industriesgreen2 sentences2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt 2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt | 2 | 2 |
Claim of Ingham v. Oswego Countygreen1 sentence2006Where, as here, a landowner executes an agreement for advance payment, and an advance payment of just compensation has been made, the failure to file a claim within three years of service of the notice of acquisition will result in the matter being deemed fully settled (see Boyajian v State of New York, 293 AD2d 560, 561 [2002]; Ebbets v State of New York, 64 AD2d 794 [1978], affd 47 NY2d 973 [1979]), notwithstanding that the service of the notice of acquisition was effected more than 90 days after the filing of the acquisition maps (see EDPL 502 [A]; cf. Matter of Ingham v Oswego County, 178 | 1 | 1 |
Boyajian v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Where, as here, a landowner executes an agreement for advance payment, and an advance payment of just compensation has been made, the failure to file a claim within three years of service of the notice of acquisition will result in the matter being deemed fully settled (see Boyajian v State of New York, 293 AD2d 560, 561 [2002]; Ebbets v State of New York, 64 AD2d 794 [1978], affd 47 NY2d 973 [1979]), notwithstanding that the service of the notice of acquisition was effected more than 90 days after the filing of the acquisition maps (see EDPL 502 [A]; cf. Matter of Ingham v Oswego County, 178 | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence1988In order to treat a notice of intent as a claim, the notice of intent must state a cause of action (see, Jackson v State of New York, 85 AD2d 818, 819, lv dismissed and denied 56 NY2d 501 , 568; see also, Waters of Saratoga Springs v State of New York, 68 NY2d 777 ) and the failure to file the claim must not have prejudiced the State (see, Carnesi v State of New York, 140 AD2d 912 ; Chalmers & Son v State of New York, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Carnesi v. Stategreen1 sentence1988In order to treat a notice of intent as a claim, the notice of intent must state a cause of action (see, Jackson v State of New York, 85 AD2d 818, 819, lv dismissed and denied 56 NY2d 501 , 568; see also, Waters of Saratoga Springs v State of New York, 68 NY2d 777 ) and the failure to file the claim must not have prejudiced the State (see, Carnesi v State of New York, 140 AD2d 912 ; Chalmers & Son v State of New York, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc. v. Stategreen1 sentence1988In order to treat a notice of intent as a claim, the notice of intent must state a cause of action (see, Jackson v State of New York, 85 AD2d 818, 819, lv dismissed and denied 56 NY2d 501 , 568; see also, Waters of Saratoga Springs v State of New York, 68 NY2d 777 ) and the failure to file the claim must not have prejudiced the State (see, Carnesi v State of New York, 140 AD2d 912 ; Chalmers & Son v State of New York, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Simon v. American Express Companygreen1 sentence1961In an early case the Industrial Commissioner held, as appears from the record on appeal, that the parties’ appearance at a hearing within the then statutory one-year period “ constitutes * * * a proper claim for compensation” but this court reversed the award and dismissed the claim “ because of the failure to file the claim for compensation within one year after the accident.” (Chefety v. Hearn & Son, 212 App. Div. 844 ; see, also, Matter of Simon v. American Express Co., 217 App. Div. 802 , affd. 244 N. Y. 560 , and record on appeal.) In the case before us, the appellant carrier was not pres | 1 | 1 |
Worden v. Henrygreen1 sentence1961In an early case the Industrial Commissioner held, as appears from the record on appeal, that the parties’ appearance at a hearing within the then statutory one-year period “ constitutes * * * a proper claim for compensation” but this court reversed the award and dismissed the claim “ because of the failure to file the claim for compensation within one year after the accident.” (Chefety v. Hearn & Son, 212 App. Div. 844 ; see, also, Matter of Simon v. American Express Co., 217 App. Div. 802 , affd. 244 N. Y. 560 , and record on appeal.) In the case before us, the appellant carrier was not pres | 1 | 1 |
Claim of Short v. Board of Educationgreen1 sentence1960It is therefore clear that the ‘ safeguards devised by the law to protect, municipalities against fraudulent and stale claims’ have not been violated.” (Biancoviso v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 320, 322 [1955]; see, also, Matter of Short v. Board of Educ. of City of Watertown, 12 Misc 2d 440 [1956].) “ Unless it definitely appears that the public agency has been prejudiced due to the failure to file a claim in behalf of an infant, the recent decisions of our appellate courts seem to hold that discretion should be exercised in favor of the infant claimant.” (Matter of Lepenske v. Board of | 1 | 1 |
Biancoviso v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1960It is therefore clear that the ‘ safeguards devised by the law to protect, municipalities against fraudulent and stale claims’ have not been violated.” (Biancoviso v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 320, 322 [1955]; see, also, Matter of Short v. Board of Educ. of City of Watertown, 12 Misc 2d 440 [1956].) “ Unless it definitely appears that the public agency has been prejudiced due to the failure to file a claim in behalf of an infant, the recent decisions of our appellate courts seem to hold that discretion should be exercised in favor of the infant claimant.” (Matter of Lepenske v. Board of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schnee v. City of New York
neutral
2 sentences1972Said failure appears to have arisen from sheer neglect or inadvertence of the infant rather than his immaturity (cf. Schnee v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1130 , affd. 1 N Y 2d 697). 1970(See Schnee v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1130 , affd. 1 N Y 2d 697; Anderson v. County of Nassau, 31 A D 2d 761; Matter of Borowski v. Town of Clarence, 19 A D 2d 580.) No showing is made of any significant omission or misstatement of fact by the infant or his mother concerning the injury and the place of its occurrence which might reasonably have affected counsel’s judgment in his designation of the corporate party defendant to whom notice was to be given. | 4 | 1963–1972 |
People Ex Rel. Matos v. Warden, Rikers Is. Correctional Facility
green
2 sentences2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt 2013Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 provides that the employer “shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are present.” Inasmuch as the record reflects that the defense of untimeliness was raised at the first hearing at which all parties in interest were present, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s determination (see Matter of Neville v Magazine Distribs., Inc., 61 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; Matter of Petitt | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Nori v. City of Yonkers
green
2 sentences1971(Matter of Borowski v. Town of Clarence, supra.) ” In the Borowski case, the court had held that a 19-year-old infant had failed to show a “ cognizable relation between the fact of infancy and the failure to file a claim within the statutory time limitation ’ ’, and had cited among other cases, Matter of Nori v. City of Yonkers ( 274 App. Div. 545 , affd. 300 N. Y. 632 , supra). 1971(Matter of Borowski v. Town of Clarence, supra.) ” In the Borowski case, the court had held that a 19-year-old infant had failed to show a “ cognizable relation between the fact of infancy and the failure to file a claim within the statutory time limitation ’ ’, and had cited among other cases, Matter of Nori v. City of Yonkers ( 274 App. Div. 545 , affd. 300 N. Y. 632 , supra). | 2 | 1963–1971 |
McCarthy v. Troberg
neutral
2 sentences1971(Matter of Borowski v. Town of Clarence, supra.) ” In the Borowski case, the court had held that a 19-year-old infant had failed to show a “ cognizable relation between the fact of infancy and the failure to file a claim within the statutory time limitation ’ ’, and had cited among other cases, Matter of Nori v. City of Yonkers ( 274 App. Div. 545 , affd. 300 N. Y. 632 , supra). 1971(Matter of Borowski v. Town of Clarence, supra.) ” In the Borowski case, the court had held that a 19-year-old infant had failed to show a “ cognizable relation between the fact of infancy and the failure to file a claim within the statutory time limitation ’ ’, and had cited among other cases, Matter of Nori v. City of Yonkers ( 274 App. Div. 545 , affd. 300 N. Y. 632 , supra). | 2 | 1963–1971 |
Schroeder v. State
neutral
2 sentences1947(Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd. 5; Schroeder v. State of New York, 252 App. Div. 16 , affd., 276 N. Y. 627 .) It is apparent that employees of the State had actual knowledge of the flood conditions. 1943The application for such permission must be made upon motion based upon affidavits showing a reasonable excuse for the failure to file within the proper time, actual knowledge upon the part of the State or its appropriate department of the essential facts" constituting the claim, a finding by the court of the absence of substantial prejudice to the State, and the submission of a claim containing the information set forth in section 11 of the Court of Claims Act. (§ 10, subd. 5; Schroeder v. State of New York, 252 App. Div. 16 , affd. 276 N. Y. 627 .) It is apparent from the motion papers that | 2 | 1943–1947 |
Schroeder v. State
green
2 sentences1947(Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd. 5; Schroeder v. State of New York, 252 App. Div. 16 , affd., 276 N. Y. 627 .) It is apparent that employees of the State had actual knowledge of the flood conditions. 1943The application for such permission must be made upon motion based upon affidavits showing a reasonable excuse for the failure to file within the proper time, actual knowledge upon the part of the State or its appropriate department of the essential facts" constituting the claim, a finding by the court of the absence of substantial prejudice to the State, and the submission of a claim containing the information set forth in section 11 of the Court of Claims Act. (§ 10, subd. 5; Schroeder v. State of New York, 252 App. Div. 16 , affd. 276 N. Y. 627 .) It is apparent from the motion papers that | 2 | 1943–1947 |
Ebbets v. State
neutral
1 sentence2006Where, as here, a landowner executes an agreement for advance payment, and an advance payment of just compensation has been made, the failure to file a claim within three years of service of the notice of acquisition will result in the matter being deemed fully settled (see Boyajian v State of New York, 293 AD2d 560, 561 [2002]; Ebbets v State of New York, 64 AD2d 794 [1978], affd 47 NY2d 973 [1979]), notwithstanding that the service of the notice of acquisition was effected more than 90 days after the filing of the acquisition maps (see EDPL 502 [A]; cf. Matter of Ingham v Oswego County, 178 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ebbets v. State
green
1 sentence2006Where, as here, a landowner executes an agreement for advance payment, and an advance payment of just compensation has been made, the failure to file a claim within three years of service of the notice of acquisition will result in the matter being deemed fully settled (see Boyajian v State of New York, 293 AD2d 560, 561 [2002]; Ebbets v State of New York, 64 AD2d 794 [1978], affd 47 NY2d 973 [1979]), notwithstanding that the service of the notice of acquisition was effected more than 90 days after the filing of the acquisition maps (see EDPL 502 [A]; cf. Matter of Ingham v Oswego County, 178 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Dependable Trucking Company, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Authority
green
1 sentence1999In view of the fact that a failure to file a claim or notice of claim within the 90-day period constitutes a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction (see, Scott v State of New York, supra; Pelnick v State of New York, supra; Dependable Trucking Co. v New York State Thruway Auth., 41 AD2d 985 ), the fact that the State may have “affirmatively disavowed any jurisdictional objections” is irrelevant. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People ex rel. Kerrigan v. Martin
neutral
1 sentence1991As this language is mandatory in character, the filing of a C-7 notice controverting claimant’s right to compensation cannot take the place of an objection at the first hearing (Matter of Gentner v Rice & Whaley, 265 App Div 1020, 1021 , affd 292 NY 522 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Claim of Gentner v. Rice & Whaley
neutral
1 sentence1991As this language is mandatory in character, the filing of a C-7 notice controverting claimant’s right to compensation cannot take the place of an objection at the first hearing (Matter of Gentner v Rice & Whaley, 265 App Div 1020, 1021 , affd 292 NY 522 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Motley
green
1 sentence1986In People v Motley ( 119 AD2d 57 ), we held that the first of the foregoing objections was waived or forfeited by a guilty plea. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Claim of Bellinger v. Perini Corp.
green
1 sentence1978Rather, Whalen and its progeny (Matter of Bellinger v Perini Corp., 28 AD2d 1044 ) hold that time limitations (Workers’ Compensation Law, §§28, 217) may be tolled if factual patterns are preponderantly resolved as to excuse late compliance. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Caffaro v. Trayna
green
1 sentence1977While the amendment will, of course, introduce new aspects on the issue of damages, the State does not suggest how the failure to file a claim for this cause of action within the 90-day period has resulted in any prejudice to it in its defense as to such additional elements of damage (Caffaro v Trayna, 35 NY2d 245 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Murray v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1975The order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, in the following memorandum: While a literal construction of section 50-e of the General Municipal Law would require a causal connection between the disability of the infancy and the failure to file a claim within the time prescribed, long precedent and the policy expressed in Matter of Murray v City of New York ( 30 N.Y.2d 113 ) mandates that this statute be read as conferring discretion on the courts vested with discretion to sustain or deny grants of permission for late filing. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Le Fevre
neutral
1 sentence1961In an early case the Industrial Commissioner held, as appears from the record on appeal, that the parties’ appearance at a hearing within the then statutory one-year period “ constitutes * * * a proper claim for compensation” but this court reversed the award and dismissed the claim “ because of the failure to file the claim for compensation within one year after the accident.” (Chefety v. Hearn & Son, 212 App. Div. 844 ; see, also, Matter of Simon v. American Express Co., 217 App. Div. 802 , affd. 244 N. Y. 560 , and record on appeal.) In the case before us, the appellant carrier was not pres | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Reife v. Osmers
green
1 sentence1947(Moore v. Taylor, 175 App. Div. 37, 39 ; Clarke v. Long Island Realty Co., 126 App. Div. 282 ; Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320 .) Before an application for permission to file a claim where the time for filing has expired can be granted, it must appear upon affidavits that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure to file such claim or a notice .of intention to file a claim within the proper time, that the State or its appropriate department had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim prior to the expiration of the prescribed period and that the State has not been subst | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Clarke v. Long Island Realty Co.
neutral
1 sentence1947(Moore v. Taylor, 175 App. Div. 37, 39 ; Clarke v. Long Island Realty Co., 126 App. Div. 282 ; Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320 .) Before an application for permission to file a claim where the time for filing has expired can be granted, it must appear upon affidavits that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure to file such claim or a notice .of intention to file a claim within the proper time, that the State or its appropriate department had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim prior to the expiration of the prescribed period and that the State has not been subst | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Moore v. Taylor neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Toyos v. Bruckman neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Matter of Toyos v. Bruckman neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Stumpf v. Hallahan green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Stumpf v. . Hallahan neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Apfelberg v. Lax green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Winter v. . City of Niagara Falls green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Walker v. Carroll neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Williams v. Cleaveland green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Termini v. Huth neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Claim of Davis v. Butler neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Ross v. . Caywood green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.