jury charge defense in New York

2025Here, the conflicting medical testimony presented at trial "did not give rise to an inference of negligence based upon the mere occurrence of the adverse event at issue" ( Knapp v Soffer , 196 AD3d 551, 552 [2d Dept 2021]), and therefore "the facts adduced at trial were insufficient to warrant a jury charge on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur" ( Sangiovanni v Koloski , 31 AD3d 422, 422-423 [2d Dept 2006]; see Seung Ja Cho v In-Chul Song , 286 AD2d 248 , 249 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 610 [2002]).

2011The nature of the testimony did not give rise to an inference that the injury was caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant North Shore School District (see Bodnarchuk v State of New York, 49 AD3d 581, 582 [2008]; Sangiovanni v Koloski, 31 AD3d 422, 423 [2006]; Patrick v Bally’s Total Fitness, 292 AD2d 433, 434-435 [2002] ).

1994In resolving whether a defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the defense of agency, the trial court must view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and determine whether there exists "at least some evidence, however slight, to support the inference that the supposed agent was acting, in effect, as an extension of the buyer” (People v Argibay, 45 NY2d 45, 55 ; see, People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 446, 448 ; People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144 ).

1994In resolving whether a defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the defense of agency, the trial court must view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and determine whether there exists "at least some evidence, however slight, to support the inference that the supposed agent was acting, in effect, as an extension of the buyer" ( People v Argibay , 45 N.Y.2d 45, 55 ; see , People v Ortiz , 76 N.Y.2d 446, 448 ; People v Padgett , 60 N.Y.2d 142, 144 ).

2025Here, the conflicting medical testimony presented at trial "did not give rise to an inference of negligence based upon the mere occurrence of the adverse event at issue" ( Knapp v Soffer , 196 AD3d 551, 552 [2d Dept 2021]), and therefore "the facts adduced at trial were insufficient to warrant a jury charge on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur" ( Sangiovanni v Koloski , 31 AD3d 422, 422-423 [2d Dept 2006]; see Seung Ja Cho v In-Chul Song , 286 AD2d 248 , 249 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 610 [2002]).

2025Here, the conflicting medical testimony presented at trial "did not give rise to an inference of negligence based upon the mere occurrence of the adverse event at issue" ( Knapp v Soffer , 196 AD3d 551, 552 [2d Dept 2021]), and therefore "the facts adduced at trial were insufficient to warrant a jury charge on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur" ( Sangiovanni v Koloski , 31 AD3d 422, 422-423 [2d Dept 2006]; see Seung Ja Cho v In-Chul Song , 286 AD2d 248 , 249 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 610 [2002]).

2025"A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the defense of temporary and lawful possession when there is evidence presented at trial showing a legal excuse for . . . possession as well as facts tending to establish that, once possession has been obtained, the weapon had not been used in a dangerous manner" ( People v Ruiz , 39 NY3d 981 , 983-984 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Reel , 150 AD3d 1028, 1028 ). "[A] person has innocent possession of a weapon when [that person] comes into possession of the weapon in an excusable manner and maintains possession, or intends to mainta

2025"A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the defense of temporary and lawful possession when there is evidence presented at trial showing a legal excuse for . . . possession as well as facts tending to establish that, once possession has been obtained, the weapon had not been used in a dangerous manner" ( People v Ruiz , 39 NY3d 981 , 983-984 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Reel , 150 AD3d 1028, 1028 ). "[A] person has innocent possession of a weapon when [that person] comes into possession of the weapon in an excusable manner and maintains possession, or intends to mainta

2022A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the defense of temporary and lawful possession when there is evidence presented at trial “‘showing a legal excuse for . . . possession as well as facts tending to establish that, once possession has been obtained, the weapon had not been used in a dangerous manner’” (Williams, 36 NY3d at 161, quoting People v Williams, 50 NY2d 1043, 1044-1045 [1980]; accord Banks, 76 NY2d at 801).

2022A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the defense of temporary and lawful possession when there is evidence presented at trial “‘showing a legal excuse for . . . possession as well as facts tending to establish that, once possession has been obtained, the weapon had not been used in a dangerous manner’” (Williams, 36 NY3d at 161, quoting People v Williams, 50 NY2d 1043, 1044-1045 [1980]; accord Banks, 76 NY2d at 801).

2020On appeal, this Court upheld Supreme Court's denial of the motions, but held that the res ipsa loquitur ruling was premature ( 141 AD3d 921, 923 [2016]).

2017However, we agree with the defendant that he was entitled to a jury charge on the defense of temporary and lawful possession of a weapon with respect to that count of the indictment (see People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 130-131 [1984]).

2016Defendant now appeals. *922 Plaintiffs do not dispute that defendant met its initial burden of demonstrating that it “maintained the [riser] in a reasonably safe condition and neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition” (McGrath v George Weston Bakeries, Inc., 117 AD3d 1303, 1304 [2014]; accord Riozzi v 30 Kingston Realty Corp., 112 AD3d 1033, 1033 [2013]).

2016Defendant now appeals. *922 Plaintiffs do not dispute that defendant met its initial burden of demonstrating that it “maintained the [riser] in a reasonably safe condition and neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition” (McGrath v George Weston Bakeries, Inc., 117 AD3d 1303, 1304 [2014]; accord Riozzi v 30 Kingston Realty Corp., 112 AD3d 1033, 1033 [2013]).

2011The nature of the testimony did not give rise to an inference that the injury was caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant North Shore School District (see Bodnarchuk v State of New York, 49 AD3d 581, 582 [2008]; Sangiovanni v Koloski, 31 AD3d 422, 423 [2006]; Patrick v Bally’s Total Fitness, 292 AD2d 433, 434-435 [2002] ).

2011The nature of the testimony did not give rise to an inference that the injury was caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant North Shore School District (see Bodnarchuk v State of New York, 49 AD3d 581, 582 [2008]; Sangiovanni v Koloski, 31 AD3d 422, 423 [2006]; Patrick v Bally’s Total Fitness, 292 AD2d 433, 434-435 [2002] ).

2010Although the jury charge error was not preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Salnave, 41 AD3d 872, 873-874 [2007]; People v Farrell, 13 AD3d 644, 645 [2004] ), we reach this issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction because, “[w]hen a defendant raises a factual issue regarding the voluntariness of a confession, he or she is entitled to a voluntariness charge” (People v Sanchez, 293 AD2d 499, 500 [2002]; see People v Cefaro, 23 NY2d 283, 286-287 [1968]).

2010Although the jury charge error was not preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Salnave, 41 AD3d 872, 873-874 [2007]; People v Farrell, 13 AD3d 644, 645 [2004] ), we reach this issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction because, “[w]hen a defendant raises a factual issue regarding the voluntariness of a confession, he or she is entitled to a voluntariness charge” (People v Sanchez, 293 AD2d 499, 500 [2002]; see People v Cefaro, 23 NY2d 283, 286-287 [1968]).

2010Although the jury charge error was not preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Salnave, 41 AD3d 872, 873-874 [2007]; People v Farrell, 13 AD3d 644, 645 [2004] ), we reach this issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction because, “[w]hen a defendant raises a factual issue regarding the voluntariness of a confession, he or she is entitled to a voluntariness charge” (People v Sanchez, 293 AD2d 499, 500 [2002]; see People v Cefaro, 23 NY2d 283, 286-287 [1968]).

2010Although the jury charge error was not preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Salnave, 41 AD3d 872, 873-874 [2007]; People v Farrell, 13 AD3d 644, 645 [2004] ), we reach this issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction because, “[w]hen a defendant raises a factual issue regarding the voluntariness of a confession, he or she is entitled to a voluntariness charge” (People v Sanchez, 293 AD2d 499, 500 [2002]; see People v Cefaro, 23 NY2d 283, 286-287 [1968]).

2008The justification charge must be given when requested if there is a reasonable view of the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to defendant, that would support a finding of justification (see People v Petty, 7 NY3d 277, 284 [2006]; People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144-145 [1983]).