jury charge defense in Georgia

2022As relevant here, in Ogilvie, our Supreme Court held that: (i) “a jury charge on the defense of accident to a strict liability traffic offense is available only where there is evidence . . . that the defendant did not voluntarily commit the prohibited act”; and (ii) a jury charge on the defense of lack of proximate cause is warranted where a defendant claims that she could not avoid a collision due to an unforeseen, intervening cause. 292 Ga. at 9 (2) (b), 11-12 (2) (d)-(e).

2022Accordingly, a jury charge on the defense of accident to a strict liability traffic offense is available only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily commit the prohibited act. 15 Ogilvie, 292 Ga. at 9 (2) (b); accord Harris, 360 Ga. App. at 696, 701 (3) (involving convictions for first-degree vehicular homicide and reckless driving); Mitchell, 355 Ga. App. at 10-11 (2) (same).

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2025See also Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 163 (2) (b) (829 SE2d 312) (2019) (noting that “our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s [professionally deficient] failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation” where “the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation”).

2025See also Swanson 14 v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 163 (2) (b) ( 829 SE2d 312 ) (2019) (noting that “our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s [professionally deficient] failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation” where “the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation”).

2022See Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 861 (8) (717 SE2d 179) (2011) (“[A] deviation from the indictment to the jury charge is not error where the trial court read the indictment in full to the jury and charged the jury that the State must prove each element of the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 65 (4) (673 SE2d 246) (2009) (When trial court read the aggravated assault count as it appeared in the indictment and instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, “[t]here is no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted [the defendant] based on the tria

2022See Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 861 (8) (717 SE2d 179) (2011) (“[A] deviation from the indictment to the jury charge is not error where the trial court read the indictment in full to the jury and charged the jury that the State must prove each element of the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 65 (4) (673 SE2d 246) (2009) (When trial court read the aggravated assault count as it appeared in the indictment and instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, “[t]here is no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted [the defendant] based on the tria

2019See Stroud v. State , 301 Ga. 807 , 810 (II), 804 S.E.2d 418 (2017) (holding that appellant could not challenge the admission of evidence to which he had acquiesced, and relying upon Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153 , 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017), in doing so); Adkins , 301 Ga. at 156-57 (2), 800 S.E.2d 341 (holding that, on plain-error review, defendant could not complain about error that he induced); see also Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756 , 764 (2) (a) n.4, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (holding that, even with plain-error review, "other waiver doctrines may still apply to

2019See Stroud v. State , 301 Ga. 807 , 810 (II), 804 S.E.2d 418 (2017) (holding that appellant could not challenge the admission of evidence to which he had acquiesced, and relying upon Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153 , 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017), in doing so); Adkins , 301 Ga. at 156-57 (2), 800 S.E.2d 341 (holding that, on plain-error review, defendant could not complain about error that he induced); see also Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756 , 764 (2) (a) n.4, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (holding that, even with plain-error review, "other waiver doctrines may still apply to

2019See Stroud v. State , 301 Ga. 807 , 810 (II), 804 S.E.2d 418 (2017) (holding that appellant could not challenge the admission of evidence to which he had acquiesced, and relying upon Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153 , 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017), in doing so); Adkins , 301 Ga. at 156-57 (2), 800 S.E.2d 341 (holding that, on plain-error review, defendant could not complain about error that he induced); see also Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756 , 764 (2) (a) n.4, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (holding that, even with plain-error review, "other waiver doctrines may still apply to

2019See Stroud v. State , 301 Ga. 807 , 810 (II), 804 S.E.2d 418 (2017) (holding that appellant could not challenge the admission of evidence to which he had acquiesced, and relying upon Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153 , 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017), in doing so); Adkins , 301 Ga. at 156-57 (2), 800 S.E.2d 341 (holding that, on plain-error review, defendant could not complain about error that he induced); see also Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756 , 764 (2) (a) n.4, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (holding that, even with plain-error review, "other waiver doctrines may still apply to

2019See Stroud v. State , 301 Ga. 807 , 810 (II), 804 S.E.2d 418 (2017) (holding that appellant could not challenge the admission of evidence to which he had acquiesced, and relying upon Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153 , 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017), in doing so); Adkins , 301 Ga. at 156-57 (2), 800 S.E.2d 341 (holding that, on plain-error review, defendant could not complain about error that he induced); see also Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756 , 764 (2) (a) n.4, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (holding that, even with plain-error review, "other waiver doctrines may still apply to

2019See Stroud v. State , 301 Ga. 807 , 810 (II), 804 S.E.2d 418 (2017) (holding that appellant could not challenge the admission of evidence to which he had acquiesced, and relying upon Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153 , 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017), in doing so); Adkins , 301 Ga. at 156-57 (2), 800 S.E.2d 341 (holding that, on plain-error review, defendant could not complain about error that he induced); see also Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756 , 764 (2) (a) n.4, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (holding that, even with plain-error review, "other waiver doctrines may still apply to

2017Hamm, supra at 796 (2).

2017Hamm, supra at 796 (2).

2015But “the appropriate inquiry is whether trial counsel provided deficient representation in failing to [object], and if so, whether the defendant can meet the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington.” Bush v. State, 271 Ga. 156, 157-158 (2) ( 517 SE2d 509 ) (1999).

2015But “the appropriate inquiry is whether trial counsel provided deficient representation in failing to [object], and if so, whether the defendant can meet the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington.” Bush v. State, 271 Ga. 156, 157-158 (2) ( 517 SE2d 509 ) (1999).

2013A defendant is not entitled to a jury charge on this defense, however, where the evidence shows that his ignorance or mistake of fact was “superinduced by the [defendant’s own] fault or negligence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 240 (5) ( 626 SE2d 491 ) (2006).

2013A defendant is not entitled to a jury charge on this defense, however, where the evidence shows that his ignorance or mistake of fact was “superinduced by the [defendant’s own] fault or negligence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 240 (5) ( 626 SE2d 491 ) (2006).

2025See also Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 163 (2) (b) (829 SE2d 312) (2019) (noting that “our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s [professionally deficient] failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation” where “the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation”).

2025See also Swanson 14 v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 163 (2) (b) ( 829 SE2d 312 ) (2019) (noting that “our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s [professionally deficient] failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation” where “the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation”).

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2019For example, in Coleman v. State , 286 Ga. 291 , 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009), we concluded that one of the two co-defendants, Jackson, was entitled to a jury charge on defense of habitation and that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to request it because Jackson testified that while he was sitting in the driver's seat of his co-defendant's car, someone struck him from outside the vehicle and, fearing he would be struck again, Jackson "retrieved his gun from under the front seat, stuck it out the door of the [vehicle], and fired." Id. at 298-299 , 687 S.E.2d 427 .

2019For example, in Coleman v. State , 286 Ga. 291 , 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009), we concluded that one of the two co-defendants, Jackson, was entitled to a jury charge on defense of habitation and that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to request it because Jackson testified that while he was sitting in the driver's seat of his co-defendant's car, someone struck him from outside the vehicle and, fearing he would be struck again, Jackson "retrieved his gun from under the front seat, stuck it out the door of the [vehicle], and fired." Id. at 298-299 , 687 S.E.2d 427 .

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2019And although our appellate courts have concluded in other cases that a defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a jury charge on defense of habitation, those cases are generally distinguishable because, for example, the record showed the defendant used force against a victim who was no longer attempting to enter a habitation, see Barrett v. State , 292 Ga. 160 , 178-180, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012) (evidence showed that defendant was outside of residence when he shot unarmed victim, who posed no threat of re-entering the residence, in the back of the head, and an eyewitness testi

2012In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), [Hill] “ ‘must prove both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if not for the deficient performance.

1997A conviction will not be reversed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel unless “‘counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” Carter v. State, 176 Ga. App. 632, 633 ( 337 SE2d 413 ) (1985), quoting from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 669 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). (a) Blackwood contends counsel was ineffective in not providing written notice to the State of her intent to introduce evidence of prior violent acts of the victim, in failing to present the defen

2025See Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 37-38 (2) ( 810 SE2d 93 ) (2018). 3.

2025See Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 37-38 (2) ( 810 SE2d 93 ) (2018). 3.

2022See Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 861 (8) (717 SE2d 179) (2011) (“[A] deviation from the indictment to the jury charge is not error where the trial court read the indictment in full to the jury and charged the jury that the State must prove each element of the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 65 (4) (673 SE2d 246) (2009) (When trial court read the aggravated assault count as it appeared in the indictment and instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, “[t]here is no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted [the defendant] based on the tria

2022See Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 861 (8) (717 SE2d 179) (2011) (“[A] deviation from the indictment to the jury charge is not error where the trial court read the indictment in full to the jury and charged the jury that the State must prove each element of the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 65 (4) (673 SE2d 246) (2009) (When trial court read the aggravated assault count as it appeared in the indictment and instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, “[t]here is no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted [the defendant] based on the tria

2021However, “a jury charge on the defense of accident to a strict liability traffic offense is available only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily 22 State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 8 (2) (a) ( 734 SE2d 50 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 23 Forte v. State, 302 Ga. 726, 729 (2) ( 808 SE2d 658 ) (2017). 11 commit the prohibited act.”24 Here, there was evidence of the bus’s speed and of the road’s features, but the trial court found there was no evidence presented related to an accident defense.

2021However, “a jury charge on the defense of accident to a strict liability traffic offense is available only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily 22 State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 8 (2) (a) ( 734 SE2d 50 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 23 Forte v. State, 302 Ga. 726, 729 (2) ( 808 SE2d 658 ) (2017). 11 commit the prohibited act.”24 Here, there was evidence of the bus’s speed and of the road’s features, but the trial court found there was no evidence presented related to an accident defense.

2021And, “if we determine that one element is missing we need not consider whether the defendant has established the other element.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Murrell v. State, 317 Ga. App. 310, 317 (2) ( 730 SE2d 675 ) (2012). (a) Hargrove argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury charge on presumption of ownership or possession because his sole defense at trial was that he did not possess the heroin or cocaine found in the townhome and that it belonged to Brittany Patterson. [W]hen a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on couns

2021And, “if we determine that one element is missing we need not consider whether the defendant has established the other element.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Murrell v. State, 317 Ga. App. 310, 317 (2) ( 730 SE2d 675 ) (2012). (a) Hargrove argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury charge on presumption of ownership or possession because his sole defense at trial was that he did not possess the heroin or cocaine found in the townhome and that it belonged to Brittany Patterson. [W]hen a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on couns

2021However, trial counsel was not required to renew his objection at trial to preserve the objection for appeal based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 245-249 (2) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010).

2021However, trial counsel was not required to renew his objection at trial to preserve the objection for appeal based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 245-249 (2) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010).

2021Here, the record reveals that Mike either intentionally exposed his penis to the 15-year-old victim, or, as the defense theorized at trial, that Mike accidentally left his pants unzipped after exiting the bathroom.1 Because the evidence did not authorize a charge on public indecency as a lesser included offense of child molestation, Mike cannot show that the charge affected the outcome of his trial, and we thus find no plain error. 1 Mike requested and received a jury charge on the defense of accident or mistake. 5 Cf. Seals v. State, 350 Ga. App. 787, 794 (2) (b) ( 830 SE2d 315 ) (2019) (beca

2021Here, the record reveals that Mike either intentionally exposed his penis to the 15-year-old victim, or, as the defense theorized at trial, that Mike accidentally left his pants unzipped after exiting the bathroom.1 Because the evidence did not authorize a charge on public indecency as a lesser included offense of child molestation, Mike cannot show that the charge affected the outcome of his trial, and we thus find no plain error. 1 Mike requested and received a jury charge on the defense of accident or mistake. 5 Cf. Seals v. State, 350 Ga. App. 787, 794 (2) (b) ( 830 SE2d 315 ) (2019) (beca

2021(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wilhite v. State, 337 Ga. App. 324, 325 (1) ( 787 SE2d 293 ) (2016).

2021(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wilhite v. State, 337 Ga. App. 324, 325 (1) ( 787 SE2d 293 ) (2016).

2021Because there was no evidence demonstrating that “the prohibited act was committed involuntarily, for example, because of an unforeseeable physical ailment or external force[,]”25 the trial court did not abuse its discretion.26 As it relates to Harris’s argument regarding criminal negligence, When [reviewing] a refusal to give a requested instruction, [the appellate court] must look to the jury charge as a whole, and if the jury charge as a whole accurately and fully apprised the jury of the law to be applied in its deliberations, then the refusal to give an additional instruction, even if tha

2021Because there was no evidence demonstrating that “the prohibited act was committed involuntarily, for example, because of an unforeseeable physical ailment or external force[,]”25 the trial court did not abuse its discretion.26 As it relates to Harris’s argument regarding criminal negligence, When [reviewing] a refusal to give a requested instruction, [the appellate court] must look to the jury charge as a whole, and if the jury charge as a whole accurately and fully apprised the jury of the law to be applied in its deliberations, then the refusal to give an additional instruction, even if tha

2020See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 (2) ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). (a) Satterfield contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment.

2020See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 (2) ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). (a) Satterfield contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment.