piercing the corporate veil doctrine in New York

2019The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil "assumes that the corporation itself is liable for the obligation sought to be imposed [and thus] does not constitute a cause of action independent of that against the corporation; rather it is an assertion of facts and circumstances which will persuade the court to impose the corporate obligation on its owners" ( Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. , 82 NY2d 135, 141 [1993]; see generally Cortlandt St.

2018The verified complaint sufficiently alleged a basis for holding Tsoumas personally liable for the loans under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil ( see Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin ., 82 NY2d 135, 140-141 ; Olivieri Constr.

2023Recovery Corp. v Bonderman , 31 NY3d 30, 49 [2018] ["It is sufficient at the pleading stage that the alleged facts and the inferences drawn from them establish the basic elements of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil"]).

2023Recovery Corp. v Bonderman , 31 NY3d 30, 49 [2018] ["It is sufficient at the pleading stage that the alleged facts and the inferences drawn from them establish the basic elements of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil"]).

2016To state a cause of action under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the “plaintiff must allege facts that, if proved, indicate that the shareholder exercised complete domination and control over the corporation [or LLC] and ‘abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate [or LLC] form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice’ ” (East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 16 NY3d 775, 776 [2011], quoting Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 NY2d 135, 142 [1993]; see Grammas v Lockwood Assoc., LLC, 95 AD3d at 1075 ).

2016A cause of action under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is “not required to meet any heightened level of particularity in its allegations (cf. CPLR 3016)” (East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122 , 125 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]).

2019"However, a party may seek to hold a member of an LLC individually liable despite this statutory proscription by application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil" ( Grammas v Lockwood Assoc., LLC , 95 AD3d at 1074-1075 ; see Matias v Mondo Props.

2017However, a party may seek to hold a member of an LLC individually liable despite this statutory proscription by application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil" ( Grammas v Lockwood Assoc. , LLC , 95 AD3d 1073, 1074-1075 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2015The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, allowing the imposition of individual liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation “to prevent fraud or to achieve equity” (Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 NY2d 135, 140 [1993] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d 737 , 738 [2013]).

2014Although “[o]ne of the primary legitimate purposes of incorporating is to limit or eliminate the personal liability of corporate principals” (Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d 737 , 738 [2013]; see East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122 , 126 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]), “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows a corporation’s separate legal existence to be disregarded to prevent fraud and achieve equity” (Baccash v Sayegh, 53 AD3d at 639 ; see Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d at 738; Campone v Pisciotta Servs., Inc., 87

2019LLC , 43 AD3d 367, 368 ; Retropolis, Inc. v 14th St.

2017LLC, 43 AD3d 367, 368 [1st Dept 2007]), and the proposed third amended complaint states a claim for piercing the corporate veil {see Cortlandt St.

2017A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue.Indicia of a situation warranting veil-piercing include: " '(1) the absence of the formalities and paraphernalia that are part and parcel of the corporate existence, i.e., issuance of stock, election of directors, keeping of corporate records and the like, (2) inadequate capitalization, (3) whether funds are put in and taken out of the corporation for personal rather than corporate purposes, (4) o

2017A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue.Indicia of a situation warranting veil-piercing include: " '(1) the absence of the formalities and paraphernalia that are part and parcel of the corporate existence, i.e., issuance of stock, election of directors, keeping of corporate records and the like, (2) inadequate capitalization, (3) whether funds are put in and taken out of the corporation for personal rather than corporate purposes, (4) o

2025"A cause of action under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is not required to meet any heightened level of particularity in its allegations" ( F & R Goldfish Corp. v Furleiter , 210 AD3d 643, 645 ), and "a fact-laden claim to pierce the corporate veil is unsuited for resolution on a pre-answer, pre-discovery motion to dismiss" ( Cortlandt St.

2025"A cause of action under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is not required to meet any heightened level of particularity in its allegations" ( F & R Goldfish Corp. v Furleiter , 210 AD3d 643, 645), and "a fact-laden claim to pierce the corporate veil is unsuited for resolution on a pre-answer, pre-discovery motion to dismiss" ( Cortlandt St.

2016Corp., 69 AD3d 840, 842 [2010]; see also Limited Liability Company Law §§ 609, 610). “[A] party may seek to hold a member of an LLC individually liable despite this statutory proscription by application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil” (Grammas v Lockwood Assoc., LLC, 95 AD3d at 1074-1075 ).

2014Although “[o]ne of the primary legitimate purposes of incorporating is to limit or eliminate the personal liability of corporate principals” (Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d 737 , 738 [2013]; see East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122 , 126 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]), “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows a corporation’s separate legal existence to be disregarded to prevent fraud and achieve equity” (Baccash v Sayegh, 53 AD3d at 639 ; see Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d at 738; Campone v Pisciotta Servs., Inc., 87

2014Although “[o]ne of the primary legitimate purposes of incorporating is to limit or eliminate the personal liability of corporate principals” (Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d 737 , 738 [2013]; see East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122 , 126 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]), “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows a corporation’s separate legal existence to be disregarded to prevent fraud and achieve equity” (Baccash v Sayegh, 53 AD3d at 639 ; see Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d at 738; Campone v Pisciotta Servs., Inc., 87

2014“A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene *906 because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff’ (East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d at 126; see Flushing Plaza Assoc. #2 v Albert, 102 AD3d at 738; Peery v United Capital Corp., 84 AD3d 1201, 1202 [2011]; Campone v Pisciotta Servs., Inc., 87 AD

2009The issue that now divides the court is whether, under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the complaint contains allegations sufficient to state a cause of action holding Canseco personally liable for actions he took as Sandpebble’s president and principal owner. * The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability (see Bartle v Home Owners Coop., 309 NY 103, 106 [1955]; Seuter v Lieberman, 229 AD2d 386, 387 [1

2009The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows the court to disregard the corporate form and hold individual shareholders responsible for corporate obligations in order to prevent fraud or achieve equity (see Matter of Morris v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 NY2d 135, 140 [1993]; Walkovszky v Carlton, 18 NY2d 414, 417 [1966]).

2009We further note that the district does not argue that Canseco is liable as an officer of Sandpebble for inducing the breach of the contracts between the district and Sandpebble in bad faith (see Murtha v Yonkers Child Care Assn., 45 NY2d 913, 915 [1978]; First Bank of Ams. v Motor Car Funding, 257 AD2d 287, 294 [1999]).

2009The issue that now divides the court is whether, under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the complaint contains allegations sufficient to state a cause of action holding Canseco personally liable for actions he took as Sandpebble’s president and principal owner. * The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability (see Bartle v Home Owners Coop., 309 NY 103, 106 [1955]; Seuter v Lieberman, 229 AD2d 386, 387 [1

2009Thus, in the principal case cited by the dissent in support of its view, the Court of Appeals held that “[a] corporate officer who is charged with inducing the breach of a contract between the corporation and a third party is immune from liability if it appears that he is acting in good faith as an officer . . . [and did not commit] independent torts or predatory acts directed at another” (Murtha v Yonkers Child Care Assn., 45 NY2d at 915; see Buckley v 112 Cent.

2009We further note that the district does not argue that Canseco is liable as an officer of Sandpebble for inducing the breach of the contracts between the district and Sandpebble in bad faith (see Murtha v Yonkers Child Care Assn., 45 NY2d 913, 915 [1978]; First Bank of Ams. v Motor Car Funding, 257 AD2d 287, 294 [1999]).

2008Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs proof was insufficient to establish that she sustained actual damages as a result of the defendant’s conduct (see Rogers v Ciprian, 26 AD3d 1, 6 [2005]; Winkler v Allvend Indus., 186 AD2d 732, 734 [1992]).

2008Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs proof was insufficient to establish that she sustained actual damages as a result of the defendant’s conduct (see Rogers v Ciprian, 26 AD3d 1, 6 [2005]; Winkler v Allvend Indus., 186 AD2d 732, 734 [1992]).

2005Williams Oil Co. v Randy Luce E-Z Mart One, 302 AD2d 736, 739-740 [2003]).