speedy hearing in New York

1999Because respondent was denied the right to a speedy hearing (see, Matter of Erick N., supra, at 434-435; see generally, Matter of Randy K., supra; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408 ), we reverse the order, grant respondent’s motion and dismiss the petition.

1993As the Court of Appeals has observed, the Family Court Act’s speedy hearing provisions were meant to "assure swift and certain adjudication at all phases of the delinquency proceeding” (Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 413 ).

2023Respondent's contention that he was denied his right to a speedy hearing is unpreserved for our review ( see Matter of Dashawn R. , 114 AD3d 686 , 686 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 901 [2014]; Matter of Shellito D. , 226 AD2d 1075, 1076-1077 [4th Dept 1996]), as is his contention that Family Court erred in considering hearsay evidence at the fact-finding hearing ( see generally Matter of Jerome G. , 192 AD3d 1476, 1477 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 906 [2021]).

2003While it can be argued, as her former attorneys do, that by moving to compel delivery of the file before requesting arbitration she has elected her remedy — a remedy that necessarily entails a speedy hearing and determination of the fee dispute by the court, not an arbitrator (see, Eighteen Assoc. v Nanjim Leasing Corp., supra; Reich v Reich, supra; Fields v Casse, supra; Andreiev v Keller, supra; Manes v Manes, supra) — it is nonetheless true that the former attorneys are bound by both the rules of the Appellate Divisions and the Code of Professional Responsibility to submit a fee dispute to

2003While it can be argued, as her former attorneys do, that by moving to compel delivery of the file before requesting arbitration she has elected her remedy — a remedy that necessarily entails a speedy hearing and determination of the fee dispute by the court, not an arbitrator (see, Eighteen Assoc. v Nanjim Leasing Corp., supra; Reich v Reich, supra; Fields v Casse, supra; Andreiev v Keller, supra; Manes v Manes, supra) — it is nonetheless true that the former attorneys are bound by both the rules of the Appellate Divisions and the Code of Professional Responsibility to submit a fee dispute to

2000The instant matter is governed by Family Court Act § 340.1, a speedy hearing statute, which is subject to stricter time limitations (see, Matter of Benjamin L., 92 NY2d 660 ).

1999The speedy hearing requirements contained in that section are to be strictly construed (see, Matter of Erick B., 200 AD2d 447 ; Matter of Erik N., 185 AD2d 433, 435 ).

1999Here,' respondent was not provided a fact-finding hearing within three days of her detention, as required by Family Court Act § 340.1 (1), and the court failed to make appropriate findings on the record when it adjourned the fact-finding hearing for an additional three days (see, Family Ct Act § 340.1 [5]; Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398, 402-403 ; Matter of Anthony H., 219 AD2d 436, 442 ).

1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). .

1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). .

1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). .

1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). .

1997Appellant seeks to vacate his fact-finding and dispositional orders for the purpose of contesting adherence to the speedy hearing requirements of Family Court Act §§ 310.2 and 340.1, objection to which is waived by acceptance of a valid admission (Matter of Melvin A., 216 AD2d 227 ; Matter of Christopher F., 126 AD2d 975 ).

1997Appellant seeks to vacate his fact-finding and dispositional orders for the purpose of contesting adherence to the speedy hearing requirements of Family Court Act §§ 310.2 and 340.1, objection to which is waived by acceptance of a valid admission (Matter of Melvin A., 216 AD2d 227 ; Matter of Christopher F., 126 AD2d 975 ).

1996The contention that respondent was denied his right to a speedy hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 340.1 has not been properly preserved for our review because no objection or motion to dismiss the petition on that ground was made before the court (see, Matter of Charles O., 182 AD2d 1063, 1064 , lv denied 81 NY2d 703 ).

1996The majority at the Appellate Division affirmed and concluded that the presentment agency was not precluded from refiling a delinquency petition after the first was dismissed for failure to hold the initial appearance within 10 days of such filing, where the juvenile’s separate right to a speedy hearing was observed. ( 207 AD2d 783 .) The Court of Appeals affirmed and stated that so long as the adjudication takes place within 60 days, unless good-cause or special-circumstances adjournments are in order, a respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding has been preserved.

1995Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court’s actions in commencing the fact-finding hearing and subsequently granting a motion for a continuance did not deprive him of his right to a speedy hearing, inasmuch as the hearing was commenced within the statutory time limit of Family Court Act § 340.1 (1) (see, Matter of Robert B., 187 AD2d 347 ; Matter of Raymond B., 160 AD2d 936 ; Matter of Jeffrey V., 185 AD2d 240 , affd 82 NY2d 121 ).

1995Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 ; Matter of Stafford B., 187 AD2d 649 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the fact-finding order since it overwhelmingly established the appellant’s knowing participation in the incident (see, e.g., Matter of Andre L., 207 AD2d 348 ; Matter of Karriem E., 206 AD2d 476 ; People v Taylor, 203 AD2d 77 ; People v Moses, 162 AD2d 311 ; People v Crutchfield, 149 AD2d 857 ).

1995Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court’s actions in commencing the fact-finding hearing and subsequently granting a motion for a continuance did not deprive him of his right to a speedy hearing, inasmuch as the hearing was commenced within the statutory time limit of Family Court Act § 340.1 (1) (see, Matter of Robert B., 187 AD2d 347 ; Matter of Raymond B., 160 AD2d 936 ; Matter of Jeffrey V., 185 AD2d 240 , affd 82 NY2d 121 ).

1995Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court’s actions in commencing the fact-finding hearing and subsequently granting a motion for a continuance did not deprive him of his right to a speedy hearing, inasmuch as the hearing was commenced within the statutory time limit of Family Court Act § 340.1 (1) (see, Matter of Robert B., 187 AD2d 347 ; Matter of Raymond B., 160 AD2d 936 ; Matter of Jeffrey V., 185 AD2d 240 , affd 82 NY2d 121 ).