speedy hearing in Massachusetts

1986After considering the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), 14 the judge concluded that the defendants had not been denied their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy hearing.

1978L. c. 123A, § 9. 1 The petitioner also argues that under the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Horne, 362 Mass. 738 (1973), the delay before his hearing violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that therefore he is entitled to release.

2014See Hashimi, supra at 609 .

2007As the motion judge suggested, Stevens could, with the assistance of counsel, renew his motion seeking a hearing on the “motion for speedy trial.” Further, we have stated that “if [a § 9 petitioner’s] right to a speedy hearing is in fact violated, that violation can be remedied on appeal from any adverse judgment. ” Pentlarge v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 1012, 1012 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 Mass. 503 (1992).

1996From 1976 until 1992, § 6G said nothing about a decision of the single justice being “final,” but only that the single justice hearing the appeal “shall schedule a speedy hearing thereon” and conduct the appeal “according to the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure.” See note 5, supra. It was recognized at the time that the provisions of § 6G constituted “a confusing statutory scheme,” Bailey v. Shriberg, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 284 (1991), containing “an anomalous route of appeal,” id. at 282 , as well as other “obscurities.” Katz v. Savitsky, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 793 (1980).

1996From 1976 until 1992, § 6G said nothing about a decision of the single justice being “final,” but only that the single justice hearing the appeal “shall schedule a speedy hearing thereon” and conduct the appeal “according to the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure.” See note 5, supra. It was recognized at the time that the provisions of § 6G constituted “a confusing statutory scheme,” Bailey v. Shriberg, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 284 (1991), containing “an anomalous route of appeal,” id. at 282 , as well as other “obscurities.” Katz v. Savitsky, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 793 (1980).

1996From 1976 until 1992, § 6G said nothing about a decision of the single justice being “final,” but only that the single justice hearing the appeal “shall schedule a speedy hearing thereon” and conduct the appeal “according to the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure.” See note 5, supra. It was recognized at the time that the provisions of § 6G constituted “a confusing statutory scheme,” Bailey v. Shriberg, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 284 (1991), containing “an anomalous route of appeal,” id. at 282 , as well as other “obscurities.” Katz v. Savitsky, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 793 (1980).

1993Moreover, although Lund testified to experiencing anxiety over the impending § 9 hearing (but see Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 [1973]) and being denied parole consideration on his sentence on the indictment (even though he did not apply for a parole hearing), we are unable to consider any claim to a constitutional right to a speedy hearing for the same reasons discussed in Trimmer, petitioner, 375 Mass. at 592 n.1.

1990Greylock Regional School Dist., 3 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 552 (1975).

1978“In construing the statute we are also mindful of its purposes which are to ascertain who are sexually dangerous persons for the protection of society, and to cure and reha bilitate them as soon as possible.” LaMorre v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 347 Mass. 534, 538 (1964).