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27 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Swartz, 2008 Ca 31 (2-27-2009)green2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Dye, 2021-Ohio-3513 , ¶ 69 (6th Dist.) (“without additional indicia of intoxication, . . . the odor of alcohol and bloodshot, glassy eyes — standing alone — are insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for field sobriety tests”); State v. Swartz, 2009-Ohio-902, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.) (“A de minimis traffic violation, coupled with glassy, bloodshot eyes and an unspecified odor of alcohol is insufficient justification to conduct field sobriety tests”); State v. Reed, 2006-Ohio-7075, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.) (reasonable suspicion for the administration of field sobriety test was not show 2023Miami No. 2008 CA 31, 2009-Ohio-902, ¶ 16 (“A de minimis traffic violation, coupled with glassy, bloodshot eyes and an unspecified odor of alcohol is insufficient justification to conduct field sobriety tests.”); State v. Reed, 7th Dist. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Reed, Unpublished Decision (12-19-2006)green2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Dye, 2021-Ohio-3513 , ¶ 69 (6th Dist.) (“without additional indicia of intoxication, . . . the odor of alcohol and bloodshot, glassy eyes — standing alone — are insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for field sobriety tests”); State v. Swartz, 2009-Ohio-902, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.) (“A de minimis traffic violation, coupled with glassy, bloodshot eyes and an unspecified odor of alcohol is insufficient justification to conduct field sobriety tests”); State v. Reed, 2006-Ohio-7075, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.) (reasonable suspicion for the administration of field sobriety test was not show 2023Belmont No. 05 BE 31, 2006-Ohio-7075, ¶ 10-27 (“slight smell of alcohol,” “red glassy eyes” and admission of drinking two beers was insufficient to detain defendant to conduct field sobriety tests where officer did not witness a moving violation or erratic driving, defendant was “cooperative” and “his speech was good”); State v. Spillers, 2d Dist. | 2 | 2 |
City of Dayton v. Ericksongreen2 sentences2025State v. Spellacy, 2019-Ohio-785, ¶ 35, citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, pp. 11-12 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. {¶28} R.C. 4549.08(A) states, “No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon the public roads and highways in this state if it displays a license plate or a distinctive number or identification mark that meets any of the following criteria: (1) Is fictitious; ... {¶29} Officer Byerly was questioned by the prosecutor regarding his reason for stopping Taylor. 2025State v. Spellacy, 2019-Ohio-785, ¶ 35, citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, pp. 11-12 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. {¶28} R.C. 4549.08(A) states, “No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon the public roads and highways in this state if it displays a license plate or a distinctive number or identification mark that meets any of the following criteria: (1) Is fictitious; ... {¶29} Officer Byerly was questioned by the prosecutor regarding his reason for stopping Taylor. | 1 | 14 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999We have previously held that the Gullett line of cases, which stood for the proposition that a de minimis traffic violation was insufficient to provide reasonable articulable suspicion, was overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in Erickson, supra , and by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 . 1999We have previously held that the Gullett line of cases, which stood for the proposition that a de minimis traffic violation was insufficient to provide reasonable articulable suspicion, was overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in Erickson, supra , and by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Hodgegreen2 sentences2019Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. at 9 . “‘Trial courts determine whether any violation occurred, not the extent of the violation.’” Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740 , 107 N.E.3d 809 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550 , 2002-Ohio-3053 , 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). 2019Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. at 9 . “‘Trial courts determine whether any violation occurred, not the extent of the violation.’” Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740 , 107 N.E.3d 809 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550 , 2002-Ohio-3053 , 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Spellacygreen2 sentences2025State v. Spellacy, 2019-Ohio-785, ¶ 35, citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, pp. 11-12 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. {¶28} R.C. 4549.08(A) states, “No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon the public roads and highways in this state if it displays a license plate or a distinctive number or identification mark that meets any of the following criteria: (1) Is fictitious; ... {¶29} Officer Byerly was questioned by the prosecutor regarding his reason for stopping Taylor. 2025State v. Spellacy, 2019-Ohio-785, ¶ 35 , citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, pp. 11-12 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. {¶28} R.C. 4549.08(A) states, “No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon the public roads and highways in this state if it displays a license plate or a distinctive number or identification mark that meets any of the following criteria: (1) Is fictitious; ... {¶29} Officer Byerly was questioned by the prosecutor regarding his reason for stopping Taylor. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howard, 2007 Ca 42 (5-9-2008)green1 sentence2025See State v. Howard, 2008-Ohio-2241, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cecil Fergusongreen1 sentence2021Determination of probable cause that a traffic offense has been committed, "'like all probable cause determinations is fact dependent and will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.'" (Emphasis sic.) Erickson at 10 , quoting United States v. -5- Butler CA2020-08-085 Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.1993). "[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop." State v. Williams, 12th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dayton v. Erickson
green
2 sentences2017Id. at ¶ 9, citing Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 , and Dayton v. Erickson , 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11-12, 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . 2015No. 01 CO 42 , 2002-Ohio-3207 , ¶30, citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 9 , 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). | 4 | 2003–2017 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2003Id. at *4, citing State v. Johnson (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 37 . 2000In his brief, appellant argues that a de minimis traffic violation does not justify a stop of a vehicle, citing State v. Johnson (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 37 , as well as several unreported cases from this court. | 3 | 2000–2003 |
State v. Gullett
green
2 sentences1999In support of his argument, he cites five cases, including State v. Gullett (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 138 , 604 N.E.2d 176 , which support the proposition that a de minimis traffic violation does not give a police officer the reasonable articulable suspicion required to stop a vehicle. 1999In support of his argument, he cites five cases, including State v. Gullett (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 138 , 604 N.E.2d 176 , which support the proposition that a de minimis traffic violation does not give a police officer the reasonable articulable suspicion required to stop a vehicle. | 2 | 1999–2002 |
State v. Wilhelm
green
2 sentences2002This court has held that even a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop, and that any cases to the contrary were effectively overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Wilhelm (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 444 , 692 N.E.2d 181 and [Dayton v.] Erickson [1996], 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . 2002This court has held that even a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop, and that any cases to the contrary were effectively overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Wilhelm (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 444 , 692 N.E.2d 181 and [Dayton v.] Erickson [1996], 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . | 2 | 2000–2002 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2025State v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-5527 (10th Dist.) (undercover officer personally observed traffic violation and communicated information to patrol officer). {¶ 46} A de minimis traffic violation provides the requisite probable cause for a non-investigatory traffic stop, even if the officer has an ulterior motive for the stop. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Fisk
neutral
1 sentence2022Preble No. CA2020-11- 016, 2021-Ohio-2989, ¶ 25 ; State v. Willis, 12th Dist. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Bullock
green
1 sentence2021Clinton No. CA2016-07-018, 2017-Ohio-497, ¶ 6 . {¶25} Even a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
City of Cleveland v. Martin
green
2 sentences2019Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. at 9 . “‘Trial courts determine whether any violation occurred, not the extent of the violation.’” Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740 , 107 N.E.3d 809 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550 , 2002-Ohio-3053 , 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). 2019Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. at 9 . “‘Trial courts determine whether any violation occurred, not the extent of the violation.’” Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740 , 107 N.E.3d 809 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550 , 2002-Ohio-3053 , 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Mays
green
2 sentences2018Specific to this case, "[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle drifting back and forth across an edge line, the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated R.C. 4511.33." State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204 , ¶ 16. 1 {¶ 19} Once a driver has been lawfully stopped, however, an officer may not request a motorist to perform field sobriety tests unless the request is separately justified by a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist is intoxicated. 2018Specific to this case, "[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle drifting back and forth across an edge line, the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated R.C. 4511.33." State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204 , ¶ 16. 1 {¶ 19} Once a driver has been lawfully stopped, however, an officer may not request a motorist to perform field sobriety tests unless the request is separately justified by a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist is intoxicated. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Hido
green
2 sentences2011Id.; State v. Hido, Clark App. No. 10 CA 46, 2011-Ohio-2560 , 2011 WL 2084160 , ¶ 9. {¶ 12} In the cases upon which Santiago relies, we have held that an odor of alcohol, coupled with a de minimis traffic violation, glassy or bloodshot eyes, and an admission to having consumed one or two beers, was insufficient to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of driving under the influence and therefore to justify further detention in order to conduct field sobriety tests. 2011Id.; State v. Hido, Clark App. No. 10 CA 46, 2011-Ohio-2560, ¶ 9 . {¶ 12} In the cases upon which Santiago relies, we have held that an odor of alcohol, coupled with a de minimis traffic violation, glassy or bloodshot eyes, and an admission to having consumed one or two beers, was insufficient to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of driving under the influence and therefore to justify further detention in order to conduct field sobriety tests. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Phillips, Unpublished Decision (12-4-2006)
green
1 sentence2008No. 8-04-25, 2006-Ohio-6338 . {¶ 7} The State, on the other hand, argues that driving off the roadway is a violation of R.C. 4511.25 , even when the driver's vehicle goes off the right side of the roadway. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Burton, Unpublished Decision (8-7-2006)
green
1 sentence2007State v. Pfeiffer , Butler App. No. CA2003-12-329, 2004-Ohio-4981 , ¶ 23. {¶ 12} In State v. Burton , Butler App. No. CA2005-12-528, 2006-Ohio-4048 , we reversed the trial court's granting of a motion to suppress based upon a similar de minimis traffic violation. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Fanning
green
1 sentence2000State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 20 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Mills
green
2 sentences1999"When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Clary (Sept. 30, 1996), Lawrence App. No. 96CA7, unreported, at *2, citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366 , 582 N.E.2d 972 , 982 , certiorari denied (1992), 505 U.S. 1227 , 112 S.Ct. 3048 . 1999"When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Clary (Sept. 30, 1996), Lawrence App. No. 96CA7, unreported, at *2, citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366 , 582 N.E.2d 972 , 982 , certiorari denied (1992), 505 U.S. 1227 , 112 S.Ct. 3048 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Mills v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1999"When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Clary (Sept. 30, 1996), Lawrence App. No. 96CA7, unreported, at *2, citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366 , 582 N.E.2d 972 , 982 , certiorari denied (1992), 505 U.S. 1227 , 112 S.Ct. 3048 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Cochran v. Turner
green
1 sentence1999"When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Clary (Sept. 30, 1996), Lawrence App. No. 96CA7, unreported, at *2, citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366 , 582 N.E.2d 972 , 982 , certiorari denied (1992), 505 U.S. 1227 , 112 S.Ct. 3048 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.