lifetime supervision requirement in Tennessee

2024The Petitioner further argues that the habeas corpus court erred in its denial of the Petitioner’s claim that his judgments are void and illegal because the trial court did not inform him of the imposition of the additional sentence of mandatory community supervision for life. “[T]rial courts have an affirmative duty to ensure that a defendant is informed and aware of the lifetime supervision requirement prior to accepting a guilty plea.” Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010).

2020In Ward, our supreme court held that “trial courts have an affirmative duty to ensure that a defendant is informed and aware of the lifetime supervision requirement prior to accepting a guilty plea.” 315 S.W.3d at 476 .

2020See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 163 .

2019See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 163 .

2018The Petitioner relies on State v. Nagele, which held that the State has the burden of showing harmless error where a -8- trial court has failed to advise a defendant of mandatory lifetime community supervision prior to accepting a guilty plea. 353 S.W.3d 112, 120-21 (Tenn. 2011).

2014Our supreme court held in Ward, “[b]ecause the lifetime supervision requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524 ‘imposes an additional set of restrictions and requirements on the offender after serving his or her entire sentence of incarceration,’ and, therefore, is a direct consequence of a guilty plea, a defendant must be informed of it prior to entering a valid guilty plea to the crimes listed in the statute.” State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 119 (Tenn. 2011)(quoting Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010).

2021The determination whether a Rule 36.1 “motion states a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence under Rule 36.1 is a question of law, to which de novo review applies.” Id. at 589 (citing Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007)). -2- We agree with the trial court that the guilty-plea submission transcript belies the defendant’s claims with regard to sentence reduction credits and the lifetime supervision requirement.

2011To further set this case at odds with McLaney, the supreme court, in Summers, reiterated that the “[v]oluntariness of [a] plea . . . has no relevance in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 259 .

2015In Bush, it determined that the rule announced in Ward is not retroactively applicable. 428 S.W.3d at 20-21 .

2015In Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010), our supreme court held that “trial courts have an affirmative duty to ensure that a defendant is informed and aware of the lifetime supervision requirement [, when applicable,] prior to accepting a guilty plea.” In Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 20-21 (Tenn. 2014), it determined that the rule announced in Ward is not retroactively applicable.

2020See State v. Bronson, 172 S.W.3d 600, 602 (Tenn. Crim.

2018The Petitioner also argues that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly because he did not understand what community supervision for life required. “[A] lawyer’s failure to advise his or her client about the mandatory lifetime community supervision sentence … is deficient performance.” Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 490 (Tenn. 2011) (concluding counsel was ineffective where both trial counsel and the trial court failed to inform a defendant of the mandatory community supervision requirement prior to entering a guilty plea); see also Ward, 315 S.W.3d at 467 (“[T]rial courts have an affirm

2015“It is the duty of the appellant to prepare a record which conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transcribed in the trial court with respect to the issues which form the basis of the appeal.” State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim.

2011Standard of Review When a trial court has not informed a defendant of a direct consequence of his or her guilty plea, “the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ward, 315 S.W.3d at 476 (citing State v. Neal, 810 S.W.2d 131, 138-40 (Tenn.1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn.1993)).

2011Standard of Review When a trial court has not informed a defendant of a direct consequence of his or her guilty plea, “the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ward, 315 S.W.3d at 476 (citing State v. Neal, 810 S.W.2d 131, 138-40 (Tenn.1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn.1993)).

2010See Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 828 , 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (2002) (concluding that “lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea”); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J.Super. 220 , 832 A.2d 360, 362 (2003) (holding that community supervision for life “is a penal and not a collateral consequence”); People v. Goss, 286 A.D.2d 180 , 733 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (concluding that “postrelease supervision is a significant, punitive component of defendant’s sentence”).

2010See Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 828 , 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (2002) (concluding that “lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea”); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J.Super. 220 , 832 A.2d 360, 362 (2003) (holding that community supervision for life “is a penal and not a collateral consequence”); People v. Goss, 286 A.D.2d 180 , 733 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (concluding that “postrelease supervision is a significant, punitive component of defendant’s sentence”).

2010See Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 828 , 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (2002) (concluding that “lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea”); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J.Super. 220 , 832 A.2d 360, 362 (2003) (holding that community supervision for life “is a penal and not a collateral consequence”); People v. Goss, 286 A.D.2d 180 , 733 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (concluding that “postrelease supervision is a significant, punitive component of defendant’s sentence”).

2010See Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 828 , 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (2002) (concluding that “lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea”); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J.Super. 220 , 832 A.2d 360, 362 (2003) (holding that community supervision for life “is a penal and not a collateral consequence”); People v. Goss, 286 A.D.2d 180 , 733 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (concluding that “postrelease supervision is a significant, punitive component of defendant’s sentence”).

2010See Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 828 , 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (2002) (concluding that “lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea”); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J.Super. 220 , 832 A.2d 360, 362 (2003) (holding that community supervision for life “is a penal and not a collateral consequence”); People v. Goss, 286 A.D.2d 180 , 733 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (concluding that “postrelease supervision is a significant, punitive component of defendant’s sentence”).