Morrison factors in California

2025(Board of Education v. Jack M., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 698, fn. 3 ; West Valley–Mission Community College Dist., at p. 1775; Broney v. California Com. on Teacher Credentialing (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 462, 475 .) Here, the trial court analyzed the Morrison factors in determining Madec’s fitness to teach and found: (1) while there was no question the sanctions issued against the basketball team adversely impacted the students who expected to play at Fresno City as well as Fresno City itself, Fresno City’s administration shared some responsibility for the sanctions and neither Madec nor the admini

2025(Board of Education v. Jack M., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 698, fn. 3 ; West Valley–Mission Community College Dist., at p. 1775; Broney v. California Com. on Teacher Credentialing (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 462, 475 .) Here, the trial court analyzed the Morrison factors in determining Madec’s fitness to teach and found: (1) while there was no question the sanctions issued against the basketball team adversely impacted the students who expected to play at Fresno City as well as Fresno City itself, Fresno City’s administration shared some responsibility for the sanctions and neither Madec nor the admini

2026Whenever disciplinary action rests upon such grounds and has been confirmed by the judgment of a superior court following an independent review of the evidence, this court will uphold the result.” (Morrison, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 240 , fn. omitted, italics added.) Furthermore, virtually every published case concerning this issue notes the trial court in fact applied the Morrison factors when discipline was imposed for unprofessional or immoral conduct, and the Court of Appeal has repeatedly endorsed this approach.

2026Whenever disciplinary action rests upon such grounds and has been confirmed by the judgment of a superior court following an independent review of the evidence, this court will uphold the result.” (Morrison, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 240 , fn. omitted, italics added.) Furthermore, virtually every published case concerning this issue notes the trial court in fact applied the Morrison factors when discipline was imposed for unprofessional or immoral conduct, and the Court of Appeal has repeatedly endorsed this approach.

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2025Our Supreme Court has held with respect to grounds such as immoral conduct and dishonesty, “the determinative test [is] fitness to teach” because these terms “are so broad and vague that, standing alone, they could be constitutionally infirm.” (Board of Education v. Jack M., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 696 ; Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 220, fn. 12 [Morrison analysis applies to attempt to discipline permanent employee on grounds of dishonesty].) The trier of fact must determine both “whether the charged conduct in fact occurred” and whether that conduct, measured aga

2020Second, the CPC’s role (and by extension, the trial court’s role) “is not merely to determine whether the charged conduct in fact occurred, but to decide whether that conduct—measured against the Morrison criteria . . . demonstrates unfitness to teach and thus constitutes ‘immoral or unprofessional conduct’ within the meaning of [section 44932, subdivision (a)(1)].” (Burman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 220 , italics added.) Crawford also asserted at oral argument that applying the Morrison factors to assess her fitness to teach—and thus whether her conduct was “immoral conduct”— conflates the issue

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2020If the Morrison standards are not applied, the teacher is left essentially at the mercy of the [CPC] (or the trial court) to be discharged whenever cause exists in the subjective estimation of either body.” (San Dieguito Union High School Dist. v. Commission On Professional Competence (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 278, 289 .) Without applying the Morrison factors, whether conduct is “immoral” “becomes little more than an abstract moral judgment,” (id. at p. 284.) allowing permanent employees to be dismissed for whatever conduct the CPC deemed “immoral.” (See Morrison, supra, Cal.3d at p. 229 [teacher’

2020If the Morrison standards are not applied, the teacher is left essentially at the mercy of the [CPC] (or the trial court) to be discharged whenever cause exists in the subjective estimation of either body.” (San Dieguito Union High School Dist. v. Commission On Professional Competence (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 278, 289 .) Without applying the Morrison factors, whether conduct is “immoral” “becomes little more than an abstract moral judgment,” (id. at p. 284.) allowing permanent employees to be dismissed for whatever conduct the CPC deemed “immoral.” (See Morrison, supra, Cal.3d at p. 229 [teacher’

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2020(See ibid.; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 826 ; Comings v. State Board of Education, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 .) In sum, we conclude (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Crawford’s conduct rendered her unfit to teach under the applicable Morrison factors, and (2) the CPC did not abuse its discretion in concluding her dismissal was appropriate.

2020(See ibid.; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 826 ; Comings v. State Board of Education, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 .) In sum, we conclude (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Crawford’s conduct rendered her unfit to teach under the applicable Morrison factors, and (2) the CPC did not abuse its discretion in concluding her dismissal was appropriate.

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2026(Ibid.) 15. 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”]; West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of

2021To establish a teacher is unfit to teach, the Supreme Court in Morrison required a nexus between government employment and alleged employee misconduct based on the principle that “[n]o person can be denied government employment because of factors unconnected with the responsibilities of that employment.” (Id. at p. 234; see Watson v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416 [“[t]he 25 evidence under Morrison factors, the Commission revoked Jaimes’s teaching credential.

2016(See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 415, 431 [party cannot challenge favorable evidentiary ruling on appeal]; Eisenberg, et al., California Practice 12 Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, § 8.198, p. 8-156 (2015).) Moreover, McMackin—the only party prejudiced by the finding of unfitness to teach—does not challenge that 4 predicate factual finding in this appeal.

2016(See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 415, 431 [party cannot challenge favorable evidentiary ruling on appeal]; Eisenberg, et al., California Practice 12 Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, § 8.198, p. 8-156 (2015).) Moreover, McMackin—the only party prejudiced by the finding of unfitness to teach—does not challenge that 4 predicate factual finding in this appeal.

2011(Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 149 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 ].) Although Morrison urges us to review the trial court’s decision de novo, we would reach the same result if we applied de novo review.

2011(Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 149 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 ].) Although Morrison urges us to review the trial court’s decision de novo, we would reach the same result if we applied de novo review.

2010California courts have recognized that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 “does not expressly state a standard to determine when an attorney’s representation of a client regarding a specific subject matter continues or when the representation ends . . . .” (Gonzalez v. Kalu (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 21, 28 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ] (Gonzalez), citing Worthington v. Rusconi (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1498 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ] (Worthington); see Lockley v. *1063 Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 887 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 877 ].) The legislative history p

2010California courts have recognized that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 “does not expressly state a standard to determine when an attorney’s representation of a client regarding a specific subject matter continues or when the representation ends . . . .” (Gonzalez v. Kalu (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 21, 28 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ] (Gonzalez), citing Worthington v. Rusconi (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1498 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ] (Worthington); see Lockley v. *1063 Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 887 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 877 ].) The legislative history p

2010(Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426, fn. 3 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ] [If a party files an amended pleading and attempts to avoid defects of original complaint by either omitting facts that rendered prior complaint defective or adding facts inconsistent with prior allegations, court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings and disregard inconsistent allegations or read into amended complaint the allegations of the superseded complaint.]; Patane v. Kiddoo (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1213 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 9 ].)” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4t

2010(Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426, fn. 3 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 807 ] [If a party files an amended pleading and attempts to avoid defects of original complaint by either omitting facts that rendered prior complaint defective or adding facts inconsistent with prior allegations, court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings and disregard inconsistent allegations or read into amended complaint the allegations of the superseded complaint.]; Patane v. Kiddoo (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1213 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 9 ].)” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4t

2010DISCUSSION I Standard of Review “When a trial court rules on a petition for writ of mandate following a license revocation [or suspension], it must exercise its independent judgment to determine whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision. [Citations.] After the trial court has exercised its independent judgment upon the weight of the evidence, an appellate court’s function ‘is solely to decide whether credible, competent evidence supports [the trial] court’s judgment.’ (Yakov [v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67 ,] 69, 72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2

2010DISCUSSION I Standard of Review “When a trial court rules on a petition for writ of mandate following a license revocation [or suspension], it must exercise its independent judgment to determine whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision. [Citations.] After the trial court has exercised its independent judgment upon the weight of the evidence, an appellate court’s function ‘is solely to decide whether credible, competent evidence supports [the trial] court’s judgment.’ (Yakov [v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67 ,] 69, 72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2