nonstatutory mitigating factors in Florida

2011Additionally, the trial court considered the following nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1) Ballard has a close relationship with his wife—little to no weight; (2) Ballard can continue the relationship with his wife in prison—little to no weight; (3) Ballard has a strong work ethic—slight weight; (4) Ballard was charitable to his stepfamily—no weight; (5)-(15) medical and mental problems—very slight weight when combined; (16) lack of impulse control—very little weight; (17) lack of societal inhibition—little weight; (18) Ballard suffered from an obsession to regain custody of Suny Houghtling—

2011Additionally, the trial court considered the following nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1) Ballard has a close relationship with his wife—little to no weight; (2) Ballard can continue the relationship with his wife in prison—little to no weight; (3) Ballard has a strong work ethic—slight weight; (4) Ballard was charitable to his stepfamily—no weight; (5)-(15) medical and mental problems—very slight weight when combined; (16) lack of impulse control—very little weight; (17) lack of societal inhibition—little weight; (18) Ballard suffered from an obsession to regain custody of Suny Houghtling—

2006NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] The aggravating factors were that (1) the murder was committed while Sliney was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of a robbery; and (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest. [3] The statutory mitigating factors were that (1) Sliney had no significant prior criminal history; and (2) he was a youthful age at the time the crime was committed. [4] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were that the defendant (1) was a good prisoner (accorded some weight)

2006NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] The aggravating factors were that (1) the murder was committed while Sliney was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of a robbery; and (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest. [3] The statutory mitigating factors were that (1) Sliney had no significant prior criminal history; and (2) he was a youthful age at the time the crime was committed. [4] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were that the defendant (1) was a good prisoner (accorded some weight)

2015Id. at 112-13 .

2015Id. at 112-13 .

2004NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were: (1) Windom had been previously convicted of another offense or felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person; and (2) the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). [2] The statutory mitigating factors were: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (very slight weight); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person (little weight).

2004NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were: (1) Windom had been previously convicted of another offense or felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person; and (2) the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). [2] The statutory mitigating factors were: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (very slight weight); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person (little weight).

2007NOTES [1] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [2] The nonstatutory mitigating factors and the weight given by the trial court are: (1) defendant entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder without asking for any plea bargain or other favor in exchange (great weight); (2) defendant has fully accepted responsibility for his actions and blames nobody else for this crime (great weight); (3) defendant is not a psychopath pursuant to expert testimony and would not be a danger to other inmates or correctional officers should he be given a life sentence (moderate weight); (4) defendant cou

2007White was sentenced to thirty years and that Tennessee plea was used at White's Florida resentencing to establish the prior violent felony aggravator. [5] On direct appeal of his resentencing, White argued that: (1) the trial court erred in not permitting the cross-examination of a key State witness concerning the underlying facts of the witness's subsequent murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws; (3) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating factor that the murder was committed while

2008Davis also argued (8) that imposing the death sentence based on a seven-to-five recommendation was unconstitutional, and (9) that Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. [4] In addition to those claims discussed in this opinion, Davis also argued to the postconviction court the following: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the jury would be able to follow the law; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the proper information to the mental health examiner and for failing to ensure that Davis received a proper evaluation under Ake v. Oklaho

2008Davis also argued (8) that imposing the death sentence based on a seven-to-five recommendation was unconstitutional, and (9) that Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. [4] In addition to those claims discussed in this opinion, Davis also argued to the postconviction court the following: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the jury would be able to follow the law; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the proper information to the mental health examiner and for failing to ensure that Davis received a proper evaluation under Ake v. Oklaho

2013Vic-torino, 23 So.3d at 94-95 .

2008See, e.g., Hildwin v. State, 951 So.2d 784 , 785 n. 1 (Fla. 2006) (noting that the nonstatutory mitigation found by the trial court included a history of drug abuse and organic brain damage); Crook v. State, 813 So.2d 68 (Fla.2002) (reversing the trial court's rejection of defendant's brain damage as a mitigating circumstance and noting that this damage was exacerbated by his use of alcohol and drugs at the time of the murder); DeAngelo v. State, 616 So.2d 440, 443 (Fla.1993) (describing defendant's *517 brain damage and resulting personality and mood disorders as mitigating factors).

2007Willacy I, 640 So.2d at 1081 n. 2. [4] The five aggravating factors were: (1) the murder was committed in the course of a felony; (2) the murder was committed to avoid lawful arrest; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP). [5] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were that Willacy (1)-(3) exhibited kindness, compassion, and concern for others; (4) enjoyed the love and affection of his family; (5)-(6) enjoyed the respect and admiration

2007White was sentenced to thirty years and that Tennessee plea was used at White's Florida resentencing to establish the prior violent felony aggravator. [5] On direct appeal of his resentencing, White argued that: (1) the trial court erred in not permitting the cross-examination of a key State witness concerning the underlying facts of the witness's subsequent murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws; (3) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating factor that the murder was committed while

2007White was sentenced to thirty years and that Tennessee plea was used at White's Florida resentencing to establish the prior violent felony aggravator. [5] On direct appeal of his resentencing, White argued that: (1) the trial court erred in not permitting the cross-examination of a key State witness concerning the underlying facts of the witness's subsequent murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws; (3) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating factor that the murder was committed while

2005NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were that the crime (1) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (accorded great weight), and (2) was committed while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and sexual battery (accorded moderate weight). [2] The statutory mitigating factor was that the defendant had no significant prior criminal history, to which the court accorded medium weight. [3] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were all accorded minimum weight and were that the defendant (1) is religious, (2) has a good jail record, (3) has family and friends who care

2005NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were that the crime (1) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (accorded great weight), and (2) was committed while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and sexual battery (accorded moderate weight). [2] The statutory mitigating factor was that the defendant had no significant prior criminal history, to which the court accorded medium weight. [3] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were all accorded minimum weight and were that the defendant (1) is religious, (2) has a good jail record, (3) has family and friends who care

2005NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were that the crime (1) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (accorded great weight), and (2) was committed while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and sexual battery (accorded moderate weight). [2] The statutory mitigating factor was that the defendant had no significant prior criminal history, to which the court accorded medium weight. [3] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were all accorded minimum weight and were that the defendant (1) is religious, (2) has a good jail record, (3) has family and friends who care

2005NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were that the crime (1) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (accorded great weight), and (2) was committed while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and sexual battery (accorded moderate weight). [2] The statutory mitigating factor was that the defendant had no significant prior criminal history, to which the court accorded medium weight. [3] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were all accorded minimum weight and were that the defendant (1) is religious, (2) has a good jail record, (3) has family and friends who care

2005NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were that the crime (1) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (accorded great weight), and (2) was committed while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and sexual battery (accorded moderate weight). [2] The statutory mitigating factor was that the defendant had no significant prior criminal history, to which the court accorded medium weight. [3] The nonstatutory mitigating factors were all accorded minimum weight and were that the defendant (1) is religious, (2) has a good jail record, (3) has family and friends who care

2005Elledge IV, 706 So.2d at 1342 n. 3. [6] These claims included: (1) the lack of funding to investigate postconviction claims violated Elledge's constitutional rights and the dictates of Spalding v. Dugger, 526 So.2d 71 (Fla.1988); (2) the State's withholding of public records denied Elledge his due process and equal protection rights; (3) Elledge was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and during sentencing in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (4) Florida law violates the constitution by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prov

2005Elledge IV, 706 So.2d at 1342 n. 2. [5] The nonstatutory mitigating factors found were: (1) the defendant had a difficult and abusive childhood; (2) the defendant demonstrated some cooperation by confessing after he was caught; and (3) the defendant was a friend and provider of support while incarcerated.

2005Elledge IV, 706 So.2d at 1342 n. 3. [6] These claims included: (1) the lack of funding to investigate postconviction claims violated Elledge's constitutional rights and the dictates of Spalding v. Dugger, 526 So.2d 71 (Fla.1988); (2) the State's withholding of public records denied Elledge his due process and equal protection rights; (3) Elledge was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and during sentencing in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (4) Florida law violates the constitution by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prov

2004NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were: (1) Windom had been previously convicted of another offense or felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person; and (2) the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). [2] The statutory mitigating factors were: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (very slight weight); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person (little weight).

2004NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were: (1) Windom had been previously convicted of another offense or felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person; and (2) the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). [2] The statutory mitigating factors were: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (very slight weight); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person (little weight).

2004He also claimed the following errors: (9) denial of the right to adversarial testing regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator, (10) denial of the right to testify in the penalty phase, (11) unconstitutionality of the death sentence because jury instructions did not define aggravators with the requisite specificity, and (12) denial of the right to adversarial testing during the penalty phase. [3] See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that when a defendant sentenced to death files a postconviction motion, the judge must hold a hearing to determine whether any of the claims req

2004He also claimed the following errors: (9) denial of the right to adversarial testing regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator, (10) denial of the right to testify in the penalty phase, (11) unconstitutionality of the death sentence because jury instructions did not define aggravators with the requisite specificity, and (12) denial of the right to adversarial testing during the penalty phase. [3] See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that when a defendant sentenced to death files a postconviction motion, the judge must hold a hearing to determine whether any of the claims req

2004He also claimed the following errors: (9) denial of the right to adversarial testing regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator, (10) denial of the right to testify in the penalty phase, (11) unconstitutionality of the death sentence because jury instructions did not define aggravators with the requisite specificity, and (12) denial of the right to adversarial testing during the penalty phase. [3] See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that when a defendant sentenced to death files a postconviction motion, the judge must hold a hearing to determine whether any of the claims req

2004NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were: (1) Windom had been previously convicted of another offense or felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person; and (2) the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). [2] The statutory mitigating factors were: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (very slight weight); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person (little weight).

2004NOTES [1] The aggravating factors were: (1) Windom had been previously convicted of another offense or felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person; and (2) the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). [2] The statutory mitigating factors were: (1) Windom had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Windom was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (very slight weight); and (3) Windom acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person (little weight).