quasi-judicial hearing in Florida

2020In addition, in determining whether an act is quasi-judicial or not, Florida courts have “examine[d] the underlying statute to determine if it [has] any requirement of a quasi-judicial hearing . . . .” Volusia Cty. v. City of Daytona Beach, 420 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (citing to Bay National Bank and Trust 10 Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)).

1982Another case in which the court examined the underlying statute to determine if it held any requirement of a quasi-judicial hearing was Bay National Bank and Trust Company v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), wherein it was held: If quasi-executive or quasi-legislative acts are performed in violation of the mandatory requirements of law, or are infected by fraudulent, capricious, or arbitrary action of the agency, they are subject to assault by appropriate proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.

1991See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 , 95 S.Ct. 729 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Hadley v. Department of Admin., 411 So.2d 184 (Fla.1982).

1991See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 , 95 S.Ct. 729 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Hadley v. Department of Admin., 411 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1982).

2022In opposing the quasi-judicial hearing, the city relied on Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997), which held that “all comprehensive plan amendments are legislative decisions subject to the fairly debatable standard of review.” Id. at 1295 .

2022In opposing the quasi-judicial hearing, the city relied on Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997), which held that “all comprehensive plan amendments are legislative decisions subject to the fairly debatable standard of review.” Id. at 1295 .

2022Dist., 217 7 So. 3d 1100 , 1102–03 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

2017Houston, 102 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (petition for mandamus by employee). 8 bringing an independent action in Circuit Court to challenge the propriety of the [discipline]. … [O]nce the employee submits himself to the administrative review procedures provided by the Ordinance, the employee has been afforded a quasi-judicial hearing and is not entitled to a de novo hearing in Circuit Court on the claim.

2010Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Hirt v. Polk County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 578 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co., 410 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

2010Partnership, 619 So.2d 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)).

2008Id. at 946 .

2003The District did not cite any authority directly on point for the proposition that a public employee cannot maintain an independent cause of action concerning his termination. [1] Our research has revealed case law holding that if a public employee has availed himself of available administrative procedures and been afforded a quasi-judicial hearing, then he may not file an independent action collaterally attacking the employer's decision, see Bass v. Metro Dade County Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 798 So.2d 835 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); the remedy in that instance would be to seek review of the employer'

1993Fla., 1973); Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, supra; and City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1971). 4 See, e.g., AGO 74-84 (individual member of the Board of Dentistry who conducts a quasi-judicial hearing or investigatory proceeding on behalf of the board subject to the Sunshine Law); AGO 74-294 (Sunshine Law applicable to single member of board to whom authority has been delegated to act on behalf of board in such matters as the lease of land); AGO 84-54 (delegation of city commission's authority to single commissioner to meet with private nonprofit organi

1993Fla., 1973); Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, supra; and City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1971). 4 See, e.g., AGO 74-84 (individual member of the Board of Dentistry who conducts a quasi-judicial hearing or investigatory proceeding on behalf of the board subject to the Sunshine Law); AGO 74-294 (Sunshine Law applicable to single member of board to whom authority has been delegated to act on behalf of board in such matters as the lease of land); AGO 84-54 (delegation of city commission's authority to single commissioner to meet with private nonprofit organi

1993Fla., 1973); Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, supra; and City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1971). 4 See, e.g., AGO 74-84 (individual member of the Board of Dentistry who conducts a quasi-judicial hearing or investigatory proceeding on behalf of the board subject to the Sunshine Law); AGO 74-294 (Sunshine Law applicable to single member of board to whom authority has been delegated to act on behalf of board in such matters as the lease of land); AGO 84-54 (delegation of city commission's authority to single commissioner to meet with private nonprofit organi

1993Fla., 1973) (public agencies may not avoid their responsibilities or conduct the public's business in secret by use of an alter ego); Wood v. Marston, 442 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1983) (committee responsible for screening applications and making nonbinding recommendations subject to Sunshine Law).

1990The court explained that the officer, “having voluntarily submitted himself to and fully utilized the administrative review procedures provided by the Miami Springs Code of Ordinances and having been accorded a quasi-judicial hearing before the civil service board on his claim of wrongful demotion, is not entitled to a de novo hearing in the circuit court on this claim, but instead, must institute appropriate proceedings in the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, to review the City’s adverse determination.” Accord Metropolitan Dade County v Rudoff, 544 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 198

1990The court explained that the officer, “having voluntarily submitted himself to and fully utilized the administrative review procedures provided by the Miami Springs Code of Ordinances and having been accorded a quasi-judicial hearing before the civil service board on his claim of wrongful demotion, is not entitled to a de novo hearing in the circuit court on this claim, but instead, must institute appropriate proceedings in the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, to review the City’s adverse determination.” Accord Metropolitan Dade County v Rudoff, 544 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 198

1990It follows that each such step constitutes an "official act," an indispensable requisite to "formal action," within the meaning of the act. 2 See, e.g., AGO 74-84 (an individual member of the Board of Dentistry or a member and the board's executive director who conduct a quasi-judicial hearing or an investigatory proceeding on behalf of the entire board are required to hold it in the sunshine); AGO 74-294 (a single member of a board or commission who has been delegated the authority to act on behalf of the board or commission in matters such as the lease of land is subject to the Sunshine Law

1990Fla., 1982). 4 Id. at 547-548 .

1983See School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1978); Carol City Utilities, Inc. v. Dade County, 143 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA), prohibition denied, 149 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1962), cert. discharged, 152 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1963); Frix v. Beck, 104 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).

1983See School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1978); Carol City Utilities, Inc. v. Dade County, 143 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA), prohibition denied, 149 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1962), cert. discharged, 152 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1963); Frix v. Beck, 104 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).

1983See School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1978); Carol City Utilities, Inc. v. Dade County, 143 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA), prohibition denied, 149 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1962), cert. discharged, 152 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1963); Frix v. Beck, 104 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).