quasi-judicial immunity in Michigan

2022“Michigan courts have previously recognized the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity in various circumstances.” Diehl, 242 Mich App at 127 . [Q]uasi-judicial immunity as developed by the common law has at least two somewhat distinct branches: one branch focuses on the nature of the job-related duties, roles, or functions of the person claiming immunity, and one branch focuses on the fact that the person claiming immunity made statements or submissions in an underlying judicial proceeding. [Denhof v Challa, 311 Mich App 499, 511 ; 876 NW2d 266 (2015).] Under this second branch, “witnesses who te

2015In Diehl, 242 Mich App at 135 , this Court addressed the very issue posed to us in this case, ruling as follows: [W]e hold that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity extends to court- appointed psychologists ordered to conduct evaluations and make recommendations to the trial court in custody disputes.

2022“Michigan courts have previously recognized the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity in various circumstances.” Diehl, 242 Mich App at 127 . [Q]uasi-judicial immunity as developed by the common law has at least two somewhat distinct branches: one branch focuses on the nature of the job-related duties, roles, or functions of the person claiming immunity, and one branch focuses on the fact that the person claiming immunity made statements or submissions in an underlying judicial proceeding. [Denhof v Challa, 311 Mich App 499, 511 ; 876 NW2d 266 (2015).] Under this second branch, “witnesses who te

2022“Michigan courts have previously recognized the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity in various circumstances.” Diehl, 242 Mich App at 127 . [Q]uasi-judicial immunity as developed by the common law has at least two somewhat distinct branches: one branch focuses on the nature of the job-related duties, roles, or functions of the person claiming immunity, and one branch focuses on the fact that the person claiming immunity made statements or submissions in an underlying judicial proceeding. [Denhof v Challa, 311 Mich App 499, 511 ; 876 NW2d 266 (2015).] Under this second branch, “witnesses who te

2017In addition to the reasons posited for extending absolute immunity to judicial officers, quasi-judicial immunity is supported by: -4- (1) the need to save judicial time in defending suits; (2) the need for finality in the resolution of disputes; (3) to prevent deterring competent persons from taking office; (4) to prevent the threat of lawsuit from discouraging independent action; and (5) the existence of adequate procedural safeguards such as change of venue and appellate review. [Diehl, 242 Mich App at 131-132 , quoting Duff v Lewis, 114 Nev 564, 569; 958 P2d 82 (1998) (quotation marks and a

2000Id. at 570-571 , 958 P.2d 82 .

2017In this vein, this Court has noted: The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity as developed by the common law has at least two somewhat distinct branches: one branch focuses on the nature of the job- related duties, roles, or functions of the person claiming immunity, and one branch focuses on the fact that the person claiming immunity made statements or submissions in an underlying judicial proceeding. [Denhof, 311 Mich App at 510 .] In relation to the first branch, a quasi-judicial body subject to quasi-judicial immunity is defined as a board or commission with statutorily conferred power “to a

2017In this vein, this Court has noted: The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity as developed by the common law has at least two somewhat distinct branches: one branch focuses on the nature of the job- related duties, roles, or functions of the person claiming immunity, and one branch focuses on the fact that the person claiming immunity made statements or submissions in an underlying judicial proceeding. [Denhof, 311 Mich App at 510 .] In relation to the first branch, a quasi-judicial body subject to quasi-judicial immunity is defined as a board or commission with statutorily conferred power “to a

2000Because summary disposition can be affirmed on the basis of the quasi- judicial immunity principles described there, I also conclude that it is unnecessary for us to consider the application of the governmental immunity act (part m A of the majority’s opinion) or the propriety or applicability of Bullock v Huster, 209 Mich App 551, 555 ; 532 NW2d 202 (1995), vacated and remanded 451 Mich 884 (1996), (On Remand), 218 Mich App 400 ; 554 NW2d 47 (1996), and further conclude we need not “hold that private psychologists performing court-ordered custody evaluations are excluded from the scope of gov

2000Because summary disposition can be affirmed on the basis of the quasi- judicial immunity principles described there, I also conclude that it is unnecessary for us to consider the application of the governmental immunity act (part m A of the majority’s opinion) or the propriety or applicability of Bullock v Huster, 209 Mich App 551, 555 ; 532 NW2d 202 (1995), vacated and remanded 451 Mich 884 (1996), (On Remand), 218 Mich App 400 ; 554 NW2d 47 (1996), and further conclude we need not “hold that private psychologists performing court-ordered custody evaluations are excluded from the scope of gov

2000“Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children.” [Id. at 97-98, quoting brief of Children’s Aid Society.] See, e.g., Stone v Glass, 2000 WL 126917 (Ky App, 2000) (court-appointed clinical social worker performing a custodial evaluation was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Foster v Washoe Co, 114 Nev 936, 937-938; 964 P2d 788 (1998) (the respondents were properly shielded from liability by the

2000“Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children.” [Id. at 97-98, quoting brief of Children’s Aid Society.] See, e.g., Stone v Glass, 2000 WL 126917 (Ky App, 2000) (court-appointed clinical social worker performing a custodial evaluation was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Foster v Washoe Co, 114 Nev 936, 937-938; 964 P2d 788 (1998) (the respondents were properly shielded from liability by the

2000NOTES [1] In Maiden, supra at 133 , 597 N.W.2d 817 , our Supreme Court stated that "witnesses who testify during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy quasi-judicial immunity" as do "those serving in a quasi-judicial adjudicative capacity" and "`those persons other than judges without whom the judicial process could not function.'" (Citation omitted.) Further, in Martin v. Children's Aid Society, 215 Mich.App. 88 , 544 N.W.2d 651 (1996), this Court granted absolute judicial immunity to the Children's Aid Society, a private organization under contract with the Department of Social Services t

2000NOTES [1] In Maiden, supra at 133 , 597 N.W.2d 817 , our Supreme Court stated that "witnesses who testify during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy quasi-judicial immunity" as do "those serving in a quasi-judicial adjudicative capacity" and "`those persons other than judges without whom the judicial process could not function.'" (Citation omitted.) Further, in Martin v. Children's Aid Society, 215 Mich.App. 88 , 544 N.W.2d 651 (1996), this Court granted absolute judicial immunity to the Children's Aid Society, a private organization under contract with the Department of Social Services t

2000“Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children.” [Id. at 97-98, quoting brief of Children’s Aid Society.] See, e.g., Stone v Glass, 2000 WL 126917 (Ky App, 2000) (court-appointed clinical social worker performing a custodial evaluation was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Foster v Washoe Co, 114 Nev 936, 937-938; 964 P2d 788 (1998) (the respondents were properly shielded from liability by the

2000Because summary disposition can be affirmed on the basis of the quasi- judicial immunity principles described there, I also conclude that it is unnecessary for us to consider the application of the governmental immunity act (part m A of the majority’s opinion) or the propriety or applicability of Bullock v Huster, 209 Mich App 551, 555 ; 532 NW2d 202 (1995), vacated and remanded 451 Mich 884 (1996), (On Remand), 218 Mich App 400 ; 554 NW2d 47 (1996), and further conclude we need not “hold that private psychologists performing court-ordered custody evaluations are excluded from the scope of gov

2000Because summary disposition can be affirmed on the basis of the quasi- judicial immunity principles described there, I also conclude that it is unnecessary for us to consider the application of the governmental immunity act (part m A of the majority’s opinion) or the propriety or applicability of Bullock v Huster, 209 Mich App 551, 555 ; 532 NW2d 202 (1995), vacated and remanded 451 Mich 884 (1996), (On Remand), 218 Mich App 400 ; 554 NW2d 47 (1996), and further conclude we need not “hold that private psychologists performing court-ordered custody evaluations are excluded from the scope of gov

2000“Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children.” [Id. at 97-98, quoting brief of Children’s Aid Society.] See, e.g., Stone v Glass, 2000 WL 126917 (Ky App, 2000) (court-appointed clinical social worker performing a custodial evaluation was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Foster v Washoe Co, 114 Nev 936, 937-938; 964 P2d 788 (1998) (the respondents were properly shielded from liability by the

2000“Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children.” [Id. at 97-98, quoting brief of Children’s Aid Society.] See, e.g., Stone v Glass, 2000 WL 126917 (Ky App, 2000) (court-appointed clinical social worker performing a custodial evaluation was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Foster v Washoe Co, 114 Nev 936, 937-938; 964 P2d 788 (1998) (the respondents were properly shielded from liability by the

2000“Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children.” [Id. at 97-98, quoting brief of Children’s Aid Society.] See, e.g., Stone v Glass, 2000 WL 126917 (Ky App, 2000) (court-appointed clinical social worker performing a custodial evaluation was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Foster v Washoe Co, 114 Nev 936, 937-938; 964 P2d 788 (1998) (the respondents were properly shielded from liability by the