11 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Praggastis v. Clackamas Countygreen2 sentences2022A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity “Judicial immunity has long been a part of the immu- nities afforded public officials.” Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419, 426 , 752 P2d 302 (1988); see also id. (not- ing judicial immunity is mentioned in the Book of Assizes, 27 Edw. 2022A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity “Judicial immunity has long been a part of the immu- nities afforded public officials.” Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419, 426 , 752 P2d 302 (1988); see also id. (not- ing judicial immunity is mentioned in the Book of Assizes, 27 Edw. | 1 | 3 |
West v. City of Astoriagreen2 sentences1978In Tierney v. Duris, Pay Less Properties, 21 Or App 613, 629 , 536 P2d 435 (1975), we stated: "In any event, we hold there is no violation of Fasano when, as in this case: (1) the 'ex parte contracts’■ [sic] were not with the proponents of change or their agents, but, rather, with relatively disinterested persons; (2) the contacts only amounted to an investigation of the merits or demerits of a proposed change; and, most importantly, (3) the occurrence and nature of the contacts were made a matter of record during a quasi-judicial hearing so that parties to the hearing then had an opportunity 1978In Tierney v. Duris, Pay Less Properties, 21 Or App 613, 629 , 536 P2d 435 (1975), we stated: "In any event, we hold there is no violation of Fasano when, as in this case: (1) the 'ex parte contracts’■ [sic] were not with the proponents of change or their agents, but, rather, with relatively disinterested persons; (2) the contacts only amounted to an investigation of the merits or demerits of a proposed change; and, most importantly, (3) the occurrence and nature of the contacts were made a matter of record during a quasi-judicial hearing so that parties to the hearing then had an opportunity | 1 | 3 |
Beason v. Harcleroadgreen2 sentences2022See Praggastis, 305 Or at 427 (“Judicial immunity is granted or withheld on the basis of the nature of the function being performed * * *.”); see also Beason v. Harcleroad, 105 Or App 376, 383 , 805 P2d 700 (1991) (stat- ing that in the context of 42 USC section 1983 claims, in determining whether absolute immunity applies, “a court must examine the function served by the conduct that gives rise to a claim for relief and determine whether it is investi- gative, administrative or quasi-judicial, i.e., integral to the judicial process”). 2022See Praggastis, 305 Or at 427 (“Judicial immunity is granted or withheld on the basis of the nature of the function being performed * * *.”); see also Beason v. Harcleroad, 105 Or App 376, 383 , 805 P2d 700 (1991) (stat- ing that in the context of 42 USC section 1983 claims, in determining whether absolute immunity applies, “a court must examine the function served by the conduct that gives rise to a claim for relief and determine whether it is investi- gative, administrative or quasi-judicial, i.e., integral to the judicial process”). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswegogreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., State ex rel Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswego, 319 Or 537 , 878 P2d 403 (1994); Flowers v. Klamath County, 98 Or App 384 , 780 P2d 227 , rev den 308 Or 592 (1989). 5 Contrary to Houston’s thesis, the statutory provisions establishing quasi-judicial procedures in connection with applications for permits and the other applications that he describes are not a statutory conferral of authority on cities or counties but a state legislative mandate with which they are required to comply. 1999See, e.g., State ex rel Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswego, 319 Or 537 , 878 P2d 403 (1994); Flowers v. Klamath County, 98 Or App 384 , 780 P2d 227 , rev den 308 Or 592 (1989). 5 Contrary to Houston’s thesis, the statutory provisions establishing quasi-judicial procedures in connection with applications for permits and the other applications that he describes are not a statutory conferral of authority on cities or counties but a state legislative mandate with which they are required to comply. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fay v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences2015In support of that argument, defendant cites several cases in which officers were held to be immune from civil suit while carrying out court orders: Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419 , 752 P2d 302 (1988); and Higgins v. Redding, 34 Or App 1029 , 580 P2d 580 (1978). 2015In support of that argument, defendant cites several cases in which officers were held to be immune from civil suit while carrying out court orders: Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419 , 752 P2d 302 (1988); and Higgins v. Redding, 34 Or App 1029 , 580 P2d 580 (1978). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Higgins v. Redding
green
2 sentences2015In support of that argument, defendant cites several cases in which officers were held to be immune from civil suit while carrying out court orders: Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419 , 752 P2d 302 (1988); and Higgins v. Redding, 34 Or App 1029 , 580 P2d 580 (1978). 2015In support of that argument, defendant cites several cases in which officers were held to be immune from civil suit while carrying out court orders: Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419 , 752 P2d 302 (1988); and Higgins v. Redding, 34 Or App 1029 , 580 P2d 580 (1978). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Buckley v. Valeo
green
2 sentences2004An interesting and novel question is posed as to whether, given the constitutionally mandated procedural protections that attach in this setting, an investigation into official misconduct under circumstances such as these can be said to “initiate” any quasi-judicial hearing that follows a discharge, since the right to such a hearing — and the employer’s obligation to conduct it — arises because of the investigation and its outcome. 6 More specifically, the record establishes that Brown’s duties included interviewing probationers when they were first sentenced to bench probation or community se 2004An interesting and novel question is posed as to whether, given the constitutionally mandated procedural protections that attach in this setting, an investigation into official misconduct under circumstances such as these can be said to “initiate” any quasi-judicial hearing that follows a discharge, since the right to such a hearing — and the employer’s obligation to conduct it — arises because of the investigation and its outcome. 6 More specifically, the record establishes that Brown’s duties included interviewing probationers when they were first sentenced to bench probation or community se | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Flowers v. Klamath County
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., State ex rel Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswego, 319 Or 537 , 878 P2d 403 (1994); Flowers v. Klamath County, 98 Or App 384 , 780 P2d 227 , rev den 308 Or 592 (1989). 5 Contrary to Houston’s thesis, the statutory provisions establishing quasi-judicial procedures in connection with applications for permits and the other applications that he describes are not a statutory conferral of authority on cities or counties but a state legislative mandate with which they are required to comply. 1999See, e.g., State ex rel Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswego, 319 Or 537 , 878 P2d 403 (1994); Flowers v. Klamath County, 98 Or App 384 , 780 P2d 227 , rev den 308 Or 592 (1989). 5 Contrary to Houston’s thesis, the statutory provisions establishing quasi-judicial procedures in connection with applications for permits and the other applications that he describes are not a statutory conferral of authority on cities or counties but a state legislative mandate with which they are required to comply. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bienz v. City of Dayton
green
1 sentence1979Bienz, 29 Or App at 766-67 , holds that approval of a subdivision is quasi-judicial in nature. 2 The only question is whether the planning commission, as the agency authorized by ordinance to *678 approve the subdivision proposal, must hold the quasi-judicial hearing or whether the Fasano requirements are satisfied by the availability of a de novo evidentiary hearing on appeal to the city council, as occurred in this case. 3 We hold that the latter procedure is sufficient. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Tierney v. Duris
green
2 sentences1978In Tierney v. Duris, Pay Less Properties, 21 Or App 613, 629 , 536 P2d 435 (1975), we stated: "In any event, we hold there is no violation of Fasano when, as in this case: (1) the 'ex parte contracts’■ [sic] were not with the proponents of change or their agents, but, rather, with relatively disinterested persons; (2) the contacts only amounted to an investigation of the merits or demerits of a proposed change; and, most importantly, (3) the occurrence and nature of the contacts were made a matter of record during a quasi-judicial hearing so that parties to the hearing then had an opportunity 1978In Tierney v. Duris, Pay Less Properties, 21 Or App 613, 629 , 536 P2d 435 (1975), we stated: "In any event, we hold there is no violation of Fasano when, as in this case: (1) the 'ex parte contracts’■ [sic] were not with the proponents of change or their agents, but, rather, with relatively disinterested persons; (2) the contacts only amounted to an investigation of the merits or demerits of a proposed change; and, most importantly, (3) the occurrence and nature of the contacts were made a matter of record during a quasi-judicial hearing so that parties to the hearing then had an opportunity | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Petersen v. MAYOR ETC. CITY OF KLAMATH FALLS
green
2 sentences1978The Supreme Court expressed a similar view of Fasano in Petersen v. Klamath Falls, 279 Or 249 , 257 n 8, 566 P2d 1193 (1977), when, in discussing the propriety of ex parte contacts in city annexation proceedings, it stated: "* * * [A]n absolute prohibition on ex parte contacts would actually have a greater tendency to inhibit rather than promote the reliability of the local decision-making process * * *191 Courts in other jurisdictions which have also considered the propriety of ex parte contacts in a zoning context have also reached similar conclusions. 1978The Supreme Court expressed a similar view of Fasano in Petersen v. Klamath Falls, 279 Or 249 , 257 n 8, 566 P2d 1193 (1977), when, in discussing the propriety of ex parte contacts in city annexation proceedings, it stated: "* * * [A]n absolute prohibition on ex parte contacts would actually have a greater tendency to inhibit rather than promote the reliability of the local decision-making process * * *191 Courts in other jurisdictions which have also considered the propriety of ex parte contacts in a zoning context have also reached similar conclusions. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Eagle Creek Rock Products, Inc. v. Clackamas County
green
2 sentences1977Judgment vacated; appeal dismissed. 1 "The lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment of any zoning regulation or amendment thereto, may be continued as such although not in conformity with the zoning regulation * * ORS 215.130(4). 2 Appellants seem to argue that Eagle Creek Rock Prod. v. Clackamas Co., 27 Or App 371 , 556 P2d 150 (1976), Sup Ct review denied (1911), holds that a local government cannot initially determine its position as to the existence of a nonconforming use by conducting a quasi-judicial hearing. 1977Judgment vacated; appeal dismissed. 1 "The lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment of any zoning regulation or amendment thereto, may be continued as such although not in conformity with the zoning regulation * * ORS 215.130(4). 2 Appellants seem to argue that Eagle Creek Rock Prod. v. Clackamas Co., 27 Or App 371 , 556 P2d 150 (1976), Sup Ct review denied (1911), holds that a local government cannot initially determine its position as to the existence of a nonconforming use by conducting a quasi-judicial hearing. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Fasano v. Board of County Com'rs of Washington Cty.
green
2 sentences1975The sole issue raised on this appeal is: Must a county grant each individual landowner a quasi-judicial hearing in the form outlined by Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574 , 507 P2d 23 (1973), when the county, having previously enacted a new comprehensive land use plan, implements that plan by adopting a zoning ordinance applicable to a substantial portion of the land in the county. 1975The sole issue raised on this appeal is: Must a county grant each individual landowner a quasi-judicial hearing in the form outlined by Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574 , 507 P2d 23 (1973), when the county, having previously enacted a new comprehensive land use plan, implements that plan by adopting a zoning ordinance applicable to a substantial portion of the land in the county. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.
green
2 sentences1952Co., 294 US 499 , 55 S Ct 462 , 79 L Ed 1023 , the court uttered a complaint which is echoed in all judicial chambers whenever the findings fall short of the issues: “In the end we are left to spell out, to argue, to choose between conflicting inferences.” Benjamin, in his valuable volume, Administrative Adjudication, at page 251, says: “Intelligent judicial review of a quasi-judicial determination is possible only if the deciding officer has made findings of fact which show the actual grounds of decision,—findings sufficiently specific so that the reviewing court may judge, first, whether the 1952Co., 294 US 499 , 55 S Ct 462 , 79 L Ed 1023 , the court uttered a complaint which is echoed in all judicial chambers whenever the findings fall short of the issues: “In the end we are left to spell out, to argue, to choose between conflicting inferences.” Benjamin, in his valuable volume, Administrative Adjudication, at page 251, says: “Intelligent judicial review of a quasi-judicial determination is possible only if the deciding officer has made findings of fact which show the actual grounds of decision,—findings sufficiently specific so that the reviewing court may judge, first, whether the | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.