continuing-narrative exception in Illinois

2026“In contrast, other-crimes evidence may not be admitted under the continuing-narrative exception, even when the crimes occur in close proximity, if the crimes are distinct and ‘undertaken for different reasons at a different place at a separate time.’ ” People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (2010) (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 139-40 (1980)).

2022However, “evidence may not be admitted under the continuing- narrative exception, even when the crimes occur in close proximity, if the crimes are distinct and ‘undertaken for different reasons at a different place at a separate time.’ ” People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (2010) (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 140 (1980)). ¶ 65 The admissibility of other-crimes evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision on the matter will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.

2026“In contrast, other-crimes evidence may not be admitted under the continuing-narrative exception, even when the crimes occur in close proximity, if the crimes are distinct and ‘undertaken for different reasons at a different place at a separate time.’ ” People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (2010) (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 139-40 (1980)).

2024When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial court must weigh the evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial effect and “may exclude the evidence -5- No. 1-22-0040 if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.” People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 156 (2001). ¶ 20 Evidence of other crimes is also admissible under the “continuing narrative” exception, where it “is part of the continuing narrative of the event giving rise to the offense,” “is intertwined with the event charged,” or “explains an aspect of the crime charged that would otherwise be implausible.”

2026“When facts concerning uncharged criminal conduct are all part of a continuing narrative which concerns the circumstances attending the entire transaction, they do not concern separate, distinct, and unconnected crimes.” People v. Collette, 217 Ill.

2005See, for instance, Collette, 217 Ill.

2016This court also applied the continuing narrative exception in People v. Johnson, 368 Ill.

2016This court also applied the continuing narrative exception in People v. Johnson, 368 Ill.

2016App. 3d 977, 992-93 , 924 N.E.2d 1039, 1052 (2009), where we concluded that without the evidence admissible under that exception, the behavior of the defendants in these cases would have been inexplicable. ¶ 82 Although Patterson, Carter, Johnson, and Slater were all cases dealing with other-crimes evidence because the defendants in those cases were each alleged to have engaged in other criminal conduct, the reasoning underlying the continuing narrative exception to the prohibition against other-crimes evidence is fully applicable in a case like this, as in Pikes, where the issue before the co

2016App. 3d 977, 992-93 , 924 N.E.2d 1039, 1052 (2009), where we concluded that without the evidence admissible under that exception, the behavior of the defendants in these cases would have been inexplicable. ¶ 82 Although Patterson, Carter, Johnson, and Slater were all cases dealing with other-crimes evidence because the defendants in those cases were each alleged to have engaged in other criminal conduct, the reasoning underlying the continuing narrative exception to the prohibition against other-crimes evidence is fully applicable in a case like this, as in Pikes, where the issue before the co

2025App. 3d at 1190 . ¶ 33 In Carter, this court examined caselaw surrounding the continuing narrative exception and noted that: -9- “[E]vidence of another crime is admissible if it is part of a continuing narrative of the event giving rise to the offense or, in other words, intertwined with the offense charged. [Citations.] As this court has explained, [w]hen facts concerning uncharged criminal conduct are all part of a continuing narrative which concerns the circumstances attending the entire transaction, they do not concern separate, distinct, and unconnected crimes.” (Internal quotation marks

2009Specifically, the evidence pertaining to the domestic-violence charge would have been admissible as “other-crimes” evidence relating to the first degree murder charge under the continuing-narrative exception to the proscription against the admission of other-crimes evidence. “[Ejvidence of another crime is admissible if it is part of a continuing narrative of the event giving rise to the offense or, in other words, intertwined with the offense charged.” People v. Thompson, 359 Ill.

2016The State contends that this evidence explained why Jason was visiting a pawn shop in the first place and provided background for Jason’s identification of defendant while he was driving his parents’ stolen car, the day before defendant was stopped in Chicago. ¶ 68 Under the continuing-narrative exception, evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts is admissible where the “ ‘other *** acts are all a part of the continuing narrative which concern the circumstances attending the entire transaction and they do not concern separate, distinct and disconnected crimes.’ ” People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d

2016The State contends that this evidence explained why Jason was visiting a pawn shop in the first place and provided background for Jason’s identification of defendant while he was driving his parents’ stolen car, the day before defendant was stopped in Chicago. ¶ 68 Under the continuing-narrative exception, evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts is admissible where the “ ‘other *** acts are all a part of the continuing narrative which concern - 16 - No. 1-13-3881 the circumstances attending the entire transaction and they do not concern separate, distinct and disconnected crimes.’ ” People v.

2016The exception will not apply, “even when the crimes occur in close proximity, if the crimes are distinct and ‘undertaken for different reasons at a different place at a separate time.’ ” Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d at 33 (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 139-40 (1980)); see also People v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 2d 202, 206 (1966) (in trial of defendant charged with stealing from sleeping train passenger, testimony that he stole from another sleeping passenger on same train was part of continuing narrative). ¶ 69 But even if we accepted the State’s invocation of the continuing-narrative exception,

2016The exception will not apply, “even when the crimes occur in close proximity, if the crimes are distinct and ‘undertaken for different reasons at a different place at a separate time.’ ” Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d at 33 (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 139-40 (1980)); see also People v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 2d 202, 206 (1966) (in trial of defendant charged with stealing from sleeping train passenger, testimony that he stole from another sleeping passenger on same train was part of continuing narrative). ¶ 69 But even if we accepted the State’s invocation of the continuing-narrative exception,

2025Suppressing the evidence would have left the jury with an incomplete story of the events of the evening. ¶ 66 Defendant also relies in part on People v. Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 133881 , to argue the continuing-narrative rule does not apply.

2023Accordingly, the admission of the evidence was not error. ¶ 26 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s contention that the admitted postarrest evidence occurred over the course of several hours and did not constitute a continuing narrative as the continuing narrative exception does not apply to crimes or bad acts that are “distinct and ‘undertaken for different reasons at a different place at a separate time.’ ” People v. Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 133881, ¶ 68 (quoting People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (2010)).

2025See Spyres, 359 Ill.

2024When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial court must weigh the evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial effect and “may exclude the evidence -5- No. 1-22-0040 if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.” People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 156 (2001). ¶ 20 Evidence of other crimes is also admissible under the “continuing narrative” exception, where it “is part of the continuing narrative of the event giving rise to the offense,” “is intertwined with the event charged,” or “explains an aspect of the crime charged that would otherwise be implausible.”

2024“Where such evidence is part of the course of conduct or a continuing narrative of the charged offense, ordinary principles of relevancy apply and the rules applicable to other-crimes evidence are not implicated.” People v. Saulsberry, 2021 IL App (2d) 181027, ¶ 50 ; see also People v. Morales, 2012 IL App (1st) 101911, ¶ 24 . ¶ 22 We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.

2024See People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 20 (recognizing that uncharged crimes admitted as part of the “continuing narrative” of the charged crime “do not constitute separate, distinct, and disconnected crimes”). ¶ 27 We, therefore, conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting R.G.’s testimony regarding the uncharged other crime as part of a continuing narrative of Mr. Perez’s course of conduct relating to the charged offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.

2022People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 58 (1999).

2012The holdings in Donegan, Adkins, Johnson, Lewis, Slater, and Hale all support admitting the shooting of Erzka into evidence as part of the continuing narrative of defendant’s shooting of Shantiel, and the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the two shootings were separate and distinct. ¶ 24 Next, the State argues that evidence of Erzka’s shooting should be admissible as other- crimes evidence even outside the continuing-narrative exception, specifically to prove motive, criminal intent, absence of mistake, identity, common design, scheme or plan, accountability, and modus oper

2012The State argues that evidence of Erzka’s shooting should be admissible as other-crimes evidence even outside the continuing-narrative exception. ¶ 47 “[E]vidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.” People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135 (2005).

2012Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is “part of a continuing narrative of the event giving rise to the offense [citation], is intertwined with the event charged [citation], or explains an aspect of the crime charged that would otherwise be implausible.” People v. Outlaw, 388 Ill.