Peppers doctrine (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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Peppers doctrine in Illinois

26 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2024 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppersgreen
ill · 1976 · cited in 22 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2005–2024
2 sentences

2023This limitation is commonly called the Peppers doctrine, stemming from our supreme court’s decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 197 (1976).

2023This limitation is commonly called the Peppers doctrine, stemming from our supreme court’s decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 197 (1976).

1122
Allstate Insurance v. Kovargreen
illappct · 2006 · cited in 10 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024In support, Progressive argues that the principle of law ignored by the trial court was the Peppers doctrine, which provides that “it is generally inappropriate for a court considering a declaratory judgment action to decide issues of ultimate 6 fact that could bind the parties to the underlying litigation.” Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kovar, 363 Ill.

2024In support, Progressive argues that the principle of law ignored by the trial court was the Peppers doctrine, which provides that “it is generally inappropriate for a court considering a declaratory judgment action to decide issues of ultimate 6 fact that could bind the parties to the underlying litigation.” Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kovar, 363 Ill.

1010
Landmark Insurance Company v. NIP Groupgreen
illappct · 2011 · cited in 6 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017App. 3d 366, 373 (2009). ¶ 43 “Under the Peppers doctrine, ‘it is generally inappropriate for a court considering a declaratory judgment action to decide issues of ultimate fact that could bind the parties to the underlying litigation.’ ” Landmark American Insurance Co. v. NIP Group, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 101155, ¶ 59 (quoting Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kovar, 363 Ill.

2017App. 3d 366, 373 (2009). ¶ 43 “Under the Peppers doctrine, ‘it is generally inappropriate for a court considering a declaratory judgment action to decide issues of ultimate fact that could bind the parties to the underlying litigation.’ ” Landmark American Insurance Co. v. NIP Group, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 101155, ¶ 59 (quoting Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kovar, 363 Ill.

66
Sentry Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co.green
illappct · 2017 · cited in 5 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2021
2 sentences

2021Sentry Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161785, ¶ 43 .

2021Sentry Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161785, ¶ 43 .

45
Bonnie Owen Realty, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurancegreen
illappct · 1996 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See, e.g., Bonnie Owen Realty, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 283 Ill.

2017See, e.g., Bonnie Owen Realty, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 283 Ill.

22
TIG Insurance v. Canelgreen
illappct · 2009 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017This ruling has come to be known as the “Peppers doctrine.” TIG Insurance Co. v. Canel, 389 Ill.

2017This ruling has come to be known as the “Peppers doctrine.” TIG Insurance Co. v. Canel, 389 Ill.

22
American States Insurance v. Kolomsgreen
ill · 1997 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017App. 3d at 367 ; see also Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 456 (“ ‘provisions that limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer’ ” (quoting Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 )). 34 No. 1-16-1785 ¶ 73 In the case at bar, as we have discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that there is no way to determine whether the Continental policy’s exclusions apply without determining ultimate facts in the underlying lawsuits, thereby running afoul of the Peppers doctrine.

2017App. 3d at 367 ; see also Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 456 (“ ‘provisions that limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer’ ” (quoting Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 )). 34 No. 1-16-1785 ¶ 73 In the case at bar, as we have discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that there is no way to determine whether the Continental policy’s exclusions apply without determining ultimate facts in the underlying lawsuits, thereby running afoul of the Peppers doctrine.

12
Pekin Insurance v. Wilsongreen
ill · 2010 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017App. 3d at 367 ; see also Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 456 (“ ‘provisions that limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer’ ” (quoting Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 )). 34 No. 1-16-1785 ¶ 73 In the case at bar, as we have discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that there is no way to determine whether the Continental policy’s exclusions apply without determining ultimate facts in the underlying lawsuits, thereby running afoul of the Peppers doctrine.

2017App. 3d at 367 ; see also Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 456 (“ ‘provisions that limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer’ ” (quoting Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 )). 34 No. 1-16-1785 ¶ 73 In the case at bar, as we have discussed above, the trial court properly concluded that there is no way to determine whether the Continental policy’s exclusions apply without determining ultimate facts in the underlying lawsuits, thereby running afoul of the Peppers doctrine.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Cullinan v. Fehrenbacher green
illappct · 2012
2 sentences

2020“An abuse of discretion occurs if the court ‘acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.’ ” Id. (quoting Cullinan v. Fehrenbacher, 2012 IL App (3d) 120005, ¶ 10 ). ¶ 28 Applicable to the analysis of determining whether the stay was appropriately entered is the Peppers doctrine.

2020“An abuse of discretion occurs if the court ‘acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.’ ” Id. (quoting Cullinan v. Fehrenbacher, 2012 IL App (3d) 120005, ¶ 10 ). ¶ 28 Applicable to the analysis of determining whether the stay was appropriately entered is the Peppers doctrine.

42017–2020
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. John green
illappct · 2017
2 sentences

2023The Second District offered a cogent explanation of the reason for the Peppers doctrine in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. John, 2017 IL App (2d) 170193 , ¶ 23: “The concern is that prematurely adjudicating such issues in the declaratory judgment action would result in collateral estoppel in the underlying litigation. [Citation.] The classic scenario is where an insured is sued and the allegations of the complaint potentially fall within the scope of the insurance policy, thus triggering the insurer’s duty to defend, but the insurer denies coverage based on an intentional-injury exclusion in

2018Courts have explained that, in such circumstances, the issue of the insured's intent should be litigated in the underlying tort action, not the declaratory judgment action. [Citations.]" Id. ¶ 20 We note that there is some irony to the Foundations' invocation of the Peppers doctrine, in that the Foundations wish for Gallagher to be treated as an insurer when it comes to issuing a stay under Peppers , but not when it comes to sharing information pursuant to the common-interest doctrine under Waste Management .

32018–2023
Skolnik v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co. green
illappct · 2015
2 sentences

2017Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, Continental is unable to “affirmatively demonstrat[e] the applicability of an exclusion” (Skolnik, 2015 IL App (1st) 142438, ¶ 26 ) and therefore cannot rely on the exclusions to establish that it has no duty to defend the Foundation because the applicability of the exclusions is not “clear and free from doubt” and we must resolve any doubts as to coverage in favor of the foundation.

2017Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, Continental is unable to “affirmatively demonstrat[e] the applicability of an exclusion” (Skolnik, 2015 IL App (1st) 142438, ¶ 26 ) and therefore cannot rely on the exclusions to establish that it has no duty to defend the Foundation because the applicability of the exclusions is not “clear and free from doubt” and we must resolve any doubts as to coverage in favor of the foundation.

22017–2017
Longo Realty v. Menard, Inc. green
illappct · 2016
2 sentences

2017The trial court in that case entered summary judgment on John Anonymous’ bailment count “on elements 1, 3 & 4.” The first element referred to by the trial court is “an express or implied agreement to establish a bailment.” Longo Realty v. Menard, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 151231 , ¶ 21.

2017The trial court in that case entered summary judgment on John Anonymous’ bailment count “on elements 1, 3 & 4.” The first element referred to by the trial court is “an express or implied agreement to establish a bailment.” Longo Realty v. Menard, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 151231 , ¶ 21.

22017–2017
American Family Mutual Insurance v. Savickas green
ill · 2000
2 sentences

2023In part, the Savickas court held that a criminal conviction “collaterally estops the retrial of issues in a later civil trial that were actually litigated in the criminal trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 384 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85(2) (1982) (stating that issues determined in a criminal conviction have preclusive effect if the requirements for collateral estoppel are met). 9 ¶ 32 In this case, the concerns underlying the Peppers doctrine are not present because, like the situation in Carioto, the insured here (Gibbs) was not only convicted of crimina

2023Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d at 384 .

12023–2023
Illinois Union Insurance Co. v. Medline Industries, Inc. green
illappct · 2022
2 sentences

2022Nothing in Scheer is inconsistent with the trial court’s ruling in the 3 Application of the Peppers doctrine resulted in the trial court in our case reconsidering, and vacating, its ruling that a genuine issue of material fact precluded entry of judgment on the pleadings. - 26 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210175 instant case.

2022Nothing in Scheer is inconsistent with the trial court’s ruling in the 3 Application of the Peppers doctrine resulted in the trial court in our case reconsidering, and vacating, its ruling that a genuine issue of material fact precluded entry of judgment on the pleadings. - 26 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210175 instant case.

12022–2022

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 15u.s.c.1681 (4) IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 26 (2005–2024) IA 2 (2020–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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