chances doctrine in Michigan

2020“Michigan has long recognized the doctrine of chances, which provides that rare or unusual events that occur frequently in relation to a single person are less likely to have an innocent explanation and more likely to demonstrate the probability of an actus reus.” People v Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1, 12 ; 798 NW2d 738 (2011).

2020“Michigan has long recognized the doctrine of chances, which provides that rare or unusual events that occur frequently in relation to a single person are less likely to have an innocent explanation and more likely to demonstrate the probability of an actus reus.” People v Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1, 12 ; 798 NW2d 738 (2011).

2024The Court distinguished People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), and stated that the doctrine of chances does not require “substantial evidence that the defendant committed the prior act and some ‘special quality’ of the act that tended to prove the defendant’s -4- identity.” Mardlin, 487 Mich at 621 .

2024The Court distinguished People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), and stated that the doctrine of chances does not require “substantial evidence that the defendant committed the prior act and some ‘special quality’ of the act that tended to prove the defendant’s -4- identity.” Mardlin, 487 Mich at 621 .

2024In Crawford, our Supreme Court explained how a defendant’s past conduct could be relevant to proving a defendant’s intent under the doctrine of chances “on the premise that the more often the defendant commits an actus reus, the less is the likelihood that the defendant acted accidentally or innocently.” Id. at 393 (quotation marks and citation omitted.) When other-acts evidence is submitted under this theory of relevance, “[t]he intermediate inference is an objective likelihood under the doctrine of chances rather than a subjective probability based on the defendant’s character.” Id. at 394 (

2024In Crawford, our Supreme Court explained how a defendant’s past conduct could be relevant to proving a defendant’s intent under the doctrine of chances “on the premise that the more often the defendant commits an actus reus, the less is the likelihood that the defendant acted accidentally or innocently.” Id. at 393 (quotation marks and citation omitted.) When other-acts evidence is submitted under this theory of relevance, “[t]he intermediate inference is an objective likelihood under the doctrine of chances rather than a subjective probability based on the defendant’s character.” Id. at 394 (

2022That is not an accurate statement of the law; as this Court has explained, the “mere fact that a judge ruled against a litigant, even if the rulings are later determined to be erroneous, is not sufficient to require disqualification or reassignment.” See In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009).

2022That is not an accurate statement of the law; as this Court has explained, the “mere fact that a judge ruled against a litigant, even if the rulings are later determined to be erroneous, is not sufficient to require disqualification or reassignment.” See In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009).

2019See Mardlin, 487 Mich at 616-617, 625 ; Kelly, 317 Mich App at 646 -647 & n 4; see also Bourjaily v United States, 483 US 171, 179-180 ; 107 S Ct 2775 ; 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987) (“[I]ndividual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it.

2018Unger, 278 Mich App at 236 .

2011Moreover, we note that Helzer’s concern regarding the high potential for automatic conviction if the same jury is allowed to hear both charges—and in the process hear evidence of a defendant’s history of sexual misconduct—is not very compelling when such evidence can be, and often is, admitted anyway under the Michigan Rules of 21 Helzer, 404 Mich at 423 . 9 Evidence or the doctrine of chances.

2011Thus, because this evidence is likely otherwise admissible for proper purposes under MRE 404(b) or the doctrine of chances, the Helzer Court’s concern about unfair prejudice from trying the charges before a single jury is significantly diminished. 24 People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 237 ; 769 NW2d 605 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 25 Helzer, 404 Mich at 423-424 . 11 juries are presumed to follow the instructions of a trial court,26 and thus trial courts have the responsibility to ensure that juries are fully informed about the applicable law and the necessary, responsible deli

2011Thus, because this evidence is likely otherwise admissible for proper purposes under MRE 404(b) or the doctrine of chances, the Helzer Court’s concern about unfair prejudice from trying the charges before a single jury is significantly diminished. 24 People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 237 ; 769 NW2d 605 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 25 Helzer, 404 Mich at 423-424 . 11 juries are presumed to follow the instructions of a trial court,26 and thus trial courts have the responsibility to ensure that juries are fully informed about the applicable law and the necessary, responsible deli

2011Thus, because this evidence is likely otherwise admissible for proper purposes under MRE 404(b) or the doctrine of chances, the Helzer Court’s concern about unfair prejudice from trying the charges before a single jury is significantly diminished. 24 People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 237 ; 769 NW2d 605 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 25 Helzer, 404 Mich at 423-424 . 11 juries are presumed to follow the instructions of a trial court,26 and thus trial courts have the responsibility to ensure that juries are fully informed about the applicable law and the necessary, responsible deli

2010Thus, the proponent of other acts evidence does not necessarily ask “the trier of fact to infer the defendant’s conduct . . . from the defendant’s personal, subjective character.”18 Instead, the proponent may properly ask the trier of fact 16 Id. at 135. 17 United States v York, 933 F2d 1343, 1350 (CA 7, 1991), cert den 502 US 916 (1991). 18 Crawford, 458 Mich at 393 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 9 “whether the uncharged incidents are so numerous that it is objectively improbable that so many accidents would befall the accused.”19 This Court addressed the doctrine of chances in Peopl

1970He should, whenever the testimonial record so connects with the time of writing that he may safely do *241 so, place himself in the position of the deceased grantor or grantors and, standing there, examine together and as one the writing and the physical characteristics of that which the writing was intended to affect.” The rule stated in Bumrell was written first in our state for Dakin v. Dakin (1893), 97 Mich 284, 292 .