chances doctrine in Texas

2018The doctrine of chances is “‘the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element [i.e. innocent intent] cannot explain them all.’” Sifuentes v. State, 494 S.W.3d 806, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex. Crim.

2016The relevance of extraneous offenses to show intent is derived from the “doctrine of chances,” which concerns “the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element [i.e. innocent intent] cannot explain them all.” Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (quoting 2 John H.

2023The evidence was also admissible for the noncharacter-conformity purpose of showing 18 Appellant’s modus operandi under the “doctrine of chances.” See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 348 .

2022Similarity is crucial to the doctrine of chances.[ 5 ] The admissibility of evidence under the doctrine of chances depends on a showing of “highly unusual events [that] are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.” In [De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Crim.

2025“When the defendant’s intent to commit the offense charged is at issue, the relevance of an extraneous offense derives from the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 317 (“[T]he ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance,” and that

2024See Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (stating that defensive theory putting consent in issue in prosecution for sexual assault necessarily also puts in issue defendant’s requisite mental state for offense and that “[w]hen the defendant’s intent to commit 21 the offense charged is at issue, the relevance of an extraneous offense derives from the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain

2022The repetitions of these “highly unlikely 5 The “doctrine of chances” is defined as “the principle that evidence of the repetition of similar unusual events over time demonstrate a decreasing probability that those unusual events occurred by chance.” Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim.

2022The doctrine of chances is “the principle that evidence of the repetition of similar unusual events over time demonstrate a decreasing probability that those unusual events occurred by chance.” Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim.

2013But cf. Stephenson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (holding that when State presented no evidence to connect defendant to crime other than complainant‘s identification of defendant as perpetrator, wrongful exclusion of defense expert pertaining to reliability of eyewitness identification of suspect was harmful); Fox v. State, 115 S.W.3d 550, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref‘d) (holding as harmful the exclusion of evidence that supported defense‘s theory under doctrine of chances when State‘s case relied solely on complainant‘s allegation of se

2011That is the ultimate damning proof for this defendant. 16 identification of suspect was harmful); Fox v. State, 115 S.W.3d 550, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref‘d) (holding as harmful under rule 44.2(b) the exclusion of evidence that supported defense‘s theory under doctrine of chances when State‘s case boiled down to complainant‘s allegation of sexual abuse, inconclusive physical evidence, and weak circumstantial evidence); see also Reed v. State, No. 02-02-0055-CR, 2003 WL 1894581 , at *7 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Apr. 17, 2003, pet. ref‘d) (op. on reh‘g) (not designated for p

2023Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881 . “[E]vidence of a remarkably similar act might be admissible to prove the corpus delicti (the crime itself), intent, or lack of consent under the ‘doctrine of chances.’” Id. (quoting Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444 , 452 n.18 (Tex. Crim.

2023Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881 . “[E]vidence of a remarkably similar act might be admissible to prove the corpus delicti (the crime itself), intent, or lack of consent under the ‘doctrine of chances.’” Id. (quoting Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444 , 452 n.18 (Tex. Crim.

2016See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347 (“Under the ‘doctrine of chances,’ evidence of such a highly unlikely event being repeated three different times would allow jurors to conclude that it is objectively unlikely that appellant was correct . . . .”); see also Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256 , 268 n.10 (Tex. Crim.

2008Relying on the doctrine of chances, the common law rule under which an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in only one instance, but that the more often similar unusual instances occur with similar results, the less likely the abnormal element is likely *741 to be the true explanation for them; see Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. Crim.App.2002) (Cochran, J., concurring); appellant argued that Gamble’s convictions for robberies one day before and twenty-two days after the offense-at-issue led to the likely conclusion that Gamble was the true perpetrator.

2020See Cantrell v. State, 731 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987)(“[W]here the material issue addressed is the defendant's intent to commit the offense charged, the relevancy of the extraneous offense derives purely from the point of view of the 3 While the State argues the assault convictions were admissible under TEX.R.EVID. 609 and Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), we find they were admissible under TEX.R.EVID. 404(b) which renders the Theus balancing analysis unnecessary. 16 doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element o

2015See Scott v. State, 720 S.W.2d 264, 266-267 (Tex. App. Austin 1986) and Cantrell v. State, 731 S.W.2d 84, 90-91 (Tex. Crim.

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character."); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances," the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remot

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character.”); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir.1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances,” the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remote

2005This is derived from the doctrine of chances--"it is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that gives the extraneous offense probative weight." Brown v. State , 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Rickerson , 138 S.W.3d at 531 ("it is the mere repetition of instances, and not their system or scheme, that satisfies our logical demand") (quoting Plante v. State , 692 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Tex. Crim.

2005This is derived from the doctrine of chances—“it is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that gives the extraneous offense probative weight.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Rickerson, 138 S.W.3d at 531 (“it is the mere repetition of instances, and not their system or scheme, that satisfies our logical demand”) (quoting Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Tex. Crim.

2021Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 745 (Tex. Crim.

2015Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 745 (Tex. Crim.

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character."); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances," the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remot

2008See Powell, 63 S.W.3d at 438 ; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). 9 The State also argues that the extraneous-offense evidence was admissible as substantive evidence of appellant’s guilt under the “doctrine of chances.” See, e.g., Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 880-81 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007); Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 265-69 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002) (Cochran, J., concurring in the judgment).

2018The doctrine of chances is “‘the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element [i.e. innocent intent] cannot explain them all.’” Sifuentes v. State, 494 S.W.3d 806, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex. Crim.

2016The relevance of extraneous offenses to show intent is derived from the “doctrine of chances.” Sifuentes v. State, —S.W.3d—, 2016 WL 1128175, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] March 22, 2016, no pet.).

1991The State, citing Scott v. State, 720 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.App.—Austin 1986, no pet.), asserts that the admitted extraneous transactions derive their relevancy from the doctrine of chances, or in other words, that logical inference(s) may be drawn from repeated conduct.

1989This rationale is referred to as the “doctrine of chances.” See Cantrell, 731 *886 S.W.2d at 90; Scott v. State, 720 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.App.—Austin 1986, pet. ref d).

2003Clark v. State , 726 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Crim.

2003Clark v. State , 726 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Crim.

2018In Jones v. State, 568 S.W.2d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim.

2018In Jones v. State, 568 S.W.2d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Flares, 319 S.W.3d at 703 (stating that the magistrate could have reasonably drawn an inference that marijuana residue found in a garbage can at the residence in question originated with that residence because “under the ‘doctrine of chances,’ it was objectively unlikely that a person or persons unconnected to the ... residence would have placed marihuana in that residence’s garbage can twice within a five-day period”). 2 Further, Marlin had previous arrests in Texas and Louisiana for various offenses, including narcotics possession, and another officer told the affiant that in 2009, Marli

2013It doesn‘t tie him to any sort of drugs, any sort of illegal activity.‖ 6 See Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 703 (stating that the magistrate could have reasonably drawn an inference that marijuana residue found in a garbage can at the residence in question originated with that residence because ―under the ‗doctrine of chances,‘ it was objectively unlikely that a person or persons unconnected to the . . . residence would have placed mari[j]uana in that residence‘s garbage can twice within a five-day period‖).2 Further, Marlin had previous arrests in Texas and Louisiana for various offenses, including n

2025“When the defendant’s intent to commit the offense charged is at issue, the relevance of an extraneous offense derives from the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 317 (“[T]he ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance,” and that

2018“When the defendant’s intent to commit the offense charged is at issue, the relevance of an extraneous offense derives from the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see also Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. Crim.

2010This presents a very close case, but keeping in mind the deference that is due the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, we conclude that the affidavit gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause to search the premises for marihuana.” Id. at 316-17 (citation omitted). 6 We granted Flores’s petition for discretionary review in order to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the magistrate who issued the search warrant for Flores’s residence had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search that res

2010This presents a very close case, but keeping in mind the deference that is due the magistrate's determination of probable cause, we conclude that the affidavit gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause to search the premises for marihuana." Id. at 316-17 (citation omitted). [6] We granted Flores's petition for discretionary review in order to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the magistrate who issued the search warrant for Flores's residence had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search that r

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character."); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances," the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remot

2008See Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) ("What must be shown to make the evidence of the extraneous crime admissible is something that sets it apart from its class or type of crime in general, and marks it distinctively in the same manner as the principal crime."). .

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character."); United States v. Woods , 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances," the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remo

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character.”); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir.1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances,” the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remote

2023Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881 . “[E]vidence of a remarkably similar act might be admissible to prove the corpus delicti (the crime itself), intent, or lack of consent under the ‘doctrine of chances.’” Id. (quoting Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444 , 452 n.18 (Tex. Crim.

2021We have recently noted that “evidence of a remarkably similar act might be admissible to prove the corpus delicti (the crime itself), intent, or lack of consent under ‘the doctrine of chances.’” Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444 , 453 n.18 (Tex. Crim.

2018App. 2010), the Court held that a 22 magistrate could reasonably conclude an anonymous informant had some familiarity with the defendant based on corroborating evidence and the “doctrine of chances.” See also Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 359–60 (tip from first-time confidential informant was not reliable where there was no detail or corroboration).  Personal knowledge.

2018App. 2010), the Court held that a 22 magistrate could reasonably conclude an anonymous informant had some familiarity with the defendant based on corroborating evidence and the “doctrine of chances.” See also Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 359–60 (tip from first-time confidential informant was not reliable where there was no detail or corroboration).  Personal knowledge.

2013But cf. Stephenson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (holding that when State presented no evidence to connect defendant to crime other than complainant‘s identification of defendant as perpetrator, wrongful exclusion of defense expert pertaining to reliability of eyewitness identification of suspect was harmful); Fox v. State, 115 S.W.3d 550, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref‘d) (holding as harmful the exclusion of evidence that supported defense‘s theory under doctrine of chances when State‘s case relied solely on complainant‘s allegation of se

2011Thus, while H.G.’s testimony that her father had sexually abused her was no doubt important to the State’s case, the State also relied on other testimony and scientific evidence to establish that Green had sexually assaulted H.G. [5] Cf. Stephenson v. State , 226 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (holding that when State presented no evidence tying defendant to crime other than complainant’s identification of defendant as perpetrator, wrongful exclusion of defense expert testimony pertaining to reliability of eyewitness identification of suspect was harmful); Fox v. State , 11

2004Without formulating any accurate test and without attempting by numerous instances to secure absolute certainty of inference, the mind applies this rough and instinctive process of reasoning namely that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in one instant [sic], but that the oftener [sic] similar instances occur with similar results, the less likely is the abnormal element likely, to be the true explanation of them.'" Wiggins v. State , 778 S.W.2d 877, 885 (Tex. App--Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd) citing Cantrell v. State , 731 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tex. Crim.

2002Cantrell v. State, 731 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Wiggins, 778 S.W.2d at 885 .

2021When evidence of 6 an extraneous offense is offered to show intent, its relevance derives from the so-called “doctrine of chances,” which “tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347–48; Sandoval v. State, 409 S.W.3d 259, 300 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).

2021This evidence rebutted Appellant’s claim that he was innocent and had never acted in an unprofessional manner as a masseur. 11 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that this evidence was admissible either (1) to rebut Appellant’s defensive theory that K.B. was asleep and unaware of what actually occurred during her massage or (2) for the noncharacter-conformity purpose of showing modus operandi under the “doctrine of chances.” See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 348 ; see also Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. Crim.