46 Oregon opinions name it 4 courts 1980–2023 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnsgreen2 sentences2022Although we do not read Baughman or its progeny as requiring a court to make an OEC 404(4) finding after determining that the other acts evidence is relevant and admissible under the OEC 404(3) and OEC 403 step, in light of the sea change to the analysis of other acts evidence presented by State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021), we anticipate more call for courts to make both OEC 404(3) and OEC 404(4) findings. 4 In State v. Johns, the court specifically considered whether other acts evidence was admissible for a noncharacter purpose of demonstrating intent through the “doctrine 2022Although we do not read Baughman or its progeny as requiring a court to make an OEC 404(4) finding after determining that the other acts evidence is relevant and admissible under the OEC 404(3) and OEC 403 step, in light of the sea change to the analysis of other acts evidence presented by State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021), we anticipate more call for courts to make both OEC 404(3) and OEC 404(4) findings. 4 In State v. Johns, the court specifically considered whether other acts evidence was admissible for a noncharacter purpose of demonstrating intent through the “doctrine | 5 | 22 |
State v. Turnidgegreen2 sentences2018But more recently, in State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364 , 436, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), the court clarified that such analysis is limited to determining the admissibility of other-acts evidence on other grounds, namely the doctrine of chances. 2018But more recently, in State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364 , 436, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), the court clarified that such analysis is limited to determining the admissibility of other-acts evidence on other grounds, namely the doctrine of chances. | 4 | 9 |
State v. Skillicorngreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Skillicorn, 367 Or at 476 (explaining that prior bad acts evidence may not be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general propensity to engage in misconduct or a spe- cific propensity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and, therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the charged crime”); id. at 473 (noting that prior bad acts evidence cannot “be admitted under the doctrine of chances for the purpose of arguing that, because the defendant engaged in delib- erate conduct before, it is likely that he engaged in it again during the charged incident”) 2023See, e.g., Skillicorn, 367 Or at 476 (explaining that prior bad acts evidence may not be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general propensity to engage in misconduct or a spe- cific propensity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and, therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the charged crime”); id. at 473 (noting that prior bad acts evidence cannot “be admitted under the doctrine of chances for the purpose of arguing that, because the defendant engaged in delib- erate conduct before, it is likely that he engaged in it again during the charged incident”) | 3 | 9 |
State v. Tenagreen2 sentences2020See State v. Tena, 362 Or 514, 524-25 , 412 P3d 175 (2018) (with regard to “the doctrine of chances” under OEC 404(3) and Johns to prove absence of mistake or accident, the admissibility of the evidence depends on “the proposition that multiple instances of similar conduct are unlikely to of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 3 A Leistiko instruction directs the jury to only consider the other acts evi- dence on the issue of intent, or absence of mistake or accident, and only if it first finds that the defendant committed th 2020See State v. Tena, 362 Or 514, 524-25 , 412 P3d 175 (2018) (with regard to “the doctrine of chances” under OEC 404(3) and Johns to prove absence of mistake or accident, the admissibility of the evidence depends on “the proposition that multiple instances of similar conduct are unlikely to of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 3 A Leistiko instruction directs the jury to only consider the other acts evi- dence on the issue of intent, or absence of mistake or accident, and only if it first finds that the defendant committed th | 3 | 6 |
State v. Tenagreen2 sentences2017Thus, contrary to defendant’s argument, we reiterate our conclusion in State v. Tena, 281 Or App 57, 71 , 384 P3d 521 (2016), that, “[i]n the present case, the trial court held that the evidence was admissible * * * to show defendant’s ‘hostile motive,”’ and, because “[t]hat theory of admissibility did not rely on the doctrine of chances,” Johns does not apply. 5 We still must determine whether the evidence of the two incidents that the state offered as prior acts evidence was, in fact, properly admitted to show defendant’s hostile motive. 2017Thus, contrary to defendant’s argument, we reiterate our conclusion in State v. Tena, 281 Or App 57, 71 , 384 P3d 521 (2016), that, “[i]n the present case, the trial court held that the evidence was admissible * * * to show defendant’s ‘hostile motive,”’ and, because “[t]hat theory of admissibility did not rely on the doctrine of chances,” Johns does not apply. 5 We still must determine whether the evidence of the two incidents that the state offered as prior acts evidence was, in fact, properly admitted to show defendant’s hostile motive. | 3 | 5 |
State v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Skillicorn, 367 Or at 476 (explaining that prior bad acts evidence may not be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general propensity to engage in misconduct or a spe- cific propensity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and, therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the charged crime”); id. at 473 (noting that prior bad acts evidence cannot “be admitted under the doctrine of chances for the purpose of arguing that, because the defendant engaged in delib- erate conduct before, it is likely that he engaged in it again during the charged incident”) 2023See, e.g., Skillicorn, 367 Or at 476 (explaining that prior bad acts evidence may not be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general propensity to engage in misconduct or a spe- cific propensity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and, therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the charged crime”); id. at 473 (noting that prior bad acts evidence cannot “be admitted under the doctrine of chances for the purpose of arguing that, because the defendant engaged in delib- erate conduct before, it is likely that he engaged in it again during the charged incident”) | 3 | 3 |
State v. Leistikogreen2 sentences2021The court next addressed the doctrine of chances in State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172 , 282 P3d 857 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 352 Or 622 , 292 P3d 522 (2012). 2021The court next addressed the doctrine of chances in State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172 , 282 P3d 857 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 352 Or 622 , 292 P3d 522 (2012). | 2 | 5 |
State v. Clarkegreen2 sentences2017Moen, 309 Or at 68 ; see also Turnidge, 359 Or at 437 (evidence of motive tends to show that the defendant acted intentionally, in the sense that the defendant “acted ‘with a conscious objective to cause the result or engage in the conduct so described’” (quoting ORS 161.085(7)); State v. Woods, 284 Or App 559, 562-63 , 393 P3d 1188 (2017) (evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct against victim admissible to show sexual predisposition and need not be justified by the doctrine of chances); State v. Clarke, 279 Or App 373, 385 , 379 P3d 674 (2016) (evidence that the defendant threatened the v 2017Moen, 309 Or at 68 ; see also Turnidge, 359 Or at 437 (evidence of motive tends to show that the defendant acted intentionally, in the sense that the defendant “acted ‘with a conscious objective to cause the result or engage in the conduct so described’” (quoting ORS 161.085(7)); State v. Woods, 284 Or App 559, 562-63 , 393 P3d 1188 (2017) (evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct against victim admissible to show sexual predisposition and need not be justified by the doctrine of chances); State v. Clarke, 279 Or App 373, 385 , 379 P3d 674 (2016) (evidence that the defendant threatened the v | 2 | 3 |
State v. Carreirogreen2 sentences2008Johns, 301 Or at 552-55 ; see also State v. Carreiro, 185 Or App 19, 23-24 , 57 P3d 910 (2002) (discussing case law concerning the doctrine of chances); State v. Johnstone, 172 Or App 559, 567 , 19 P3d 966 (2001) (quoting part of Johns’s description of the doctrine of chances and noting that “[t]hus, under Johns, evidence of other bad acts can be used under some circumstances to demonstrate that a defendant acted with the requisite intent on one occasion because he had done so on other occasions”); State v. Wieland, 131 Or App 582, 587 , 887 P2d 368 (1994) (“We read Johns as accepting [the doc 2008Johns, 301 Or at 552-55 ; see also State v. Carreiro, 185 Or App 19, 23-24 , 57 P3d 910 (2002) (discussing case law concerning the doctrine of chances); State v. Johnstone, 172 Or App 559, 567 , 19 P3d 966 (2001) (quoting part of Johns’s description of the doctrine of chances and noting that “[t]hus, under Johns, evidence of other bad acts can be used under some circumstances to demonstrate that a defendant acted with the requisite intent on one occasion because he had done so on other occasions”); State v. Wieland, 131 Or App 582, 587 , 887 P2d 368 (1994) (“We read Johns as accepting [the doc | 2 | 2 |
State v. Baughmangreen2 sentences2021This court held 722 State v. Jackson that A’s testimony could not be used to prove the defendant’s intent to abuse B under the doctrine of chances because the “defendant did not raise mistake or inadvertence as a defense.” Id. at 407 . 2019Admissibility under doctrine of chances The doctrine of chances rests on the "proposition that multiple instances of similar conduct are unlikely to occur *622 accidentally." Baughman , 361 Or. at 407 , 393 P.3d 1132 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2021On the same day that it decided Johns, the court decided another case based on the doctrine of chances, Cite as 368 Or 705 (2021) 721 State v. Allen, 301 Or 569 , 725 P2d 331 (1986). 2021On the same day that it decided Johns, the court decided another case based on the doctrine of chances, Cite as 368 Or 705 (2021) 721 State v. Allen, 301 Or 569 , 725 P2d 331 (1986). | 1 | 3 |
Green v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364, 435 , 374 P3d 853 (2016), cert den, _ US _, 137 S Ct 665 (2017) CTurnidge) (“[T]he particular analytical framework outlined in [Johns] was specifically fashioned to determine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence offered to prove a defendant’s ‘intent or absence of mistake’ under the theory of the doctrine of chances [.] ”). 2017State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364, 435 , 374 P3d 853 (2016), cert den, _US_, 137 S Ct 665 (2017) (Turnidge) (explaining that evidence offered to prove intent on a doctrine-of-chances theory must satisfy the multi-factor Johns test); see also State v. Tena, 281 Or App 57 , 65 n 4, 384 P3d 521 (2016), rev allowed, 360 Or 752 (2017) (noting that the doctrine of chances supports the admission of other acts evidence only when the other acts and charged acts are similar and claimed to have been the result of an accident or mistake). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wielandgreen2 sentences2008Johns, 301 Or at 552-55 ; see also State v. Carreiro, 185 Or App 19, 23-24 , 57 P3d 910 (2002) (discussing case law concerning the doctrine of chances); State v. Johnstone, 172 Or App 559, 567 , 19 P3d 966 (2001) (quoting part of Johns’s description of the doctrine of chances and noting that “[t]hus, under Johns, evidence of other bad acts can be used under some circumstances to demonstrate that a defendant acted with the requisite intent on one occasion because he had done so on other occasions”); State v. Wieland, 131 Or App 582, 587 , 887 P2d 368 (1994) (“We read Johns as accepting [the doc 2008Johns, 301 Or at 552-55 ; see also State v. Carreiro, 185 Or App 19, 23-24 , 57 P3d 910 (2002) (discussing case law concerning the doctrine of chances); State v. Johnstone, 172 Or App 559, 567 , 19 P3d 966 (2001) (quoting part of Johns’s description of the doctrine of chances and noting that “[t]hus, under Johns, evidence of other bad acts can be used under some circumstances to demonstrate that a defendant acted with the requisite intent on one occasion because he had done so on other occasions”); State v. Wieland, 131 Or App 582, 587 , 887 P2d 368 (1994) (“We read Johns as accepting [the doc | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ciancanelligreen1 sentence2021See Ciancanelli, 339 Or at 290 (“Many decisions of this court serve as precedent in later decisions. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2019See *676 State v. Jones , 285 Or. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2018Even assuming that the facts here presented the type of situation in which evidence of lack of mistake could be admissible on any of the charges, see State v. Tena , 362 Or. 514 , 524-25, 412 P.3d 175 (2018) (theory of relevance based on lack of mistake under the doctrine of chances "does not apply when there is a dispute about whether the defendant performed the [charged] act"), the evidence that Express merchandise and a receipt were present in the car was not sufficiently similar to evidence of the charged conduct relating to the AF and AK theft and robbery. 2 See State v. Davis , 279 Or. 2018App. 223 , 234, 381 P.3d 888 (2016) ("Even where the prior act and the charged conduct involve similar kinds of bad conduct *** the similarities between the physical elements must outweigh the differences."). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Turnidgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jurygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnsgreen2 sentences2022Although we do not read Baughman or its progeny as requiring a court to make an OEC 404(4) finding after determining that the other acts evidence is relevant and admissible under the OEC 404(3) and OEC 403 step, in light of the sea change to the analysis of other acts evidence presented by State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021), we anticipate more call for courts to make both OEC 404(3) and OEC 404(4) findings. 4 In State v. Johns, the court specifically considered whether other acts evidence was admissible for a noncharacter purpose of demonstrating intent through the “doctrine 2022Although we do not read Baughman or its progeny as requiring a court to make an OEC 404(4) finding after determining that the other acts evidence is relevant and admissible under the OEC 404(3) and OEC 403 step, in light of the sea change to the analysis of other acts evidence presented by State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021), we anticipate more call for courts to make both OEC 404(3) and OEC 404(4) findings. 4 In State v. Johns, the court specifically considered whether other acts evidence was admissible for a noncharacter purpose of demonstrating intent through the “doctrine | 1 | 22 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2023See, e.g., Skillicorn, 367 Or at 476 (explaining that prior bad acts evidence may not be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general propensity to engage in misconduct or a spe- cific propensity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and, therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the charged crime”); id. at 473 (noting that prior bad acts evidence cannot “be admitted under the doctrine of chances for the purpose of arguing that, because the defendant engaged in delib- erate conduct before, it is likely that he engaged in it again during the charged incident”) 2023See, e.g., Skillicorn, 367 Or at 476 (explaining that prior bad acts evidence may not be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general propensity to engage in misconduct or a spe- cific propensity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and, therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the charged crime”); id. at 473 (noting that prior bad acts evidence cannot “be admitted under the doctrine of chances for the purpose of arguing that, because the defendant engaged in delib- erate conduct before, it is likely that he engaged in it again during the charged incident”) | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1982Again, the factors from which Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), directs us to derive the requirements of due process — the private interest affected, the chances of error and of its reduction by better procedures, and the countervailing governmental interests — clearly affirm a licensee’s right to the kind of adjudicatory procedures of notice, hearing, and findings based on evidence that, in this state, are provided him under the administrative procedure act; but nothing indicates whether this due process calculus extends also to restricting adverse action t 1982Again, the factors from which Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), directs us to derive the requirements of due process — the private interest affected, the chances of error and of its reduction by better procedures, and the countervailing governmental interests — clearly affirm a licensee’s right to the kind of adjudicatory procedures of notice, hearing, and findings based on evidence that, in this state, are provided him under the administrative procedure act; but nothing indicates whether this due process calculus extends also to restricting adverse action t | 2 | 1980–1982 |
State v. Sperou
green
2 sentences2022The state concedes that, in light of State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021), the court erred in relying on the doctrine of chances, but it defends at least the latter part of the trial court’s reasoning, namely, that defendant’s reliance on the EED defense made all that evi- dence of marital strife relevant and admissible. “[O]ur review of a trial court’s ruling is limited to the record as it had developed at the time of the ruling; we do not evaluate a court’s pretrial decision with the benefit of hindsight by, for example, taking into account what hap- pened at trial.” State v. 2022The state concedes that, in light of State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021), the court erred in relying on the doctrine of chances, but it defends at least the latter part of the trial court’s reasoning, namely, that defendant’s reliance on the EED defense made all that evi- dence of marital strife relevant and admissible. “[O]ur review of a trial court’s ruling is limited to the record as it had developed at the time of the ruling; we do not evaluate a court’s pretrial decision with the benefit of hindsight by, for example, taking into account what hap- pened at trial.” State v. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Skillicorn
green
1 sentence2021The Court of Appeals observed that “[i]t is an understatement to say that the line between propensity and nonpropensity inferences is difficult to discern under Oregon law.” Skillicorn, 297 Or App at 678 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Stockton
green
1 sentence2021Under Williams, propensity evidence needs only to be relevant in the broad sense of OEC 401, not relevant for one of the specific purposes in OEC 404(3), but the state Cite as 310 Or App 116 (2021) 135 has identified no basis for relevance in this case other than hostile motive and the doctrine of chances. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Levasseur
green
1 sentence2021Skillicorn makes clear what Johns did not: Other- acts evidence is not admissible under OEC 404(3) under the doctrine of chances—or any other theory of relevance—to Cite as 309 Or App 745 (2021) 753 allow a party to argue propensity. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Thompson
neutral
1 sentence2021Cite as 315 Or App 817 (2021) 819 Court has issued its decision in Skillicorn, which clarified the OEC 404(3) boundaries for admissibility of other-acts evidence under the doctrine of chances. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
S059191A State v. Leistiko
green
2 sentences2021The court next addressed the doctrine of chances in State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172 , 282 P3d 857 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 352 Or 622 , 292 P3d 522 (2012). 2021The court next addressed the doctrine of chances in State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172 , 282 P3d 857 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 352 Or 622 , 292 P3d 522 (2012). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Mayfield
green
2 sentences2018Mayfield , 302 Or. at 645 , 733 P.2d 438 . 2018Mayfield , 302 Or. at 645 , 733 P.2d 438 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2018App. 51 , 55, 380 P.3d 1023 (2016) (recognizing that Turnidge abrogated cases applying the Johns framework to assess relevance of prior bad acts under theories other than the doctrine of chances). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Moen
green
1 sentence2017Moen, 309 Or at 68 ; see also Turnidge, 359 Or at 437 (evidence of motive tends to show that the defendant acted intentionally, in the sense that the defendant “acted ‘with a conscious objective to cause the result or engage in the conduct so described’” (quoting ORS 161.085(7)); State v. Woods, 284 Or App 559, 562-63 , 393 P3d 1188 (2017) (evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct against victim admissible to show sexual predisposition and need not be justified by the doctrine of chances); State v. Clarke, 279 Or App 373, 385 , 379 P3d 674 (2016) (evidence that the defendant threatened the v | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Woods
green
2 sentences2017Moen, 309 Or at 68 ; see also Turnidge, 359 Or at 437 (evidence of motive tends to show that the defendant acted intentionally, in the sense that the defendant “acted ‘with a conscious objective to cause the result or engage in the conduct so described’” (quoting ORS 161.085(7)); State v. Woods, 284 Or App 559, 562-63 , 393 P3d 1188 (2017) (evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct against victim admissible to show sexual predisposition and need not be justified by the doctrine of chances); State v. Clarke, 279 Or App 373, 385 , 379 P3d 674 (2016) (evidence that the defendant threatened the v 2017Moen, 309 Or at 68 ; see also Turnidge, 359 Or at 437 (evidence of motive tends to show that the defendant acted intentionally, in the sense that the defendant “acted ‘with a conscious objective to cause the result or engage in the conduct so described’” (quoting ORS 161.085(7)); State v. Woods, 284 Or App 559, 562-63 , 393 P3d 1188 (2017) (evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct against victim admissible to show sexual predisposition and need not be justified by the doctrine of chances); State v. Clarke, 279 Or App 373, 385 , 379 P3d 674 (2016) (evidence that the defendant threatened the v | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Wright
green
1 sentence2017Similarly, as the court explained in Wright, 283 Or App at 169-70 , where the state offered evidence of the defendant’s hostile motive towards the complainant to rebut the defendant’s “assert [ion] that he had caused the complainant’s injuries by accident,” the Johns test did not apply, because “the court did not admit the evidence * * * under a doctrine-of-chances theory.” Put another way, the doctrine of chances can only be used to prove a defendant’s intent in the sense of absence of mistake or accident, but a defendant’s absence of mistake or accident can still be proven by nondoctrine-of- | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Bracken
green
2 sentences2016State v. Bracken, 174 Or App 294, 300 , 23 P3d 417 (2001); see also State v. Tena, 281 Or App 57, 70 , 384 P3d 521 (2016) (“[A]s explained in [State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364 , 374 P3d 853 (2016)], the Johns analysis applies whenever the evidence is offered to prove ‘intent,’ specifically in the sense of ‘absence of mistake or accident,’ under the doctrine of chances. 2016State v. Bracken, 174 Or App 294, 300 , 23 P3d 417 (2001); see also State v. Tena, 281 Or App 57, 70 , 384 P3d 521 (2016) (“[A]s explained in [State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364 , 374 P3d 853 (2016)], the Johns analysis applies whenever the evidence is offered to prove ‘intent,’ specifically in the sense of ‘absence of mistake or accident,’ under the doctrine of chances. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Gailey green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Johnstone green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Donnell v. Eastern Oregon State College neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Springfield Education Ass'n v. Springfield School District No. 19 green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Paul R. Soglin v. Joseph F. Kauffman, Etc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.