PennDOT motion in Pennsylvania

2000The court noted that “[f]or purposes of deciding the applicability of the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, it is the cause of the accident — the event that set the accident in motion — that is determinative.” Id. at 842 n. 8. 3 The common pleas court agreed that Rothermel controlled the instant case and granted PennDOT’s motion for summary judgment.

2000The court noted that "[f]or purposes of deciding the applicability of the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, it is the cause of the accident—the event that set the accident in motion—that is determinative." Id. at 842 n. 8. [3] The common pleas court agreed that Rothermel controlled the instant case and granted PennDOT's motion for summary judgment.

2024(Stevens’ Br. at 20.) See DiCola v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 694 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (citing Morrell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 575 A.2d 171 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)).

2024In denying PennDOT’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court appropriately relied on this Court’s decisions in Patton v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 669 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 686 A.2d 1302 (Pa. 1997), and Clark v. Department of Transportation, 962 A.2d 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

2024In denying PennDOT’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court appropriately relied on this Court’s decisions in Patton v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 669 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 686 A.2d 1302 (Pa. 1997), and Clark v. Department of Transportation, 962 A.2d 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

2024In denying PennDOT’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court appropriately relied on this Court’s decisions in Patton v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 669 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 686 A.2d 1302 (Pa. 1997), and Clark v. Department of Transportation, 962 A.2d 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

2020Id. 6 We turn, then, to PennDOT’s challenge to the trial court’s order.

2019Licensee has had no violations since his 2014 conviction, and he has established that he would be prejudiced by a suspension of his operating privilege. 4 This Court’s recent en banc decision in Middaugh v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 196 A.3d 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), resolves PennDOT’s issue here.

2018Id. at 610 .

2017Id. at 493 . 2 In response to PennDOT’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contended that the written notice requirement of the pothole exception should not apply because “what occurred was that [Plaintiff] stepped down off the bus with her left foot and then stepped onto the brick with her right foot twisted which caused her to fall.

2016Concluding that the alleged dangerous conditions of the crosswalk did not overcome PennDOT’s claim of sovereign immunity, we explained that: We find Glenn [v. Horan, 765 A.2d 426 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)] instructive here.

2016Id.

2010Id.

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2009There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found it need not reach the question of prejudice to the licensee since there was no delay attributable to PennDOT in the case. 589 Pa. at 410 n.6, 909 A.2d at 802 n.6 (holding where a licensee appealed notice of suspension for refusing to submit to chemical testing, appeal was transferred on PennDOT’s motion to county where arrest occurred under 42 Pa.C.S. §933(a)(1)(ii), and four years of delay in the transferee court followed before hearing was held, delay was not attributable to PennDOT because the burden never shifted from the moving party/licensee

2005Thereafter, PennDOT sought reconsideration on the basis of a recent decision of this Court in Dunkle v. Middleburg Municipal Authority, 842 A.2d 477 (Pa. Cmwlth.2004) appeal denied, — Pa. -, 860 A.2d 491 (2004).

2005Thereafter, PennDOT sought reconsideration on the basis of a recent decision of this Court in Dunkle v. Middleburg Municipal Authority, 842 A.2d 477 (Pa. Cmwlth.2004) appeal denied, — Pa. -, 860 A.2d 491 (2004).

2004In Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 210, 216 , 772 A.2d 435, 438 (2001), the Supreme Court recently restated the standard for granting summary judgment: “Summary judgment will be entered only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

2004PennDOT based its claim on Buttermore, supra; Republic, supra; and Taylor, supra. PennDOT raised genuine legal issues regarding how the court should interpret the intent behind a release.