TPR hearing in South Carolina

2025Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602 , 613, 582 S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address a statutory TPR ground after concluding clear and convincing evidence supported another ground). of the TPR hearing.

2025Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602 , 613, 582 S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address a statutory TPR ground after concluding clear and convincing evidence supported another ground). of the TPR hearing.

2022Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129 , 140, 538 S.E.2d 285 , 290-91 (Ct. App. 2000) (applying harmless error analysis to cumulative evidence in a TPR case). remained there until the September 28, 2021 TPR hearing—a period of approximately thirty months.

2022Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129 , 140, 538 S.E.2d 285 , 290-91 (Ct. App. 2000) (applying harmless error analysis to cumulative evidence in a TPR case). remained there until the September 28, 2021 TPR hearing—a period of approximately thirty months.

2025See Lee v. Bunch, 373 S.C. 654, 661 , 647 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2007) ("The prejudice that would warrant denial of a motion to amend the pleadings is a lack of notice that a new issue is to be tried and a lack of opportunity to refute it."). 2.

2025See Lee v. Bunch, 373 S.C. 654, 661 , 647 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2007) ("The prejudice that would warrant denial of a motion to amend the pleadings is a lack of notice that a new issue is to be tried and a lack of opportunity to refute it."). 2.

2025See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657 , 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal." (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))). 2 Because we hold clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned statutory TPR ground, we decline to consider whether the remaining ground was met.

2025See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657 , 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal." (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))). 2 Because we hold clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned statutory TPR ground, we decline to consider whether the remaining ground was met.

2020See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96 , 109-10 742 S.E.2d 382, 398-89 (2013) (finding no prejudice when the family court's error did not affect the outcome of the TPR hearing); Wiley, 387 S.C. at 495 , 692 S.E.2d at 563 ("[A] defendant must show both error and resulting prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial.").

2020See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96 , 109-10 742 S.E.2d 382, 398-89 (2013) (finding no prejudice when the family court's error did not affect the outcome of the TPR hearing); Wiley, 387 S.C. at 495 , 692 S.E.2d at 563 ("[A] defendant must show both error and resulting prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial.").

2020See id. at 296 , 547 S.E.2d at 510 (finding the mother willfully failed to support her children notwithstanding her payment on the day of the TPR hearing of $457 toward the $490 arrears).

2020See id. at 296 , 547 S.E.2d at 510 (finding the mother willfully failed to support her children notwithstanding her payment on the day of the TPR hearing of $457 toward the $490 arrears).

2025See Klein, 427 S.C. at 79 , 828 S.E.2d at 776 ("On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de novo.").

2025See Klein, 427 S.C. at 79 , 828 S.E.2d at 776 ("On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de novo.").

2025See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal." (quoting Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417 , 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997))). 3.

2025See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal." (quoting Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417 , 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997))). 3.

2025See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal." (quoting Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417 , 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997))). 3.

2025See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87 , 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal." (quoting Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417 , 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997))). 3.

2025See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657 , 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal." (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))). 2 Because we hold clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned statutory TPR ground, we decline to consider whether the remaining ground was met.

2025See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657 , 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal." (quoting State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))). 2 Because we hold clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned statutory TPR ground, we decline to consider whether the remaining ground was met.

2023See Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 111 , 498 S.E.2d 395, 406 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review."); Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 S.C. 639, 655 , 615 S.E.2d 440, 449 (2005) (finding an objection to the admission of a report was untimely when the objecting party permitted the other side's expert to testify using the report earlier in the proceeding and allowed the other side to reference the report without objection).

2023See Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 111 , 498 S.E.2d 395, 406 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review."); Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 S.C. 639, 655 , 615 S.E.2d 440, 449 (2005) (finding an objection to the admission of a report was untimely when the objecting party permitted the other side's expert to testify using the report earlier in the proceeding and allowed the other side to reference the report without objection).

2023See Hickman v. Hickman, 301 S.C. 455, 457 , 392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding an argument is not preserved for appellate review when it is presented to the court for the first time in a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP).

2023See Hickman v. Hickman, 301 S.C. 455, 457 , 392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding an argument is not preserved for appellate review when it is presented to the court for the first time in a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP).

2023See Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 111 , 498 S.E.2d 395, 406 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review."); Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 S.C. 639, 655 , 615 S.E.2d 440, 449 (2005) (finding an objection to the admission of a report was untimely when the objecting party permitted the other side's expert to testify using the report earlier in the proceeding and allowed the other side to reference the report without objection).

2023See Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 111 , 498 S.E.2d 395, 406 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review."); Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 S.C. 639, 655 , 615 S.E.2d 440, 449 (2005) (finding an objection to the admission of a report was untimely when the objecting party permitted the other side's expert to testify using the report earlier in the proceeding and allowed the other side to reference the report without objection).

2021See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court does not need to address remaining issues when prior issue is dispositive). totality of the circumstances that have occurred since the trial in a permanency planning hearing.6 A permanency planning hearing will allow all parties and Child's guardian ad litem an opportunity to update the family court on what has occurred since the TPR hearing.

2021See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court does not need to address remaining issues when prior issue is dispositive). totality of the circumstances that have occurred since the trial in a permanency planning hearing.6 A permanency planning hearing will allow all parties and Child's guardian ad litem an opportunity to update the family court on what has occurred since the TPR hearing.

2021See Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 375-76 , 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family court] to be preserved for appellate review.").

2021See Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 375-76 , 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family court] to be preserved for appellate review.").

2020See Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 218-19 , 363 S.E.2d 413, 418 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding this court could not determine whether the alleged erroneous exclusion of testimony affected the outcome of the trial because the appellant did not proffer the excluded testimony or show how the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial); Divine v. Robbins, 385 S.C. 23, 42 , 683 S.E.2d 286, 296 (Ct. App. 2009) (providing that this court can "refuse[] to address an issue on appeal when no proffer is made after the family court excludes evidence").

2020See Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 218-19 , 363 S.E.2d 413, 418 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding this court could not determine whether the alleged erroneous exclusion of testimony affected the outcome of the trial because the appellant did not proffer the excluded testimony or show how the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial); Divine v. Robbins, 385 S.C. 23, 42 , 683 S.E.2d 286, 296 (Ct. App. 2009) (providing that this court can "refuse[] to address an issue on appeal when no proffer is made after the family court excludes evidence").

2020See Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 218-19 , 363 S.E.2d 413, 418 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding this court could not determine whether the alleged erroneous exclusion of testimony affected the outcome of the trial because the appellant did not proffer the excluded testimony or show how the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial); Divine v. Robbins, 385 S.C. 23, 42 , 683 S.E.2d 286, 296 (Ct. App. 2009) (providing that this court can "refuse[] to address an issue on appeal when no proffer is made after the family court excludes evidence").

2020See Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 218-19 , 363 S.E.2d 413, 418 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding this court could not determine whether the alleged erroneous exclusion of testimony affected the outcome of the trial because the appellant did not proffer the excluded testimony or show how the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial); Divine v. Robbins, 385 S.C. 23, 42 , 683 S.E.2d 286, 296 (Ct. App. 2009) (providing that this court can "refuse[] to address an issue on appeal when no proffer is made after the family court excludes evidence").

2020See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96 , 109-10 742 S.E.2d 382, 398-89 (2013) (finding no prejudice when the family court's error did not affect the outcome of the TPR hearing); Wiley, 387 S.C. at 495 , 692 S.E.2d at 563 ("[A] defendant must show both error and resulting prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial.").

2020See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96 , 109-10 742 S.E.2d 382, 398-89 (2013) (finding no prejudice when the family court's error did not affect the outcome of the TPR hearing); Wiley, 387 S.C. at 495 , 692 S.E.2d at 563 ("[A] defendant must show both error and resulting prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial.").

2020See State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 34 , 615 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure[,] which should be taken only where an incident is so grievous that prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.").

2020See State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 34 , 615 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure[,] which should be taken only where an incident is so grievous that prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.").

2019This court expressly stated in South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Cameron N.F.L., 403 S.C. 323, 331 , 742 S.E.2d 697, 701 (Ct. App. 2013), that it did not "believe DSS must identify a pre[]adoptive home prior" to granting TPR.

2019This court expressly stated in South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Cameron N.F.L., 403 S.C. 323, 331 , 742 S.E.2d 697, 701 (Ct. App. 2013), that it did not "believe DSS must identify a pre[]adoptive home prior" to granting TPR.

2019"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo." Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414 , 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).

2019"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo." Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414 , 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).

2018Because DSS never identified Mother's prescription drug use as an issue that needed to be remedied prior to the TPR hearing, her use of prescription medicine cannot serve as a basis to find she failed to remedy the conditions causing removal. 2 See McCutcheon, 302 S.C. at 343 , 396 S.E.2d at 118 ("First, DSS must identify the condition that led to the removal of the child."). 1 Mother was pregnant with Child when she tested positive for marijuana in February 2016, and DSS initially initiated an action concerning Child's sister.

2018Because DSS never identified Mother's prescription drug use as an issue that needed to be remedied prior to the TPR hearing, her use of prescription medicine cannot serve as a basis to find she failed to remedy the conditions causing removal. 2 See McCutcheon, 302 S.C. at 343 , 396 S.E.2d at 118 ("First, DSS must identify the condition that led to the removal of the child."). 1 Mother was pregnant with Child when she tested positive for marijuana in February 2016, and DSS initially initiated an action concerning Child's sister.

2017Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 107 , 536 S.E.2d 372, 374 (2000).

2017Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 107 , 536 S.E.2d 372, 374 (2000).

2017See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385 , 709 S.E.2d at 651-52 (explaining that although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony).

2017See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385 , 709 S.E.2d at 651-52 (explaining that although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony).

2015Servs. v. Bowes, 313 S.C. 188, 193 , 437 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1993) (finding it was error to rely on a finding of abuse in the removal order at a TPR hearing because "[i]n a removal action, as opposed to a termination proceeding, abuse need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence"), superseded on other grounds by statute, S.C.

2015Servs. v. Bowes, 313 S.C. 188, 193 , 437 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1993) (finding it was error to rely on a finding of abuse in the removal order at a TPR hearing because "[i]n a removal action, as opposed to a termination proceeding, abuse need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence"), superseded on other grounds by statute, S.C.

2014See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) ("Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.").

2014See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) ("Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.").

2014See id.

2014See id.

2014"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo." Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451 , 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014).

2014"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo." Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451 , 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014).