TPR hearing in District of Columbia

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2016Cf. In re L.L., 653 A.2d at 875 (permitting appeal from the denial of a TPR motion).

2016Cf. In re L.L., 653 A.2d at 875 (permitting appeal from the denial of a TPR motion).

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2015Continuity of care, stability and permanence of home environment, physical, mental and emotional health, interactions and relationships, and the child’s judgment on the ultimate question all focus on fitness.”); see also Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d at 1178 (explaining that the TPR factors, "as applied to the natural parent ... are of central concern” in evaluating the meaning of parental "fitness”) (Ferren, J., concurring); In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d at 303 n. 32 ("[Pjarental fitness, exceptional circumstances, and the child’s best interests considerations are not different and separate analyses.

2015Continuity of care, stability and permanence of home environment, physical, mental and emotional health, interactions and relationships, and the child’s judgment on the ultimate question all focus on fitness.”); see also Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d at 1178 (explaining that the TPR factors, "as applied to the natural parent ... are of central concern” in evaluating the meaning of parental "fitness”) (Ferren, J., concurring); In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d at 303 n. 32 ("[Pjarental fitness, exceptional circumstances, and the child’s best interests considerations are not different and separate analyses.

2019See In re Tw.P. , 756 A.2d at 410 ("evidence ... that the children progressed emotionally and psychologically when they were apart from their natural parents in stable environments like those they enjoyed with their longer-term foster care families" was relevant to TPR analysis).

2019This is D.C.’s lay opinion, unsupported by anything in the record – and, in fact, contradicted by the testimony of a CFSA adoption recruiter at the TPR hearing that K.C. is adoptable and that CFSA would likely have more success placing K.C. in a permanent adoptive home if D.C.’s parental rights were terminated.23 23 See also In re Tw.P., 756 A.2d at 411 (“Because prospective adoptive parents are reluctant to consider an ‘at risk’ adoption, where a natural parent may oppose and contest their adoption efforts, [TPR] is critical to increasing the (continued…) 60 As to (2) the physical, mental, an

2016See In re Karl H., 906 A.2d 898, 902-03 (Md. 2006); accord, In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d 276, 288, 292 (Md. 2013) (rejecting argument that proceedings to terminate a parent’s rights must be stayed when the parent appeals a change in the permanency plan, even though “without a stay of TPR proceedings, the outcome of the parent’s appeal of a change in the permanency plan may be rendered moot”); see also Settlemire v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 898 A.2d 902 , 904- 05 (D.C. 2006) (“In general, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable i

2016See In re Karl H., 906 A.2d 898, 902-03 (Md. 2006); accord, In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d 276, 288, 292 (Md. 2013) (rejecting argument that proceedings to terminate a parent’s rights must be stayed when the parent appeals a change in the permanency plan, even though “without a stay of TPR proceedings, the outcome of the parent’s appeal of a change in the permanency plan may be rendered moot”); see also Settlemire v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 898 A.2d 902 , 904- 05 (D.C. 2006) (“In general, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable i

2016See In re Karl H., 906 A.2d 898, 902-03 (Md. 2006); accord, In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d 276, 288, 292 (Md. 2013) (rejecting argument that proceedings to terminate a parent’s rights must be stayed when the parent appeals a change in the permanency plan, even though “without a stay of TPR proceedings, the outcome of the parent’s appeal of a change in the permanency plan may be rendered moot”); see also Settlemire v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 898 A.2d 902 , 904- 05 (D.C. 2006) (“In general, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable i

2016See In re Karl H., 906 A.2d 898, 902-03 (Md. 2006); accord, In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d 276, 288, 292 (Md. 2013) (rejecting argument that proceedings to terminate a parent’s rights must be stayed when the parent appeals a change in the permanency plan, even though “without a stay of TPR proceedings, the outcome of the parent’s appeal of a change in the permanency plan may be rendered moot”); see also Settlemire v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, 898 A.2d 902 , 904- 05 (D.C. 2006) (“In general, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable i

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002) (termination of parental rights; “Since [father] sat mute at the TPR hearing, we cannot say that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference as to his relationship with his son, where the controlling legal principle is ‘the best interests of the child.’”); In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1234 (D.C.1993) (termination of parental rights; “In that limited sense [described in the opinion, mother’s] refusal to testify in the proceedings may have worked against her, but legitimately so.”); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 847 A.2d 883, 899 (2004) (term

2008See, e.g., Fields v. United States, 793 A.2d 1260, 1265 (D.C.2002) (affirming conviction for contempt based on trial judge’s conclusion that defendant stared at witnesses in attempt to intimidate them at civil protective order hearing). 6 Further, in In re Antj.P., 812 A.2d 965, 970-71 (D.C.2002), which involved a TPR proceeding, this court affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights, where the trial court drew adverse inferences from the father’s failure to testify at the TPR hearing.

2008See, e.g., Fields v. United States, 793 A.2d 1260, 1265 (D.C.2002) (affirming conviction for contempt based on trial judge’s conclusion that defendant stared at witnesses in attempt to intimidate them at civil protective order hearing). 6 Further, in In re Antj.P., 812 A.2d 965, 970-71 (D.C.2002), which involved a TPR proceeding, this court affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights, where the trial court drew adverse inferences from the father’s failure to testify at the TPR hearing.

1995The court discussed at length the statutory factor outlined in D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(2) — “the physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved” — which, as we have noted, requires the trial court to focus “on how well the parent, despite significant problems, can meet the particular needs of the child.” In re D.S., 600 A2d 71, 82 (D.C.1991).

1995The court discussed at length the statutory factor outlined in D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(2)—"the physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved"—which, as we have noted, requires the trial court to focus "on how well the parent, despite significant problems, can meet the particular needs of the child." In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 82 (D.C.1991).

1995I feel compelled, however, to speak to another irrelevancy; notwithstanding our court’s decision in In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230 (D.C.1993), I voice my agreement with the appellant’s argument in the instant case that the GAL, an attorney who “shall in general be charged with the representation of the child’s best interest” (see In re J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186, 191 (D.C.1993) (emphasis added)) should not have had the authority to bring this TPR motion.

1995I feel compelled, however, to speak to another irrelevancy; notwithstanding our court's decision in In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230 (D.C.1993), I voice my agreement with the appellant's argument in the instant case that the GAL, an attorney who "shall in general be charged with the representation of the child's best interest" ( see In re J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186, 191 (D.C.1993) (emphasis added)) should not have had the authority to bring this TPR motion.

2019In re J.G., supra, 831 A.2d at 1001.

2019In re J.G., supra, 831 A.2d at 1001.

2016"Fitness,” rather, is an independent determination of parental "intention and ability over time,” guided not only by application of the TPR factors but also by additional considerations, as needed (with examples given) to resolve the natural parent’s capacity to "care for the child” and protect the child against "undue risk of harm.” Id. 12 .

2016"Fitness,” rather, is an independent determination of parental "intention and ability over time,” guided not only by application of the TPR factors but also by additional considerations, as needed (with examples given) to resolve the natural parent’s capacity to "care for the child” and protect the child against "undue risk of harm.” Id. 12 .

1995The parents maintain that in light of the new developments, this court should not without further proceedings affirm the grant of the TPR motion, citing In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160 (D.C.1990).

1995Although the prospect of adoption is “one factor in the assessment of whether termination of parental rights [is] in [the child]’s best interests,” see id. at 168 , the lack of a prospective adoptive home does not preclude the trial court from granting a TPR motion, see In re AW., supra note 2, 569 A.2d at 172.

2019Regarding (1) the need for continuity of care, the magistrate judge found, based on the testimony of the government experts, that K.C. “was without any sense of stability while in his mother’s care due to her mental health issues,” and 6 See In re A.B., 955 A.2d 161 , 167 (D.C. 2008) (“[T]he trial judge here committed no error by factoring her own observations of [the mother’s] behavior into her evaluation of [the mother’s] mental and emotional health.”). 7 As discussed below, there are two additional factors, related to abandonment of an infant at a hospital and to drug use, which are not rel

2015Accordingly, while “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State,”29 a natural parent’s unfitness may be evidenced by a variety of behaviors, conditions, and circumstances, including but not limited to past or ongoing child abuse, neglect, maltreatment, or abandonment; a failure to maintain contact with, nurture, or support the child; involvement in criminal or other activities that are seriously inimical to a

2015Accordingly, while “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State,”29 a natural parent’s unfitness may be evidenced by a variety of behaviors, conditions, and circumstances, including but not limited to past or ongoing child abuse, neglect, maltreatment, or abandonment; a failure to maintain contact with, nurture, or support the child; involvement in criminal or other activities that are seriously inimical to a

2015A court may grant an adoption petition without the consent of a natural parent if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the consent is being withheld contrary to the best interest of the child.18 Because granting an adoption over a natural parent’s objection necessarily terminates the parent’s rights, the court must weigh the same statutory factors that are considered in a TPR proceeding to decide whether termination is in the child’s best interest.19 The statutory TPR factors relevant to this case are: 16 In re C.L.O, 41 A.3d at 510. 17 Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omi

2015A court may grant an adoption petition without the consent of a natural parent if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the consent is being withheld contrary to the best interest of the child.18 Because granting an adoption over a natural parent’s objection necessarily terminates the parent’s rights, the court must weigh the same statutory factors that are considered in a TPR proceeding to decide whether termination is in the child’s best interest.19 The statutory TPR factors relevant to this case are: 16 In re C.L.O, 41 A.3d at 510. 17 Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omi

2015Continuity of care, stability and permanence of home environment, physical, mental and emotional health, interactions and relationships, and the child’s judgment on the ultimate question all focus on fitness.”); see also Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d at 1178 (explaining that the TPR factors, "as applied to the natural parent ... are of central concern” in evaluating the meaning of parental "fitness”) (Ferren, J., concurring); In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d at 303 n. 32 ("[Pjarental fitness, exceptional circumstances, and the child’s best interests considerations are not different and separate analyses.

2015Continuity of care, stability and permanence of home environment, physical, mental and emotional health, interactions and relationships, and the child’s judgment on the ultimate question all focus on fitness.”); see also Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d at 1178 (explaining that the TPR factors, "as applied to the natural parent ... are of central concern” in evaluating the meaning of parental "fitness”) (Ferren, J., concurring); In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d at 303 n. 32 ("[Pjarental fitness, exceptional circumstances, and the child’s best interests considerations are not different and separate analyses.

1999Ornease law interpreting § 16-2353(a) leaves no doubt, however, that in a TPR hearing and order “ ‘the best interests of the child’ [is] controlling.” In re M.M.M., 485 A.2d 180, 184 (D.C.1984); E.C., supra, 589 A.2d at 1249.

1999Ornease law interpreting § 16-2353(a) leaves no doubt, however, that in a TPR hearing and order “ ‘the best interests of the child’ [is] controlling.” In re M.M.M., 485 A.2d 180, 184 (D.C.1984); E.C., supra, 589 A.2d at 1249.